Increasing incidence of Clostridium difficile infection, Australia, 2011–2012

Objectives: To report the quarterly incidence of hospital-identified Clostridium difficile infection (HI-CDI) in Australia, and to estimate the burden ascribed to hospital-associated (HA) and community-associated (CA) infections. Design, setting and patients: Prospective surveillance of all cases of CDI diagnosed in hospital patients from 1 January 2011 to 31 December 2012 in 450 public hospitals in all Australian states and the Australian Capital Territory. All patients admitted to inpatient wards or units in acute public hospitals, including psychiatry, rehabilitation and aged care, were included, as well as those attending emergency departments and outpatient clinics. Main outcome measures: Incidence of HI-CDI (primary outcome); proportion and incidence of HA-CDI and CA-CDI (secondary outcomes). Results: The annual incidence of HI-CDI increased from 3.25/10 000 patient-days (PD) in 2011 to 4.03/10 000 PD in 2012. Poisson regression modelling demonstrated a 29% increase (95% CI, 25% to 34%) per quarter between April and December 2011, with a peak of 4.49/10 000 PD in the October–December quarter. The incidence plateaued in January–March 2012 and then declined by 8% (95% CI, − 11% to − 5%) per quarter to 3.76/10 000 PD in July–September 2012, after which the rate rose again by 11% (95% CI, 4% to 19%) per quarter to 4.09/10 000 PD in October–December 2012. Trends were similar for HA-CDI and CA-CDI. A subgroup analysis determined that 26% of cases were CA-CDI. Conclusions: A significant increase in both HA-CDI and CA-CDI identified through hospital surveillance occurred in Australia during 2011–2012. Studies are required to further characterise the epidemiology of CDI in Australia.

When should private property rights give way to the public interest?

Since Queensland Wire Industries Pty Ltd v Broken Hill Pty Co Ltd (1989) 167 CLR 177 it has been recognised that corporations with substantial market power are subject to special responsibilities and restraints that corporations without market power are not. In NT Power Generation Pty Ltd v Power and Water Authority (2004) 219 CLR 90 McHugh A-CJ, Gummow, Callinan and Heydon JJ in their joint reasons stated (at [76]), that s 46 of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) (CCA) can operate not only to prevent firms with substantial market power from doing prohibited things, but also compel them positively to do things they do not want to do. Their Honours also stated (at [126]) that the proposition that a private property owner who declines to permit competitors to use the property is immune from s 46 is “intrinsically unsound”. However, the circumstances in which a firm with substantial power must accommodate competitors, and private property rights give way to the public interest are uncertain. The purpose of this Note is to consider recent developments in two areas of the CCA where the law requires private property rights to give way to the public interest. The first part of the Note considers two recent cases which clarify the circumstances in which s 46 of the CCA can be used to compel a firm with substantial market power to accommodate a competitor and allow the competitor to make use of private property rights in the public interest. Secondly, on 12 February 2014 the Minister for Small Business, the Hon Bruce Billson,released the Productivity Commission’s Final Report, on the National Access Regime in Pt IIIA of the CCA (National Access Regime, Inquiry Report No 66, Canberra). Pt IIIA provides for the processes by which third parties may obtain access to infrastructure owned by others in the public interest. The Report recommends that Pt IIIA be retained but makes a number of suggestions for its reform, some of which will be briefly considered.

A 5- versus 3-day course of oral corticosteroids for children with asthma exacerbations who are not hospitalised : a randomised controlled trial

Objective To determine whether a 5-day course of oral prednisolone is superior to a 3-day course in reducing the 2-week morbidity of children with asthma exacerbations who are not hospitalised. Design, setting and participants Double-blind randomised controlled trial of asthma outcomes following a 5-day course of oral prednisolone (1 mg/kg) compared with a 3-day course of prednisolone plus placebo for 2 days. Participants were children aged 2–15 years who presented to the emergency departments of three Queensland hospitals between March 2004 and February 2007 with an acute exacerbation of asthma, but were not hospitalised. Sample size was defined a priori for a study power of 90%. Main outcome measures Difference in proportion of children who were symptom-free at Day 7, as measured by intention-to-treat (ITT) and per-protocol analysis; quality of life (QOL) on Days 7 and 14. Results 201 children were enrolled, and there was an 82% completion rate. There was no difference between groups in the proportion of children who were symptom-free (observed difference, 0.04 [95% CI, − 0.09 to 0.18] by ITT analysis; 0.04 [95% CI, − 0.17 to 0.09] by per-protocol analysis). There was also no difference between groups in QOL (P = 0.42). The difference between groups for the primary outcome was within the equivalence range calculated post priori. Conclusion A 5-day course of oral prednisolone confers no advantage over a 3-day course for children with asthma exacerbations who are not hospitalised.

Default judgment - whether irregular - whether court has residual discretion not to set aside default judgment irregularly entered

In CB Richard Ellis (C) Pty Ltd v Wingate Properties Pty Ltd [2005] QDC 399 McGill DCJ examined whether the court now has a discretion to set aside an irregularly entered default judgment.

Limitation of actions - Workcover Queensland Act 1996 s 308(2)

In Narayan v S-Pak Pty Ltd [2002] QSC 373 the court concluded that proceedings to which the Workcover (Queensland) Act 1996 applies must be commenced within 60 days after the compulsory conference required by s308(2) of the Act and there is no power in the court to extend the time for compliance.

Strategic entry deterrence : does it constitute a misuse of market power?

A challenge for regulators and the courts has been establishing the boundary between behaviour is exclusionary and should be condemned under s 46 of the then Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) (TPA), now s 46 of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) (CCA), and behaviour that is not exclusionary and might even be pro-competitive. This boundary can be especially difficult to draw in the case of entry deterring strategies. Section 46(1) prohibits corporations with a substantial degree of market power from taking advantage of that market power for one of the statutorily proscribed purposes which include preventing the entry of a person into that or any other market. Section 45(2) separately prohibits corporations from making and giving effect to contracts arrangements and understandings that have the purpose, effect or likely effect of substantially lessening competition in a market. The latest case in which the ACCC has failed to satisfy the s 46 criteria is the decision of Greenwood J in ACCC v Cement Australia Pty Ltd [2013] FCA 909 (Cement Australia case). Final orders were published in a separate judgment, in ACCC v Cement Australia Pty Ltd [2014] FCA 148 (28 February 2014). The case concerned an entry deterring strategy, namely the pre-emptive buying of input factors in an upstream market to protect an incumbent with substantial market power in a downstream market and to prevent new entry in the downstream market. Greenwood J found that while Cement Australia Pty Ltd, formerly known as Queensland Cement Ltd (QCL), had substantial market power, its conduct in entering into the pre-emptive contracts was not a contravention of s 46, because Cement Australia had not “taken advantage” of its market power. However, since Cement Australia’s purpose in entering into the pre-emptive contracts was anti-competitive, they were held to contravene s 45(2) of the TPA. The purpose of this Note is to consider only the reasons for judgment in the Cement Australia case in relation to the “taking advantage” element. The judgment was handed down on 10 September 2013. The final hearing date was 15 July 2011, so it was long-awaited. At 714 pages, it is carefully drafted.

In pursuit of an architecture realism

The noble idea of studying seminal works to ‘see what we can learn’ has turned in the 1990s into ‘let’s see what we can take’ and in the last decade a more toxic derivative ‘what else can’t we take’. That is my observation as a student of architecture in the 1990s, and as a practitioner in the 2000s. In 2010, the sense that something is ending is clear. The next generation is rising and their gaze has shifted. The idea of classification (as a means of separation) was previously rejected by a generation of Postmodernists; the usefulness of difference declined. It’s there in the presence of plurality in the resulting architecture, a decision to mine history and seize in a willful manner. This is a process of looking back but never forward. It has been a mono-culture of absorption. The mono-culture rejected the pursuit of the realistic. It is a blanket suffocating all practice of architecture in this country from the mercantile to the intellectual. Independent reviews of Australia’s recent contributions to the Venice Architecture Biennales confirm the malaise. The next generation is beginning to reconsider classification as a means of unification. By acknowledging the characteristics of competing forces it is possible to bring them into a state of tension. Seeking a beautiful contrast is a means to a new end. In the political setting, this is described by Noel Pearson as the radical centre[1]. The concept transcends the political and in its most essential form is a cultural phenomenon. It resists the compromised position and suggests that we can look back while looking forward. The radical centre is the only demonstrated opportunity where it is possible to pursue a realistic architecture. A realistic architecture in Australia may be partially resolved by addressing our anxiety of permanence. Farrelly’s built desires[2] and Markham’s ritual demonstrations[3] are two ways into understanding the broader spectrum of permanence. But I think they are downstream of our core problem. Our problem, as architects, is that we are yet to come to terms with this place. Some call it landscape others call it country. Australian cities were laid out on what was mistaken for a blank canvas. On some occasions there was the consideration of the landscape when it presented insurmountable physical obstacles. The architecture since has continued to work on its piece of a constantly blank canvas. Even more ironic is the commercial awards programs that represent a claim within this framework but at best can only establish a dialogue within itself. This is a closed system unable to look forward. It is said that Melbourne is the most European city in the southern hemisphere but what is really being described there is the limitation of a senseless grid. After all, if Dutch landscape informs Dutch architecture why can’t the Australian landscape inform Australian architecture? To do that, we would have to acknowledge our moribund grasp of the meaning of the Australian landscape. Or more precisely what Indigenes call Country[4]. This is a complex notion and there are different ways into it. Country is experienced and understood through the senses and seared into memory. If one begins design at that starting point it is not unreasonable to think we can arrive at an end point that is a counter trajectory to where we have taken ourselves. A recent studio with Masters students confirmed this. Start by finding Country and it would be impossible to end up with a building looking like an Aboriginal man’s face. To date architecture in Australia has overwhelmingly ignored Country on the back of terra nullius. It can’t seem to get past the picturesque. Why is it so hard? The art world came to terms with this challenge, so too did the legal establishment, even the political scene headed into new waters. It would be easy to blame the budgets of commerce or the constraints of program or even the pressure of success. But that is too easy. Those factors are in fact the kind of limitations that opportunities grow out of. The past decade of economic plenty has, for the most part, smothered the idea that our capitals might enable civic settings or an architecture that is able to looks past lot line boundaries in a dignified manner. The denied opportunities of these settings to be prompted by the Country they occupy is criminal. The public realm is arrested in its development because we refuse to accept Country as a spatial condition. What we seem to be able to embrace is literal and symbolic gestures usually taking the form of a trumped up art installations. All talk – no action. To continue to leave the public realm to the stewardship of mercantile interests is like embracing derivative lending after the global financial crisis.Herein rests an argument for why we need a resourced Government Architect’s office operating not as an isolated lobbyist for business but as a steward of the public realm for both the past and the future. New South Wales is the leading model with Queensland close behind. That is not to say both do not have flaws but current calls for their cessation on the grounds of design parity poorly mask commercial self interest. In Queensland, lobbyists are heavily regulated now with an aim to ensure integrity and accountability. In essence, what I am speaking of will not be found in Reconciliation Action Plans that double as business plans, or the mining of Aboriginal culture for the next marketing gimmick, or even discussions around how to make buildings more ‘Aboriginal’. It will come from the next generation who reject the noxious mono-culture of absorption and embrace a counter trajectory to pursue an architecture of realism.

Regulation, compliance and the Australian forensic accounting profession

Legacies of the Global Financial Crisis and major domestic corporate collapses – such as HIH Insurance Pty Ltd and One.Tel Ltd (telecommunications) – have significantly changed Australia‟s financial regulatory landscape. Legal requirements for auditors have attracted particular attention as have practice standards more broadly around disclosure and conflict of interest. Conversely, although successful detection and prosecution of breaches may rest in significant part on forensic accounting activities, Australia‟s practitioners in this field have no minimum training or qualifications standards other than the baseline requirements mandated by the country‟s three professional accounting bodies. For those unaffiliated with these organizations, no professional oversight exists. In Australia, growth in the forensic accounting industry has been in direct response to public demand for expertise in a broad range of fraud, forensic and business analytics areas in order to improve the corporate governance practices of Australian organizations. During the 1990s, Australian forensic accounting firms expanded and diversified into a number of different areas going well beyond just the examination of financial documents and involvement in financial litigation disputes. “Big 4” accounting firms such as PriceWaterhouseCoopers, KPMG, Deloitte and Ernst and Young formed independent forensic accounting or forensic services units; a number of mid-tier and „boutique‟ forensic accounting firms similarly expanded into forensic investigative, analytical and advisory services. By 2008, 800 forensic accountants were registered with the country‟s largest specialist forensic accounting group, the Forensic Accounting Special Interest Group (FASIG) of the ICAA1. Currently, obtaining more precise figures on numbers of forensic accounting practitioners is problematic: professional accounting bodies either do not keep a register or have ceased registering their forensic accounting members; lack of formal recognition, admission or certification processes complicate identification of candidates; and diversity of the skills sets the industry requires has meant the influx of non-accounting based specialists.

Insurance and transport law : controlling insurance contract terms : Section 54 of the Insurance Contracts Act – compliance, recovery and accountability

Commonwealth legislation covering insurance contracts contains numerous provisions designed to control the operation and effect of terms in life and general insurance contracts. For example, the Life Insurance Act 1995 (Cth) contains provisions regulating the consequences attendant upon incorrect statements in proposals [1] and non-payment of premiums, [2] provides that an insurer may only exclude liability in the case of suicide if it has made express provision for such contingency in its policy, [3] and severely restricts the efficacy of conditions as to war risks. [4] The Insurance Contracts Act 1984 (Cth) is even more intrusive and has a major impact upon contractual provisions in the general insurance field. It is beyond the scope of this note to explore all of these provisions in any detail but examples of controls and constraints imposed upon the operation and effect of contractual provisions include the following. A party is precluded from relying upon a provision in a contract of insurance if such reliance would amount to a failure to act with the utmost good faith. [5] Similarly, a policy provision which requires differences or disputes arising out of the insurance to be submitted to arbitration is void, [6] unless the insurance is a genuine cover for excess of loss over and above another specified insurance. [7] Similarly clause such as conciliation clauses, [8] average clauses, [9] and unusual terms [10] are given qualified operation. [11] However the provision in the Insurance Contracts Act that has the greatest impact upon, and application to, a wide range of insurance clauses and claims is s 54. This section has already generated a significant volume of case law and is the focus of this note. In particular this note examines two recent cases. The first, Johnson v Triple C Furniture and Electrical Pty Ltd [2012] 2 Qd R 337, (hereafter the Triple C case), is a decision of the Queensland Court of Appeal; and the second, Matthew Maxwell v Highway Hauliers Pty Ltd [2013] WASCA 115, (hereafter the Highway Hauliers case), is a decision of the Court of Appeal in Western Australia. This latter decision is on appeal to the High Court of Australia. The note considers too the decision of the New South Wales Court of Appeal in Prepaid Services Pty Ltd v Atradius Credit Insurance NV [2013] NSWCA 252 (hereafter the Prepaid Services case).These cases serve to highlight the complex nature of s 54 and its application, as well as the difficulty in achieving a balance between an insurer and an insured's reasonable expectations.

Incentivising tenants to stay the term – will clawbacks be enforceable?

Incentives are commonly offered by commercial landlords to tenants in the form of short term rent deductions or contributions to the tenant’s fitout. Usually these incentives are conditional upon the lessee remaining in the premises for the term of the lease with an obligation on the tenant to repay a proportion of the fitout contribution and rent deductions upon early termination or assignment. While the enforceability of clawback provisions has always been unclear, there was commercial benefit to landlords in maintaining high rentals on the face of the lease and attracting good quality tenants through fitout contributions. The use of clawback provisions as part of these incentives was recently analysed by the Queensland Supreme Court through the lens of the penalties doctrine in GWC Property Group Pty Ltd v Higginson & Ors [2014] QSC 264, with a negative outcome for the landlord. Unless the decision is overturned on appeal, the salient message for landlords is that repayment of incentives for any reason, not just a breach of the lease, is unlikely to be enforceable.

MATLAB/Simulink simulation and C2000 code generation model for a grid-interactive 3-phase 4-wire inverter

This work is a MATLAB/Simulink model of a controller for a three-phase, four-wire, grid-interactive inverter. The model provides capacity for simulating the performance of power electroinic hardware, as well as code generation for an embedded controller. The implemented hardware topology is a three-leg bridge with a neutral connection to the centre-tap of the DC bus. An LQR-based current controller and MAF-based phase detector are implemented. The model is configured for code generation for a Texas Instruments TMS320F28335 Digital Signal Processor (DSP).

Amendments potentially time-barred : A practical approach

In Mineral Resources Engineering Services Pty Ltd as Trustee for the Meakin Investment Trust v Commonwealth Bank of Australia: Hay v Commonwealth Bank of Australia [2015] QSC 62 Philip McMurdo J considered challenges to amended statements of claim in two related actions. The amendments were potentially time-barred and his Honour considered in particular the date from which the amendments should take effect.

Costs assessor selection: A question of timing, or cost?

In Lessbrook Pty Ltd (in liq) v Whap; Stephen; Bowie; Kepa & Kepa [2014] QCA 63 the Queensland Court of Appeal dealt with significant questions of general application relating to the appointment of assessors to conduct an assessment of costs under the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld) (UCPR).

Email negotiations form a binding land contract without a 'signature'

Email is rapidly replacing other forms of communication as the preferred means of communication between contracting parties. The recent decision of Stellard Pty Ltd v North Queensland Fuel Pty Ltd [2015] QSC 119 reinforces the judicial acceptance of email as an effective means of creating a binding agreement and the willingness to adopt a liberal concept of ‘signing’ in an electronic environment.