Real-life versus package insert: a post-marketing study on adverse-event rates of the virosomal hepatitis A vaccine Epaxal® in healthy travellers.

There are various methods to collect adverse events (AEs) in clinical trials. The methods how AEs are collected in vaccine trials is of special interest: solicited reporting can lead to over-reporting events that have little or no biological relationship to the vaccine. We assessed the rate of AEs listed in the package insert for the virosomal hepatitis A vaccine Epaxal(®), comparing data collected by solicited or unsolicited self-reporting. In an open, multi-centre post-marketing study, 2675 healthy travellers received single doses of vaccine administered intramuscularly. AEs were recorded based on solicited and unsolicited questioning during a four-day period after vaccination. A total of 2541 questionnaires could be evaluated (95.0% return rate). Solicited self-reporting resulted in significantly higher (p<0.0001) rates of subjects with AEs than unsolicited reporting, both at baseline (18.9% solicited versus 2.1% unsolicited systemic AEs) and following immunization (29.6% versus 19.3% local AEs; 33.8% versus 18.2% systemic AEs). This could indicate that actual reporting rates of AEs with Epaxal(®) may be substantially lower than described in the package insert. The distribution of AEs differed significantly between the applied methods of collecting AEs. The most common AEs listed in the package insert were reported almost exclusively with solicited questioning. The reporting of local AEs was more likely than that of systemic AEs to be influenced by subjects' sex, age and study centre. Women reported higher rates of AEs than men. The results highlight the need for detailing the methods how vaccine tolerability was reported and assessed.

Adverse effects of industrial multiwalled carbon nanotubes on human pulmonary cells

The aim of this study was to evaluate adverse effects of multiwalled carbon nanotubes (MWCNT), produced for industrial purposes, on the human epithelial cell line A549. MWCNT were dispersed in dipalmitoyl lecithin (DPL), a component of pulmonary surfactant, and the effects of dispersion in DPL were compared to those in two other media: ethanol (EtOH) and phosphate-buffered saline (PBS). Effects of MWCNT were also compared to those of two asbestos fibers (chrysotile and crocidolite) and carbon black (CB) nanoparticles, not only in A549 cells but also in mesothelial cells (MeT5A human cell line), used as an asbestos-sensitive cell type. MWCNT formed agglomerates on top of both cell lines (surface area 15-35 μm2) that were significantly larger and more numerous in PBS than in EtOH and DPL. Whatever the dispersion media, incubation with 100 μg/ml MWCNT induced a similar decrease in metabolic activity without changing cell membrane permeability or apoptosis. Neither MWCNT cellular internalization nor oxidative stress was observed. In contrast, asbestos fibers penetrated into the cells, decreased metabolic activity but not cell membrane permeability, and increased apoptosis, without decreasing cell number. CB was internalized without any adverse effects. In conclusion, this study demonstrates that MWCNT produced for industrial purposes exert adverse effects without being internalized by human epithelial and mesothelial pulmonary cell lines. [Authors]

Adverse life events among community-dwelling persons aged 65-70 years: gender differences in occurrence and perceived psychological consequences.

OBJECTIVES: To describe the occurrence of selected adverse life events in young-old men and women, as well as their perceived psychological consequences. METHODS: In 2005, 1,422 participants in the Lausanne Cohort 65+ study, born in 1934-1938, self-reported whether they experienced any of 26 life events during the preceding year. Most participants (N = 1,309, 92%) completed the geriatric adverse life events scale during a face-to-face interview, by rating the level of stress associated with each event, as well as its impact on their psychological well-being. RESULTS: Overall, 72% of the participants experienced at least one of the 26 events in the preceding year (range 1-9). Disease affecting the respondent (N = 525) or a close relative (N = 276) was most frequent, as well as the death of a friend or non-close relative (N = 274). Women indicated a higher frequency of events (mean 2.1 vs. 1.7 events, P < 0.001), as well as a higher level of stress and a stronger negative impact on well-being than men. In multivariate analyses adjusting for self-rated health, depressive symptoms and comorbidity, female gender remained significantly associated with the level of stress and negative impact on psychological well-being. CONCLUSION: This exploratory study shows that several types of adverse life events frequently occur at age 65-70, with gender differences both in the frequency of reporting and consequences of these events. However, information on this topic is limited and studies based on different populations and designs are needed to better understand the impact of such events.

Haben selektive COX-2-Hemmer unerwünschte renale und kardiovaskuläre Wirkungen [Do selective COX-2 inhibitors have adverse renal and cardiovascular effects?].

Selective cyclooxygenase-2-inhibitors (COX-2) were developed as an alternative to the non-steroidal anti-inflammatory drugs (NSAID) in order to reduce their known gastrointestinal and renal toxicity. Several recent studies have shown the complex mechanism of the cyclooxygenase-2. The inhibition of the COX-2 has effects on renal hemodynamics, renal salt and water retention and may increase the thromboembolic and therefore the cardiovascular risk. The renal toxicity of the COX-2 inhibitors is similar to that of traditional NSAID. Regarding these data, COX-2 inhibitors should be prescribed with much caution to high risk patients, that is, patients with renal failure and/or cardiovascular diseases.

Endogenous Credit Cycles and Financial Dampening in an Adverse Selection Economy

We propose an adverse selection framework in which the financial sector has a dual role. It amplifies or dampens exogenous shocks and also generates endogenous fluctuations. We fully characterize constrained optimal contracts in a setting in which entrepreneurs need to borrow and are privately informed about the quality of their projects. Our characterization is novel in analyzing pooling and separating allocations in a context of multi-dimensional screening: specifically, the amounts of investment undertaken and of entrepreneurial net worth are used to screen projects. We then embed these results in a dynamic competitive economy. First, we show how endogenous regime switches in financial contracts may generate fluctuations in an economy that exhibits no dynamics under full information. Unlike previous models of endogenous cycles, our result does not rely on entrepreneurial net worth being counter-cyclical or inconsequential for determining investment. Secondly, the model shows the different implications of adverse selection as opposed to pure moral hazard. In particular, and contrary to standard results in the macroeconomic literature, the financial system may dampen exogenous shocks in the presence of adverse selection.

Adverse Selection, Credit, and Efficiency: the Case of the Missing Market

We analyze a standard environment of adverse selection in credit markets. In our envi- ronment, entrepreneurs who are privately informed about the quality of their projects need to borrow from banks. As is generally the case in economies with adverse selection, the competitive equilibrium of our economy is shown to be ine¢ cient. Under adverse selection, the choices made by one type of agents limit what can be o¤ered to other types in an incentive-compatible manner. This gives rise to an externality, which cannot be internalized in a competitive equilibrium. We show that, in this type of environment, the ine¢ ciency associated to adverse selection is the consequence of one implicit assumption: entrepreneurs can only borrow from banks. If an additional market is added (say, a .security market.), in which entrepreneurs can obtain funds beyond those o¤ered by banks, we show that the e¢ cient allocation is an equilibrium of the economy. In such an equilibrium, all entrepreneurs borrow at a pooling rate in the security market. When they apply to bank loans, though, only entrepreneurs with good projects pledge these additional funds as collateral. This equilibrium thus simultaneously entails cross- subsidization and separation between di¤erent types of entrepreneurs.

Adverse selection, credit, and efficiency: the case of the missing market

We analyze a standard environment of adverse selection in credit markets. In our environment, entrepreneurs who are privately informed about the quality of their projects need to borrow in order to invest. Conventional wisdom says that, in this class of economies, the competitive equilibrium is typically inefficient. We show that this conventional wisdom rests on one implicit assumption: entrepreneurs can only access monitored lending. If a new set of markets is added to provide entrepreneurs with additional funds, efficiency can be attained in equilibrium. An important characteristic of these additional markets is that lending in them must be unmonitored, in the sense that it does not condition total borrowing or investment by entrepreneurs. This makes it possible to attain efficiency by pooling all entrepreneurs in the new markets while separating them in the markets for monitored loans.

Optimal Contracts, Adverse Selection, and Social Preferences: An Experiment

It has long been standard in agency theory to search for incentive-compatible mechanisms on the assumption that people care only about their own material wealth. However, this assumption is clearly refuted by numerous experiments, and we feel that it may be useful to consider nonpecuniary utility in mechanism design and contract theory. Accordingly, we devise an experiment to explore optimal contracts in an adverse-selection context. A principal proposes one of three contract menus, each of which offers a choice of two incentive-compatible contracts, to two agents whose types are unknown to the principal. The agents know the set of possible menus, and choose to either accept one of the two contracts offered in the proposed menu or to reject the menu altogether; a rejection by either agent leads to lower (and equal) reservation payoffs for all parties. While all three possible menus favor the principal, they do so to varying degrees. We observe numerous rejections of the more lopsided menus, and approach an equilibrium where one of the more equitable contract menus (which one depends on the reservation payoffs) is proposed and agents accept a contract, selecting actions according to their types. Behavior is largely consistent with all recent models of social preferences, strongly suggesting there is value in considering nonpecuniary utility in agency theory.

A Model of Collateral, Investment, and Adverse Selection

This paper characterizes the relationship between entrepreneurial wealth and aggregate investment under adverse selection. Its main finding is that such a relationship need not be monotonic. In particular, three results emerge from the analysis: (i) pooling equilibria, in which investment is independent of entrepreneurial wealth, are more likely to arise when entrepreneurial wealth is relatively low; (ii) separating equilibria, in which investment is increasing in entrepreneurial wealth, are most likely to arise when entrepreneurial wealth is relatively high and; (iii) for a given interest rate, an increase in entrepreneurial wealth may generate a discontinuous fall in investment.

Causes for the underreporting of adverse drug events by health professionals: a systematic review

Objective: Identifying the main causes for underreporting of Adverse Drug Reaction (ADR) by health professionals. Method: A systematic review carried out in the following databases: LILACS, PAHO, SciELO, EMBASE and PubMed in the period between 1992 and 2012. Descriptors were used in the search for articles, and the identified causes of underreporting were analyzed according to the classification of Inman. Results: In total, were identified 149 articles, among which 29 were selected. Most studies were carried out in hospitals (24/29) for physicians (22/29), and pharmacists (10/29). The main causes related to underreporting were ignorance (24/29), insecurity (24/29) and indifference (23/29). Conclusion: The data show the eighth sin in underreporting, which is the lack of training in pharmacovigilance. Therefore, continuing education can increase adherence of professionals to the service and improve knowledge and communication of risks due to drug use.


Adverse obstetrical and neonatal outcomes in elective and medically indicated inductions of labor at term.

OBJECTIVE: To compare the adverse neonatal and maternal outcomes after medically indicated and elective labor induction. Both induction groups were also compared to women with spontaneous onset of labor. METHOD: Retrospective cohort study of 13 971 women with live, cephalic singleton pregnancies who delivered at term (from 1997 to 2007). Adverse maternal and neonatal outcomes were compared between women who underwent an induction of labor in the presence and absence of standard medical indications. RESULTS: Among 5090 patients with induced labor, 2059 (40.5%) underwent elective labor inductions, defined as inductions without any medical or obstetrical indication. Risks of cesarean or instrumental delivery, postpartum hemorrhage >500 ml, prolonged maternal hospitalization >6 days, Apgar<7 at 5 min of life, arterial umbilical cord pH<7.1, admission in neonatal intensive care unit (NICU) and prolonged NICU hospitalization >7 days were similar between nulliparous who underwent elective and medical labor induction. Similar results were obtained for multiparous. All the above mentioned risks, but the Apgar<7 at 5 min of life, were significantly increased after induction in comparison to spontaneous labor. CONCLUSION: Elective induction of labor carries similar obstetrical and neonatal risks as a medically indicated labor induction. Thus, elective induction of labor should be strongly discouraged.

Adverse effects of intraperitoneal onlay mesh used for incisional hernia repair

Context: In the past 50 years, the use of prosthetic mesh in surgery has dramatically¦changed the management of primary, as well as incisional hernias. Currently, there¦are a large number of different mesh brands and no consensus on the best material,¦nor the best mesh implantation technique to use. The purpose of this study is to¦illustrate the adverse effects of intraperitoneal onlay mesh used for incisional¦hernia repair encountered in patients treated at CHUV for complications after¦incisional hernia repair.¦Materials & Methods: This work is an observational retrospective study. A PubMed¦search and a systematic review of literature were performed. Thereafter, the medical¦records of 22 patients who presented with pain, abdominal discomfort, ileus, fistula,¦abscess, seroma, mesh infection or recurrent incisional hernia after a laparoscopic or¦open repair with intra-abdominal mesh were reviewed.¦Results: Twenty-two persons were reoperated for complications after incisional¦hernia repair with a prosthetic mesh. Ten were male and twelve female, with a¦median age of 58,6 years (range 24-82). Mesh placement was performed by a¦laparoscopic approach in nine patients and by open approach in thirteen others.¦Eight different mesh brands were found (Ultrapro®, Mersilene®, Parietex Composite®,¦Proceed®, DynaMesh®, Gore® DualMesh®, Permacol®, Titanium Metals UK Ltd®).¦Mean time from implantation and reoperation for complication was 34.2 months¦(range 1-147). In our sample of 22 patients, 21 (96%) presented mesh adhesion and¦15 (68%) presented hernia recurrence. Others complications like mesh shrinkage,¦mesh migration, nerve entrapment, seroma, fistula and abscess were also evaluated.¦Conclusion: The majority of articles deal with complications induced by¦intraperitoneal prosthetic mesh, but the effectiveness of mesh has been studied¦mostly on experimental models. Actually and as shown in the present study,¦intraperitoneal mesh placement was associated with severe complications witch may¦potentially be life threatening. In our opinion, intraperitoneal mesh placement should¦only be reserved in exceptional situations, when the modified Rives-Stoppa could not¦be achieved and when tissues covering the mesh are insufficient.

Interviews and adverse selection

Interviewing in professional labor markets is a costly process for firms. Moreover, poor screening can have a persistent negative impact on firms bottom lines and candidates careers. In a simple dynamic model where firms can pay a cost to interview applicants who have private information about their own ability, potentially large inefficiencies arise from information-based unemployment, where able workers are rejected by firms because of their lack of offers in previous interviews. This effect may make the market less efficient than random matching. We show that the first best can be achieved using either a mechanism with transfers or one without transfers.