963 resultados para Bilateral Contracting
Resumo:
Unilateral migration policies impose externalities on other countries. In order to try to internalize these externalities, countries sign bilateral migration agreements. One element of these agreements is the emphasis on enforcing migration policies: immigrant-receiving countries agree to allow more immigrants from their emigrant-sending partner if they cooperate in enforcing their migration policy at the border. I present a simple theoretical model that justifies this behavior in a two-country setting with welfare maximizing governments. These governments establish migration quotas that need to be enforced at a cost. I prove that uncoordinated migration policies are inefficient. Both countries can improve welfare by exchanging a more "generous" migration quota for expenditure on enforcement policy. Contrary to what could be expected, this result does not depend on the enforcement technology that both countries employ.
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We consider a principal who deals with a privately informed agent protected by limited liability in a correlated information setting. The agent's technology is such that the fixed cost declines with the marginal cost (the type), so that countervailing incentives may arise. We show that, with high liability, the first-best outcome can be effected for any type if (1) the fixed cost is non-concave in type, under the contract that yields the smallest feasible loss to the agent; (2) the fixed cost is not very concave in type, under the contract that yields the maximum sustainable loss to the agent. We further show that, with low liability, the first-best outcome is still implemented for a non-degenerate range of types if the fixed cost is less concave in type than some given threshold, which tightens as the liability reduces. The optimal contract entails pooling otherwise.
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We study the screening problem that arises in a framework where, initially, the agent is privately informed about both the expected production cost and the cost variability and, at a later stage, he learns privately the cost realization. The speci c set of relevant incentive constraints, and so the characteristics of the optimal mechanism, depend nely upon the curvature of the principal s marginal surplus function as well as the relative importance of the two initial information problems. Pooling of production levels is optimally induced with respect to the cost variability when the principal's knowledge imperfection about the latter is sufficiently less important than that about the expected cost.
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The quality of contracting institutions has been thought to be of second-order importance next to the impact that good property rights institutions can have on long-run growth. Using a large range of proxies for each type of institution, we find a robust negative link between the quality of contracting institutions and long-run growth when we condition on property rights and a number of additional macroeconomic variables. Although the result remains something of a puzzle, we present evidence which suggests that only when property rights institutions are good do contracting institutions appear also to be good for development. Good contracting institutions can reduce long-run growth when property rights are not secured, presumably because the gains from the (costly) contracting institutions cannot be realised. This suggests that contracting institutions can benefit growth, and that the sequence of institutional change can matter.
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We study a strategic market game in which traders are endowed with both a good and money and can choose whether to buy or sell the good. We derive conditions under which a non-autarkic equilibrium exists and when the only equilibrium is autarky. Autarky is ‘nice’ (robust to small perturbations in the game) when it is the only equilibrium, and ‘very nice’ (robust to large perturbations) when no gains from trade exist. We characterize economies where autarky is nice but not very nice; that is, when gains from trade exist and yet no trade takes place.
Resumo:
Bilateral oligopoly is a simple model of exchange in which a finite set of sellers seek to exchange the goods they are endowed with for money with a finite set of buyers, and no price-taking assumptions are imposed. If trade takes place via a strategic market game bilateral oligopoly can be thought of as two linked proportional-sharing contests: in one the sellers share the aggregate bid from the buyers in proportion to their supply and in the other the buyers share the aggregate supply in proportion to their bids. The analysis can be separated into two ‘partial games’. First, fix the aggregate bid at B; in the first partial game the sellers contest this fixed prize in proportion to their supply and the aggregate supply in the equilibrium of this game is X˜ (B). Next, fix the aggregate supply at X; in the second partial game the buyers contest this fixed prize in proportion to their bids and the aggregate bid in the equilibrium of this game is ˜B (X). The analysis of these two partial games takes into account competition within each side of the market. Equilibrium in bilateral oligopoly must take into account competition between sellers and buyers and requires, for example, ˜B (X˜ (B)) = B. When all traders have Cobb-Douglas preferences ˜ X(B) does not depend on B and ˜B (X) does not depend on X: whilst there is competition within each side of the market there is no strategic interdependence between the sides of the market. The Cobb-Douglas assumption provides a tractable framework in which to explore the features of fully strategic trade but it misses perhaps the most interesting feature of bilateral oligopoly, the implications of which are investigated.
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Bilateral oligopoly is a strategic market game with two commodities, allowing strategic behavior on both sides of the market. When the number of buyers is large, such a game approximates a game of quantity competition played by sellers. We present examples which show that this is not typically a Cournot game. Rather, we introduce an alternative game of quantity competition (the market share game) and, appealing to results in the literature on contests, show that this yields the same equilibria as the many-buyer limit of bilateral oligopoly, under standard assumptions on costs and preferences. We also show that the market share and Cournot games have the same equilibria if and only if the price elasticity of the latter is one. These results lead to necessary and sufficient conditions for the Cournot game to be a good approximation to bilateral oligopoly with many buyers and to an ordering of total output when they are not satisfied.
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BACKGROUND: Reconstruction of the central aortic pressure wave from the noninvasive recording of the radial pulse with applanation tonometry has become a standard tool in the field of hypertension. It is not presently known whether recording the radial pulse on the dominant or the nondominant side has any effect on such reconstruction. METHOD: We carried out radial applanation tonometry on both forearms in young, healthy, male volunteers, who were either sedentary (n = 11) or high-level tennis players (n = 10). The purpose of including tennis players was to investigate individuals with extreme asymmetry between the dominant and nondominant upper limb. RESULTS: In the sedentary individuals, forearm circumference and handgrip strength were slightly larger on the dominant (mean +/- SD respectively 27.9 +/- 1.5 cm and 53.8 +/- 10 kg) than on nondominant side (27.3 +/- 1.6 cm, P < 0.001 vs. dominant, and 52.1 +/- 11 kg, P = NS). In the tennis players, differences between sides were more conspicuous (forearm circumference: dominant 28.0 +/- 1.7 cm nondominant 26.4 +/- 1.5 cm, P < 0.001; handgrip strength 61.4 +/- 10.8 vs. 53.4 +/- 9.7 kg, P < 0.001). We found that in both sedentary individuals and tennis players, the radial pulse had identical shape on both sides and, consequently, the reconstructed central aortic pressure waveforms, as well as derived indices of central pulsatility, were not dependent on the side where applanation tonometry was carried out. CONCLUSION: Evidence from individuals with maximal asymmetry of dominant vs. nondominant upper limb indicates that laterality of measurement is not a methodological issue for central pulse wave analysis carried out with radial applanation tonometry.
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Purpose: to describe a case of probable bilateral diffuse uveal melanocytic proliferation (BDUMP) with scleral involvement, free from systemic malignancies and cataract. Methods: fifty months of follow up with recurrent complete ophthalmological examinations, including fundus photography, fluorescein/indocyanine green angiography (FA) and optical coherence tomography (OCT). Investigations also included an electroretinography (ERG) and histological examination of scleral biopsy. Extraocular malignancies were repeatedly searched. Results: the patient was a 61 year-old Italian man with chronic hepatitis type C. At first visit his best corrected visual acuity (BCVA) was 20/32 in OS and 20/25 in OD. Funduscopy showed multiple patch-shaped pigmented alterations involving macular region and mid retinal periphery. FA showed corresponding areas of late-phase hyperfluorescent pinpoints (figure 1a, OS) and intemediate-phase hypocyanescence (figure 1b, OS), with subtle serous neurosensory retinal detachment confirmed by OCT. Photopic and scotopic ERG tested normal. Systemic prednisone was administered for one month without any improvement. After ten months round pigmentary lesions appeared also in superior scleral surface of both eyes. Biopsy allowed to disclose slightly pigmented spindle cells. BCVA worsened for further 10 months, with enlargement of FA alteration areas but lenses still clear. After 30 months spontaneous coalescence and atrophy of retinal lesions started, paralleled by progressive visual recovery. At the end of our follow up BCVA was 20/25 in OU while scleral pigmentary lesions remained unchanged. Conclusions: we report the case of a patient with main features of BDUMP and some unusual findings. Although not all classical diagnostic criteria were fulfilled, the presence of scleral pigmented lesions and spontaneous visual recovery may enlarge clinical spectrum of the disease.
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The respective roles of the medial temporal lobe (MTL) structures in memory are controversial. Some authors put forward a modular account according to which episodic memory and recollection-based processes are crucially dependent on the hippocampal formation whereas semantic acquisition and familiarity-based processes rely on the adjacent parahippocampal gyri. Others defend a unitary view. We report the case of VJ, a boy with developmental amnesia of most likely perinatal onset diagnosed at the age of 8. Magnetic resonance imaging (MRI), including quantitative volumetric measurements of the hippocampal formation and of the entorhinal, perirhinal, and temporopolar cortices, showed severe, bilateral atrophy of the hippocampal formation, fornix and mammillary bodies; by contrast, the perirhinal cortex was within normal range and the entorhinal and temporopolar cortex remained within two standard deviations (SDs) from controls' mean. We examined the development of his semantic knowledge from childhood to teenage as well as his recognition and cued recall memory abilities. On tasks tapping semantic memory, VJ increased his raw scores across years at the same rate as children from large standardisation samples, except for one task; he achieved average performance, consistent with his socio-educational background. He performed within normal range on 74% of recognition tests and achieved average to above average scores on 42% of them despite very severe impairment on 82% of episodic recall tasks. Both faces and landscapes-scenes gave rise to above average scores when tested with coloured stimuli. Cued recall, although impaired, was largely superior to free recall. This case supports a modular account of the MTL with episodic, but not semantic memory depending on the hippocampal formation. Furthermore, the overall pattern of findings is consistent with evidence from both brain-damaged and neuroimaging studies indicating that recollection requires intact hippocampal formation and familiarity relies, at least partly, on the adjacent temporal lobe cortex.
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PURPOSE: Patients with hereditary retinoblastoma (Rb) develop in 4%-8% a malignant midline tumor called trilateral Rb (TRb). We report in this study on benign pineal cysts observed in patients investigated for TRb. PATIENTS AND METHODS: Between September 1990 and December 2001, 172 patients were screened for TRb. Ninty-five had bilateral, 77 unilateral disease. The median age at diagnosis of Rb was 7 months (range 1-26). Treatment included enucleation, local treatment with cryotherapy or photocoagulation, first-line chemotherapy (CT), thermo-chemotherapy (TCT), Ruthenium plaque, and, rarely, external beam radiation (EBR). RESULTS: TRb was found in 5/95 patients (5.3%) with bilateral disease. Interestingly, five other patients (5.3%) presented a pineal cyst on magnetic resonance imaging (MRI). No cysts were recorded in the 77 patients with unilateral disease. This difference was statistically significant (P < 0.05). The median age at diagnosis of the pineal cyst was 26 months (range 16-80), much younger than reported in literature for healthy children. Four of five patients with TRb died of the disease, while all the patients with pineal cysts remained stable and asymptomatic during a median follow-up of 41 months (range 37-54). CONCLUSIONS: This report describes benign cystic lesions of the pineal gland in patients with hereditary Rb, suggesting a benign variant of TRb. Underlying possible pathogenetic mechanisms are discussed.