Conceptual spaces and consciousness: Integrating cognitive and affective processes

In the book Conceptual Spaces: the Geometry of Thought [2000] Peter Gärdenfors proposes a new framework for cognitive science. Complementary to symbolic and subsymbolic [connectionist] descriptions, conceptual spaces are semantic structures constructed from empirical data representing the universe of mental states. We argue that Gärdenfors' modeling can be used in consciousness research to describe the phenomenal conscious world, its elements and their intrinsic relations. The conceptual space approach affords the construction of a universal state space of human consciousness, where all possible kinds of human conscious states could be mapped. Starting from this approach, we discuss the inclusion of feelings and emotions in conceptual spaces, and their relation to perceptual and cognitive states. Current debate on integration of affect/emotion and perception/cognition allows three possible descriptive alternatives: emotion resulting from basic cognition; cognition resulting from basic emotion, and both as relatively independent functions integrated by brain mechanisms. Finding a solution for this issue is an important step in any attempt of successful modeling of natural or artificial consciousness. After making a brief review of proposals in this area, we summarize the essentials of a new model of consciousness based on neuro-astroglial interactions. © 2011 World Scientific Publishing Company.

What affective neuroscience means for science of consciousness

The field of affective neuroscience has emerged from the efforts of Jaak Panksepp in the 1990s and reinforced by the work of, among others, Joseph LeDoux in the 2000s. It is based on the ideas that affective processes are supported by brain structures that appeared earlier in the phylogenetic scale (as the periaqueductal gray area), they run in parallel with cognitive processes, and can influence behaviour independently of cognitive judgements. This kind of approach contrasts with the hegemonic concept of conscious processing in cognitive neurosciences, which is based on the identification of brain circuits responsible for the processing of (cognitive) representations. Within cognitive neurosciences, the frontal lobes are assigned the role of coordinators in maintaining affective states and their emotional expressions under cognitive control. An intermediary view is the Damasio-Bechara Somatic Marker model, which puts cognition under partial somatic-affective control. We present here our efforts to make a synthesis of these views, by proposing the existence of two interacting brain circuits; the first one in charge of cognitive processes and the second mediating feelings about cognitive contents. The coupling of the two circuits promotes an endogenous feedback that supports conscious processes. Within this framework, we present the defence that detailed study of both affective and cognitive processes, their interactions, as well of their respective brain networks, is necessary for a science of consciousness.© MSM 2013.

A Commentary on de Sousa′s towards an Integrative Theory of Consciousness

De Sousa′s comprehensive two-part review of a diversity of contemporary approaches to the study of consciousness is highly welcome. He makes us aware of a proliferation of theoretical and empirical approaches targeting a common theme, but diverging in many ways. He skilfully accomplishes a classification of kinds of approach, identification of the main representatives, their contributions, and respective limitations. However, he does not show how the desired integration could be accomplished. Besides summarising de Sousa′s efficient analytical work, I make critical comments and briefly report my contribution for the integration project.© MSM 2013.

Hollows of a science of consciousness?

I consider Nixon’s essay a well thought discussion of the possibility of a genuine science of consciousness. Most of the sections are worth discussing, but to find the main message it may be necessary to read between the lines. The good news is that he does not present true impossibilities for this science, but his discussion leads to the (sound) conclusion that it would have to account for many unconscious factors that make us creative and human.

Yoruba nationalist movements, ethnic politics and violence : a creation from historical consciousness and socio-political space in South-western Nigeria /// Arbeitspapiere / Institut für Ethnologie und Afrikastudien ; 105

Since 1900, the Yoruba people of South-western Nigeria have put its ethnic history at work in the construction of its identity in Nigeria. The exercise resulted in the creation of ethno-nationalist movements and the practice of ethnic politics, often expressed through violent attacks on the Nigerian State and some ethnic groups in Nigeria. Relying on mythological attachment to its traditions and subjective creation of cultural pride, the people created a sense of history that established a common interest among different Yoruba sub-groups in form of pan-Yoruba interest which forms the basis for the people’s imagination of nation. Through this, historical consciousness and socio-political space in which Yoruba people are located acted as instrumental forces employed by Yoruba political elites, both at colonial and post-colonial periods to demand for increasing access to political and economic resources in Nigeria. In form of nationalism, nationalist movements and ethnic politics continued in South-western Nigeria since 1900, yet without resulting to actual creation of an independent Yoruba State up to 2009. Through ethnographic data, the part played by history, tradition and modernity is examined in this paper. While it is concluded that ethno-nationalist movement and ethnic politics in Yoruba society are constructive agenda dated back to pre-colonial period, it continues to transform both in structure and function. Thus, Yoruba ethno-nationalist movement and ethnic politics is ambiguous, dynamic and complex, to the extent that it remains a challenge to State actions in Nigeria.

Parochialism or self-consciousness? Internationality in medical history journals 1997-2006

Research councils, universities and funding agencies are increasingly asking for tools to measure the quality of research in the humanities. One of their preferred methods is a ranking of journals according to their supposed level of internationality. Our quantitative survey of seventeen major journals of medical history reveals the futility of such an approach. Most journals have a strong national character with a dominance of native language, authors and topics. The most common case is a paper written by a local author in his own language on a national subject regarding the nineteenth or twentieth century. American and British journals are taken notice of internationally but they only rarely mention articles from other history of medicine journals. Continental European journals show a more international review of literature, but are in their turn not noticed globally. Increasing specialisation and fragmentation has changed the role of general medical history journals. They run the risk of losing their function as international platforms of discourse on general and theoretical issues and major trends in historiography, to international collections of papers. Journal editors should therefore force their authors to write a more international report, and authors should be encouraged to submit papers of international interest and from a more general, transnational and methodological point of view.

Xenomelia: a social neuroscience view of altered bodily self-consciousness

Xenomelia, the "foreign limb syndrome," is characterized by the non-acceptance of one or more of one's own extremities and the resulting desire for elective limb amputation or paralysis. Formerly labeled "body integrity identity disorder" (BIID), the condition was originally considered a psychological or psychiatric disorder, but a brain-centered Zeitgeist and a rapidly growing interest in the neural underpinnings of bodily self-consciousness has shifted the focus toward dysfunctional central nervous system circuits. The present article outlays both mind-based and brain-based views highlighting their shortcomings. We propose that full insight into what should be conceived a "xenomelia spectrum disorder" will require interpretation of individual symptomatology in a social context. A proper social neuroscience of xenomelia respects the functional neuroanatomy of corporeal awareness, but also acknowledges the brain's plasticity in response to an individual's history, which is lived against a cultural background. This integrated view of xenomelia will promote the subfield of consciousness research concerned with the unity of body and self.