Calcareous nannofossil abundance and datum events of ODP Holes 181-1123C and 181-1124C, southwest Pacific

Seven sites were drilled off the eastern shore of New Zealand during Ocean Drilling Program Leg 181 to gain knowledge of southwest Pacific ocean history, in particular, the evolution of the Pacific Deep Western Boundary Current (DWBC). Holes 1123C and 1124C penetrated lower Oligocene to middle Eocene sediments containing moderately to poorly preserved calcareous nannofossils. Nannofossil assemblages show signs of dissolution and overgrowth, but key marker species can be identified. Nannofossil abundance ranges from abundant to barren. The lower Oligocene sediments are distinctly separated from the overlying Neogene sequences by the Marshall Paraconformity, a regional marker of environmental and sea level change. An age-depth model for Hole 1123C through this sequence was constructed using nine nannofossil age datums and three magnetostratigraphic datums. There is good agreement between the biostratigraphy and magnetostratigraphy, which indicates that the Marshall Paraconformity spans ~12 m.y. in Hole 1123C. The same sequence in Hole 1124C is disrupted by at least three hiatuses, complicating interpretation of the sedimentation history. The Marshall Paraconformity spans at least 3 m.y. in Hole 1124C. A 4- m.y. gap separates lower Oligocene and middle Eocene sediments, and a ~15 m.y. hiatus separates middle Eocene mudstones from middle Paleocene nannofossil-bearing mudstones. Nannofossil biostratigraphy from Holes 1123C and 1124C indicates that the Eocene-Oligocene transition was a time of fluctuating biota and intensification of the DWBC along the New Zealand margin.

Retina-specific nuclear receptor: A potential regulator of cellular retinaldehyde-binding protein expressed in retinal pigment epithelium and Müller glial cells

In an effort to identify nuclear receptors important in retinal disease, we screened a retina cDNA library for nuclear receptors. Here we describe the identification of a retina-specific nuclear receptor (RNR) from both human and mouse. Human RNR is a splice variant of the recently published photoreceptor cell-specific nuclear receptor [Kobayashi, M., Takezawa, S., Hara, K., Yu, R. T., Umesono, Y., Agata, K., Taniwaki, M., Yasuda, K. & Umesono, K. (1999) Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA 96, 4814–4819] whereas the mouse RNR is a mouse ortholog. Northern blot and reverse transcription–PCR analyses of human mRNA samples demonstrate that RNR is expressed exclusively in the retina, with transcripts of ≈7.5 kb, ≈3.0 kb, and ≈2.3 kb by Northern blot analysis. In situ hybridization with multiple probes on both primate and mouse eye sections demonstrates that RNR is expressed in the retinal pigment epithelium and in Müller glial cells. By using the Gal4 chimeric receptor/reporter cotransfection system, the ligand binding domain of RNR was found to repress transcriptional activity in the absence of exogenous ligand. Gel mobility shift assays revealed that RNR can interact with the promoter of the cellular retinaldehyde binding protein gene in the presence of retinoic acid receptor (RAR) and/or retinoid X receptor (RXR). These data raise the possibility that RNR acts to regulate the visual cycle through its interaction with cellular retinaldehyde binding protein and therefore may be a target for retinal diseases such as retinitis pigmentosa and age-related macular degeneration.

Russia goes on the offensive ahead of the Eastern Partnership summit in Vilnius. OSW Commentary No. 115, 30.09.2013

In recent weeks, Russia has stepped up its efforts to prevent a group of former Soviet republics from tightening their relations with the European Union. The intensification of these efforts comes ahead of the upcoming Eastern Partnership summit, scheduled to take place in Vilnius on 28-29 November. It is expected that during the summit Kiev will sign the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement (AA) initialled in March 2012, including an agreement for a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA). Meanwhile, Moldova, Armenia and Georgia are expected to initial similar documents, effectively accepting their terms and conditions, and paving the way for their official signing in the near future. Moscow has always viewed the relations between the EU and the post-Soviet states as a threat to its own influence in the region. Consequently, any attempts to tighten these relations have been actively opposed by Russia. The EU’s Eastern Partnership programme, launched in 2009, has posed a particular challenge to Moscow’s policies in the region.. Russia responded by rolling out a Eurasian integration project, which began in 2010 with the establishment of the Customs Union of Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus, and is expected to culminate in the establishment of the Eurasian Economic Union by 2015. Moscow’s overarching objective has been to persuade the countries in the region, especially Ukraine, to adopt an unambiguously pro-Russian geopolitical stance and to join the integration project proposed by the Kremlin. The Russian government hopes that this would permanently place these states in Moscow’s sphere of influence and at the same time prevent them from developing closer relations with Brussels. Russia has regularly taken actions aimed at showcasing the benefits of integration with the Customs Union (particularly, by promising preferential pricing of Russian energy resources) and at the same time it has adopted measures highlighting the pitfalls of retaining a pro-European orientation (mainly by imposing occasional trade sanctions). The upcoming summit in Vilnius, during which Ukraine, Moldova, Armenia and Georgia could lock themselves on to a pro-European course, has spurred Moscow to intensify its efforts to torpedo a successful outcome of the Vilnius meeting, with a view to slowing down or even blocking the possibility of closer cooperation between the EU and the former Soviet republics.

Too high and too low: The problems with energy prices in the EU. OSW Commentary No. 122, 03.12.2013

On 11 October, the top executives of ten European energy companies, which jointly own about half of the European Union’s electricity generating capacity, warned that “energy security is no longer guaranteed” and once again called for changes to EU energy policy. Due to persistent adverse conditions in the energy market (linked to, for example, the exceptionally low wholesale energy prices) more and more conventional power plants are being closed down. According to sector representatives, this could lead to energy shortages being seen as early as this winter. Meanwhile, in an interview with The Daily Telegraph published in September of this year, the European industry commissioner Antonio Tajani warned – in a rather alarmist tone – of the disastrous consequences the rising energy prices could have on European industry. Amongst the reasons for the high prices of energy, Tajani mentioned the overambitious pace and methods used to increase the share of renewables in the sector. In a similar vein, EU President Herman Van Rompuy has highlighted the need to reduce energy costs as a top priority for EU energy policy1. The price of energy has become one of the central issues in the current EU energy debate. The high consumer price of energy – which has been rising steadily over the past several years – poses a serious challenge to both household and industrial users. Meanwhile, the declining wholesale prices are affecting the cost-effectiveness of energy production and the profits of energy companies. The current difficulties, however, are first and foremost a symptom of much wider problems related to the functioning of both the EU energy market as well as to the EU’s climate and energy policies.

Security of Russian gas supplies to the EU - the question of infrastrucutral connections. OSW Point of View, February 2005

The energy security of countries importing energy resources depends largely on the shape and quality of operational transport connections. This is particularly important in the case of natural gas supplies. Natural gas is transported mostly by gas pipelines which permanently connect gas producers and consumers. Thus Europe as a consumer is "tied" to certain gas suppliers for anywhere between a dozen and several tens of years. As their own resources are becoming depleted, the EU Member States get increasingly dependent on import of natural gas. The present paper discusses the existing and projected gas transport routes from Russia to the EU. The first part deals with the importance of gas exports to the economy of the Russian Federation, and the second delves into the EU Member States' dependence on gas imports. Then this paper examines the differences in perceiving the energy security issue between the old and the new Member States, those differences stemming from the different degrees of their dependence on Russian supplies. In the third part, two new transport route projects for Russian gas supplies to the EU are compared and it is argued that from the point of view of the Community's interests, the Yamal gas pipeline is a better solution than the North European (Trans-Baltic) gas pipeline.

Nord Stream on the liberalising EU gas market. OSW Point of View, March 2010

Nord Stream increases Gazprom’s flexibility as far its export routes are concerned; it enables them to be changed with regard to the market or political situation. Nevertheless, this expensive pipeline may contribute to a further drop in the price competitiveness of Russian gas. Accordingly, increasing the attractiveness of Russian fuel and ensuring profitable sales is steadily becoming the main challenge for Gazprom in the EU against a backdrop of increasing competitiveness on the market.