Director independence or decision bias? An investigation of alternative sources of agency costs in board decision making

Research into boards traditionally focuses on independent monitoring of management, with studies focused on the effect of board independence on firm performance. This thesis aims to broaden the research tradition by consolidating prior research and investigating how agents may circumvent independent monitoring. Meta-analysis of previous board independence-firm performance studies indicated no systematic relationship between board independence and firm performance. Next, a series of experiments demonstrated that the presentation of recommendations to directors may bias decision making irrespective of other information presented and the independence of the decision maker. Together, results suggest that independence may be less important than the agent's motivation to misdirect the monitoring process.

Governance of enterprise Information and Technology: A new core competency for boards of directors

With the level of digital disruption that is affecting businesses around the globe, you might expect high levels of Governance of Enterprise Information and Technology (GEIT) capability within boards. Boards and their senior executives know technology is important. More than 90% of boards and senior executives currently identify technology as essential to their current businesses, and to their organization’s future. But as few as 16% have sufficient GEIT capability. Global Centre for Digital Business Transformation’s recent research contains strong indicators of the need for change. Despite board awareness of both the likelihood and impact of digital disruption, things digital are still not viewed as a board-level matter in 45% of companies. And, it’s not just the board. The lack of board attention to technology can be mirrored at senior executive level as well. When asked about their organization’s attitude towards digital disruption, 43% of executives said their business either did not recognise it as a priority or was not responding appropriately. A further 32% were taking a “follower” approach, a potentially risky move as we will explain. Given all the evidence that boards know information and technology (I&T***) is vital, that they understand the inevitably, impact and speed of digital change and disruption, why are so many boards dragging their heels? Ignoring I&T disruption and refusing to build capability at board level is nothing short of negligence. Too many boards risk flying blind without GEIT capability [2]. To help build decision quality and I&T governance capability, this research: • Confirms a pressing need to build individual competency and cumulative, across-board capability in governing I&T • Identifies six factors that have rapidly increased the need, risk and urgency • Finds that boards may risk not meeting their duty of care responsibilities when it comes to I&T oversight • Highlights barriers to building capability details three GEIT competencies that boards and executives can use for evaluation, selection, recruitment and professional development.

Leading Digital Transformation: Building Technology and Information Governance Capability in Boards of Directors and the C-Suite

Information and technology and its use in organisation transformation presents unprecedented opportunities and risks. Increasingly, the Governance of Enterprise Information and Technology (GEIT) competency in the board room and executive is needed. Whether your organization is small or large, public, private or not for profit or whether your industry is not considered high-tech, IT is impacting your sector – no exceptions. But there is a skill shortage in boards: GEIT capability is concerningly low. This capability is urgently needed across the board, including those directors who come from finance, legal, marketing, operations and HR backgrounds. Digital disruption also affects all occupations. Putting in place a vision will help ensure emergency responses will meet technology-related duty of care responsibilities. When GEIT-related forward thinking and planning is carried out at the same time that you put your business strategy and plan in place, your organization has a significantly increased chance of not only surviving, but thriving into the future. Those organizations that don’t build GEIT capability risk joining the growing list of once-leading firms left behind in the digital ‘cloud of smoke’. Those organizations that do will be better placed to reap the benefits and hedge against the risks of a digital world. This chapter provides actionable, research-based considerations and processes for boards to use, to build awareness, knowledge and skills in governing technology-related organization strategy, risk and value creation.

Removal of directors of public companies takes centre stage in Australia : an exploration of the corporate law and governance issues

Increasing attention is being given to the legal and governance issues relating to the removal of directors in Australian public companies. This has been due mainly to the difficulties experienced by the board of National Australia Bank in attempting to remove one of its fellow directors, and the subsequent development of public companies entering into so-called 'prenuptial agreements' with new directors, requiring that the director 'resign' if the board pass a vote of no-confidence in the director. In this article, the author revisits the area of director removal in Australian public companies for two reasons. The first reason, which covers the majority of the article, is to engage in a detailed analysis of whether the pre-nuptial agreements which some public companies have indicated that they support using to remove directors, are in fact enforceable under Australia's Corporations Act The second reason is to outline a law reform proposal to enable public companies to remove directors without requiring the vote of shareholders at a general meeting. The proposal involves providing Australia' corporate  regulator, the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) with the power to grant relief from the statutory removal provisions to public companies, but in a way which balances the competing objectives of commercial efficiency and shareholder participation and, very importantly, encourages good corporate governance practices by companies in relation to the performance assessment  of directors.

It is in the interests of both shareholders and directors to agree on a set of ground rules for the effective supervision of companies that reconciles the rights of the owners to overall control with the much tougher demands on modern directors

Impact of board size and board diversity on firm value: Australian evidence

The aim of this paper is to provide a preliminary analysis of the relationship between firm market value and the size and gender diversity of a board of directors for a sample of publicly listed Australian firms. Our results show that smaller boards appear to be more effective in representing the shareholders as smaller boards are associated with higher firm value. As board size increases firm value declines, however at a decreasing rate suggesting that the relationship between board size and firm value is not strictly linear. Our findings further indicate that gender diversity promotes shareholders' value as the presence of women directors is associated with higher firm value.

Corporate governance, board responsibilities and financial performance : the National Bank of Australia

This paper examines board responsibilities and accountability by management and Board of Directors in relation to the National Australia Bank's (NABs) performance. The NAB, an international financial service provider within the top thirty most profitable banks in the world, is compared with the Australian major banks. The evidence suggests that NABs poor performance was consistent with a lack of accountability, poor corporate governance and board dysfunction associated with fraudulent currency trading and the subsequent AUD360 million foreign currency losses. The NAB's performance is investigated by utilising accounting-based measures of profitability and cost efficiency as proxies for performance. Following the foreign currency trading losses in 2004 the NAB under-performed the other major Australian banks in terms of profits, cost to income ratio and growth in assets. In terms of profitability and cost efficiency NAB had the lowest ROE and ROA with a 19.7% fall in net profit and the highest cost to income ratio of 5 7.4% of any of the five largest banks. This case study provides an Australian example of poor corporate governance and suggests that financial institutions and regulators can learn from the NAB's experience. Failure to have top-down accountability can have significant impact on over-all performance, profitability and reputation. In particular, it suggests that management and Boards need to review their risk management procedures and regulators need to be more pro-active in their prudential oversight of financial institutions.

Annual report of the president and directors of the Lake Shore and Michigan Southern Railway Company to the stockholders for the fiscal year ending ...

Description based on: 6th (1875).

Annual report of the Directors of the Pennsylvania Rail-road Company.

Title varies slightly.

Report of the directors of the Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Company.

Title varies slightly.

An extract from the Report of the directors of Massachusetts State Prison, made to his excellency the governor and the honourable council. October 18, 1827. : Reviewing certain parts of the Second annual report of the Prison Discipline Society.

Mode of access: Internet.

Annual report of the State Board of Live Stock Commissioners ...

In 1917 the State Board of Live Stock Commissioners was abolished, its work being taken over by the Division of Animal Industry of the Department of Agriculture.

Annual report of the Board of Education of the City of St. Louis, Mo., for the year ending June 30 ...

Latest issue consulted: 89th (1943).

The role of the board in firm strategy: Integrating agency and organisational control perspectives

The role of the board of directors in firm strategy has long been the subject of debate. However, research efforts have suffered from several deficiencies: the lack of an overarching theoretical perspective, reliance on proxies for the strategy role rather than a direct measure of it and the lack of quantitative data linking this role to firm financial performance. We propose a new theoretical perspective to explain the board's role in strategy, integrating organisational control and agency theories. We categorise a board's approach to strategy according to two constructs: strategic control and financial control. The extent to which either construct is favoured depends on contextual factors such as board power, environmental uncertainty and information asymmetry.

The impact of board independence and ownership structure on the timeliness of corporate internet reporting of Irish-listed companies

Purpose – This study seeks to provide valuable new insight into the timeliness of corporate internet reporting (TCIR) by a sample of Irish-listed companies. Design/methodology/approach – The authors apply an updated version of Abdelsalam et al. TCIR index to assess the timeliness of corporate internet reporting. The index encompasses 13 criteria that are used to measure the TCIR for a sample of Irish-listed companies. In addition, the authors assess the timeliness of posting companies’ annual and interim reports to their web sites. Furthermore, the study examines the influence of board independence and ownership structure on the TCIR behaviour. Board composition is measured by the percentage of independent directors, chairman’s dual role and average tenure of directors. Ownership structure is represented by managerial ownership and blockholder ownership. Findings – It is found that Irish-listed companies, on average, satisfy only 46 per cent of the timeliness criteria assessed by the timeliness index. After controlling for size, audit fees and firm performance, evidence that TCIR is positively associated with board of director’s independence and chief executive officer (CEO) ownership is provided. Furthermore, it is found that large companies are faster in posting their annual reports to their web sites. The findings suggest that board composition and ownership structure influence a firm’s TCIR behaviour, presumably in response to the information asymmetry between management and investors and the resulting agency costs. Practical implications – The findings highlight the need for improvement in TCIR by Irish-listed companies in many areas, especially in regard to the regular updates of information provided on their web sites. Originality/value – This study represents one of the first comprehensive examinations of the important dimension of the TCIR in Irish-listed companies.