Strategic entry deterrence : does it constitute a misuse of market power?

A challenge for regulators and the courts has been establishing the boundary between behaviour is exclusionary and should be condemned under s 46 of the then Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) (TPA), now s 46 of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) (CCA), and behaviour that is not exclusionary and might even be pro-competitive. This boundary can be especially difficult to draw in the case of entry deterring strategies. Section 46(1) prohibits corporations with a substantial degree of market power from taking advantage of that market power for one of the statutorily proscribed purposes which include preventing the entry of a person into that or any other market. Section 45(2) separately prohibits corporations from making and giving effect to contracts arrangements and understandings that have the purpose, effect or likely effect of substantially lessening competition in a market. The latest case in which the ACCC has failed to satisfy the s 46 criteria is the decision of Greenwood J in ACCC v Cement Australia Pty Ltd [2013] FCA 909 (Cement Australia case). Final orders were published in a separate judgment, in ACCC v Cement Australia Pty Ltd [2014] FCA 148 (28 February 2014). The case concerned an entry deterring strategy, namely the pre-emptive buying of input factors in an upstream market to protect an incumbent with substantial market power in a downstream market and to prevent new entry in the downstream market. Greenwood J found that while Cement Australia Pty Ltd, formerly known as Queensland Cement Ltd (QCL), had substantial market power, its conduct in entering into the pre-emptive contracts was not a contravention of s 46, because Cement Australia had not “taken advantage” of its market power. However, since Cement Australia’s purpose in entering into the pre-emptive contracts was anti-competitive, they were held to contravene s 45(2) of the TPA. The purpose of this Note is to consider only the reasons for judgment in the Cement Australia case in relation to the “taking advantage” element. The judgment was handed down on 10 September 2013. The final hearing date was 15 July 2011, so it was long-awaited. At 714 pages, it is carefully drafted.

Behaviour v structure : Tribunal’s AGL Energy merger authorisation

Section 95AT of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) (CCA) provides that the Tribunal may grant an authorisation to acquire shares or assets that would otherwise contravene s 50. Section 95AT was inserted by the Trade Practices Legislation Amendment Act 2006 (Cth) and commenced on 1 January 2007. In Application for Authorisation of Macquarie Generation by AGL Energy Limited, (AGL Energy) the Tribunal has for the first time granted AGL Energy Limited (AGL) a conditional authorisation to acquire the assets of Macquarie Generation from the NSW Government.

Competition policy review : draft recommendations on competition laws

On 4 December 2013, the Prime Minister and the Minister for Small Business announced a “root and branch” review of Australia’s competition policy. The Minister for Small Business released the final Terms of Reference for the competition policy review on 27 March 2014, following consultation with the States and Territories, and announced the Review Panel headed by Professor Ian Harper. Under the terms of reference the Competition Policy Review Committee (the Harper Committee) is required to focus on three broad areas: •examining what can be done to create more competition in service areas such as health, education and intellectual property; •considering whether the structure and powers of the competition institutions (the ACCC , the NCC, the Tribunal and the AER) remain appropriate; and •examining the effectiveness of the competition provisions of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) (CCA) and laying down a broad framework through which the law can be streamlined and reformed over time.

Regulating unilateral supermarket misconduct as customer/acquirer of goods and services

Supermarkets in Australia may have substantial market power as buyers in wholesale markets for grocery products. They may also have substantial bargaining power in negotiating contracts with their suppliers of grocery products. The Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) (CCA) regulates misconduct by supermarkets as customer/acquirers in three ways. First, s 46(1) of the CCA prohibits the ‘taking advantage’ of buyer power for the purpose of damaging a competitor, preventing entry or deterring or preventing competitive conduct. Secondly, s 21 of the ACL prohibits unconscionable conduct in business–to–business transactions. Thirdly, Pt IVB of the CCA provides for the promulgation of mandatory and voluntary industry codes of conduct. Since 1 July 2015 the conduct of supermarkets as customer/acquirers has been regulated by the Food and Grocery Industry Code of Conduct. This article examines these three different approaches. It considers them against the background of the misconduct at issue in ACCC v Coles Supermarkets Australia Pty Ltd which the ACCC chose to litigate as an unconscionable conduct case, rather than a misuse of market power case. The article also considers the strengths and weaknesses of each of the three approaches and concludes that while the three approaches address different problems there is scope for overlap and all three should be retained for compete coverage.

Bank guarantees and the reasonable expectations of beneficiaries

A bank guarantee has traditionally been viewed as a cash equivalent. This view is supported by the operation of the autonomy principle. However, the autonomy principle is subject to certain recognised exceptions both at common law and under statute. One of these exceptions is commonly referred to as the negative stipulation or underlying contract exception. In recent times the operation of this particular exception has given rise to a wealth of case law. This article examines whether this recent case law appropriately recognises the reasonable expectations of the beneficiary of a bank guarantee that a bank guarantee should function not only as a security but as a risk allocation device.

Accountability of insurers under s 54: Striking the balance between commerciality and consumer protection

Section 54 of the Insurance Contracts Act 1984 (Cth) continues to occupy a prominent position in insurance-related litigation. This section which imposes a concept of causation, or prejudice to the insurer, to restrict an insurer’s reliance upon contractual terms to avoid liability for particular claims, is often before the courts. This note focuses upon the recent High Court of Australia decision in Maxwell v Highway Hauliers Pty Ltd [2014] HCA 33.

Accountability 30 years on: Insurance Contracts Act Reform

The Insurance Contracts Act 1984 (Cth) since inception has effected major reform to the law in this field. One of Australia’s most frequently cited pieces of legislation, it has had a major impact upon the law and practice of insurance. Given the importance of insurance to domestic and commercial activity and its pivotal position as a mechanism to manage exposure to risk, it is not surprising that this legislation has been the subject of extensive analysis in the courts and in legal literature. Furthermore the Act has, arising out of a 2009 review, been significantly amended by the Insurance Contracts Amendment Act 2013 (Cth). The principal amendments introduced are: two-fold: the Insurance Contracts Act 1984 (Cth) has been amended so that a failure to comply with the duty of good faith is now a breach of the Act; and disclosure and misrepresentation provisions under the Insurance Contracts Act 1984 (Cth) are amended and clarified.

A growing good faith in contracts

The Supreme Court of Canada's ruling in Bhasin v Hrynew represents a significant step forward in harmonising the multiple strands of debate surrounding the existence of a good faith provision in common law contracting. Although a general principle of good faith (derived from Roman Law) is recognized by most civil law systems and a growing number of common law countries have embraced statutory provisions towards this end, Bhasin v Hrynew is argued to be a critical advance in catalysing uniform acceptance of good faith as a fundamental principle essential to support an increasingly integrated global commercial environment.

"Re-thinking" the influence of regulatory capture in the development of government regulation

On 30 March 2015 the Australian Federal Government launched its "Re-Think" initiative with the objective of achieving a better tax system which delivers taxes that are lower, simpler and fairer. The discussion paper released as part of the "Re:think" initiative is designed to start a national conversation on tax reform. However, inquiries into Australia's future tax system, subsequent reforms and the introduction of new taxes are nothing new. Unfortunately, recent history also demonstrates that reform initiatives arising from reviews of the Australian tax system are often deemed a failure. The most prominent of these failures in recent times is the Minerals Resource Rent Tax (MRRT), which lasted a mere 16 months before its announced repeal. Using the established theoretic framework of regulatory capture to interpret publically observable data, the purpose of this article is to explain the failure of this arguably sound tax. It concludes that the MRRT legislation itself, through the capture by the mining companies, provided internal subsidization in the form of reduced tax and minimal or no rents. In doing so, it offers an opportunity to understand and learn from past experiences to ensure that recommendations coming out of the Re:think initiative do not suffer the same fate.

Directors and officers insurance – Recent critical issues in Australia and New Zealand

Directors and Officers Liability Insurance (“D&O insurance”) has grown and evolved rapidly over the past 80 years to assume an important position in most corporations’ corporate governance and risk management strategies. This article focuses upon certain topical matters of particular concern to directors and officers including the availability of defence costs where a D&O policy is subject to a statutory charge; the commercial desirability of stand-alone “A-side” coverage, being the cover provided directly to directors and officers for loss resulting from claims made against them for wrongful acts; the impact of fraud and/or dishonesty upon D&O cover; and disclosure of the nature and extent of D&O cover to the directors and officers themselves and to third parties – in the latter case such access frequently being necessary to determine the economic viability of pursuing a proposed action against a company and its directors and officers.

China’s New Approach to CSR in Congo: Is the leverage turning to China?

China has been the world’s fastest growing economy in the past 30 years with its enterprises rapidly emerging and becoming leading players globally. In particular, the progressive integration into the international system has been spurred by China’s entry into the global trading regime of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001. The 'go global' policy has been facilitating the rapidly growing engagement on the African continent of Chinese multinational companies (MNCs). As a promising tri-polar global economic entity, its growth of relations with Africa has been both unprecedented and impressive. As the Sino-Africa economic and business partnership surges forward, the matter of corporate social responsibility (CSR) is increasingly becoming an imperative ingredient for any successful business. It is noteworthy that responsible corporate citizens should take account of the impact of their investment on both economic and social arenas. However, it still remains uncertain what role Chinese MNCs have been playing in the continent’s sustainable development.
A Sino-Congo deal seems a positive way forward, accelerating the Democratic Republic of Congo’s (hereinafter referred to as Congo) regional economy, depressed due to years of war. Meanwhile, the escalating investment into Congo has raised controversies for its no-attachment policy, with increasing pressure imposed on China’s MNCs to take CSR more seriously. Particular concerns are focused on the multinationals’ inadequate environmental and human rights protection. The recent massive infrastructure investment is arguably perceived as a different interpretation of CSR, which has aroused a hot debate about whether China is heading for status as a responsible stakeholder in the international community. It is conducive to clarifying the paradoxical issue by addressing whether China’s recent approaches have the potential to facilitate CSR initiatives or hinder them in the long run.