Contractual arrangements: the overlooked step towards a fiscal union. European Policy Brief No. 18, December 2013

‘Contractual arrangements’ were proposed as an initial step towards a fiscal union that would consolidate the EMU. At this stage, the debate should be centred on the cornerstone of these contracts: the solidarity mechanism. The form of the financial support should not be limited to loans, and include the possibility for grants. Only the countries with the greatest adjustment needs should benefit from the financial support of other countries. This solidarity could be justified in principle by the intensity of the ‘shocks’ they experienced. In this way, contractual arrangement would facilitate the completion of the necessary adjustment in the current crisis – thanks both to more structural reforms and more mutual support within the eurozone.

Which fiscal union for the euro area? Bruegel Policy Contribution ISSUE 2016/05, February 2016

At the current level of political and societal integration, a large federal budget is unrealistic in the euro area. The authors make three recommendations that would lead national fiscal policies to be more stabilising with respect to the economic cycle, while achieving long-term sustainability. They also recommend a move towards a European unemployment insurance scheme targeted at ‘large’ shocks, and a minimum set of labour-market harmonisation criteria.

A proposal to revive the European Fiscal Framework. Bruegel Policy Contribution ISSUE 2016/07 MARCH 2016

Pro-cyclical fiscal tightening might be one reason for the anaemic economic recovery in Europe, raising questions about the effectiveness of the EU’s fiscal framework in achieving its two main objectives: public debt sustainability and fiscal stabilisation. • In theory, the current EU fiscal rules, with cyclically adjusted targets, flexibility clauses and the option to enter an excessive deficit procedure, allow for large-scale fiscal stabilisation during a recession. However, implementation of the rules is hindered by the badly-measured structural balance indicator and incorrect forecasts, leading to erroneous policy recommendations. The large number of flexibility clauses makes the system opaque. • The current inefficient European fiscal framework should be replaced with a system based on rules that are more conducive to the two objectives, more transparent, easier to implement and which have a higher potential to be complied with. • The best option, re-designing the fiscal framework from scratch, is currently unrealistic. Therefore we propose to eliminate the structural balance rules and to introduce a new public expenditure rule with debt-correction feedback, embodied in a multi-annual framework, which would also support the central bank’s inflation target. A European Fiscal Council could oversee the system.

Fiscal imbalances, inflation and sovereign default dynamics

Resumen: La cuestión central que este artículo busca responder es como la política monetaria puede afectar el comportamiento de equilibrio de primas por riesgo soberano y cesación de pagos. El artículo se basa en el modelo de “una-tasa-interés”. La deuda pública se hace riesgosa a causa de una política fiscal activa, como en Uribe (2006), reflejando la habilidad limitada de la autoridad fiscal para controlar el superávit primario. El problema de insolvencia es debido a una oleada de mala suerte (shocks negativos que afectan el superávit primario). Pero en contraste a los resultados de Uribe, a medida que aumenta el costo de la deuda soberana (que resulta de un excedente primario débil), la cesación de pagos se anticipa y es reflejada por una creciente prima de riesgo en el país y una probabilidad de cesación de pagos. La cesación de pagos se define como un incumplimiento de un acuerdo contractual y por ende la decisión es tomada por la autoridad fiscal. Mientras tanto, objetivos conflictivos entre la autoridad monetaria y fiscal juegan un rol importante en llevar a la autoridad fiscal a la cesación de pagos sobre sus pasivos. La característica de la política del gobierno necesaria para restaurar el equilibrio después de la cesación de pagos también es analizada.

Balance de la política fiscal desarrollada en España en época de crisis. ¿Por qué elegir el camino contractivo?

The use of a contractive fiscal policy in times of crisis and austerity can lead to so many different opinion streams which can be, at the same time, very opposite with each other. The high budget deficit in some economies has forced the eurozone to implement austerity policies, meaning that the debate is now more alive than ever. Therefore, the aim of this paper is to analyze the effects of the implementation of a contractive policy during a crisis considering the case of Spain. The positive effects in financial markets were noticed due to the decrease of the risk premium and the payment of interests, and also thanks to the increase of trust towards Spain. This way, the reduction of the Spanish deficit was remarkable but in any case there is still a long path until reaching the limit of 3% of the GDP. Also, in the short run it is possible to see that the consolidation had contractive effects in the economic activity but, in the long run, the debate is among the defenders of the fact that austerity is followed by a growing period and the ones opposing to it due to the drowning effect produced by it.

Incidencia redistributiva de la política fiscal en la República Dominicana, 2000-2014

[ES]El trabajo es un análisis de la incidencia de la política fiscal llevada a cabo en la República Dominicana a lo largo del periodo 2000-2014, orientado a evaluar la progresividad o regresividad del sistema tributario y el gasto público así como sus efectos en la distribución del ingreso de la población dominicana. Con objeto de evaluar la acción fiscal se compara la distribución del ingreso antes y después del pago de impuestos y de las actuaciones de gasto, utilizando los indicadores de medidas de desigualdad y concentración tales como el índice de Gini, Kakwani, Concentración y Reybolds-Smolensky. El estudio considera algunas propuestas de política fiscal para lograr una mejora en la distribución del ingreso disponible a partir de las actuaciones de gasto público y un sistema tributario más progresivo.

Fiscal Integration in the European Union : assessment of different proposals

This paper explores the fiscal situation of the European Union as well as the different approaches proposed for achieving fiscal policy coordination among the member states. Furthermore, it works through the need of fiscal integration as a pressing matter in order for the European Union to achieve its aim of functioning as an efficient single market and economic unit. In order to do so, it analyzes the theoretical lines of the Modern Money Theory as a possible framework for further integration, and it evaluates the different proposals made for fiscal integration so that it can give an assessment regarding their compatibility with this theory.

Estímulos fiscais e a interação entre as políticas monetária e fiscal no Brasil

Este trabalho estima, utilizando dados trimestrais de 1999 a 2011, o impacto dinâmico de um estímulo fiscal no Brasil sobre as principais variáveis macroeconômicas Brasileiras. Na estimativa dos impactos permitiu-se que as expectativas dos agentes econômicas fossem afetadas pela existência e probabilidade de alternância de regimes (foram detectados dois regimes) na política monetária do país. Os parâmetros da regra da política monetária, nos dois regimes detectados, foram estimados através de um modelo - composto apenas pela equação da regra da política monetária - que permite uma mudança de regime Markoviana. Os parâmetros do único regime encontrado para a política fiscal foram estimados por um modelo Vetorial de Correção de Erros (Vector Error Correction Model - VEC), composto apenas pelas variáveis pertencentes à regra da política fiscal. Os parâmetros estimados, para os diversos regimes das políticas monetária e fiscal, foram utilizados como auxiliares na calibragem de um modelo de equilíbrio geral estocástico dinâmico (MEGED), com mudanças de regime, com rigidez nominal de preços e concorrência monopolística (como em Davig e Leeper (2011)). Após a calibragem do MEGED os impactos dinâmicos de um estímulo fiscal foram obtidos através de uma rotina numérica (desenvolvida por Davig e Leeper (2006)) que permite obter o equilíbrio dinâmico do modelo resolvendo um sistema de equações de diferenças de primeira ordem expectacionais dinâmicas não lineares. Obtivemos que a política fiscal foi passiva durante todo o período analisado e que a política monetária foi sempre ativa, porém sendo em determinados momentos menos ativa. Em geral, em ambas as combinações de regimes, um choque não antecipado dos gastos do governo leva ao aumento do hiato do produto, aumento dos juros reais, redução do consumo privado e (em contradição com o resultado convencional) redução da taxa de inflação.

Varieties of Economic Crisis, Varieties of Ideational Change: How and Why Macroeconomic Policy and Financial Regulation Differ

One of the principal tasks facing post-crash academic political economy is to analyse patterns of ideational change and the conditions that produce such change. What has been missing from the existing literature on ideational change at times of crises however, is a sense of how processes of persuasive struggle, and how the success of those ‘norm entrepreneurs’ arguing for ideational change is shaped by two contextual variables: the most immediate material symptoms and problems that a crisis displays (the variety of crisis); and the institutional character of the policy subsystem that agents have to operate within to affect change. Introducing these two variables into our accounts of persuasive struggle and ideational change enables us to deepen our understanding of the dynamics of ideational change at times of crisis. The article identifies that a quite rapid and radical intellectual change has been evident in the field of financial regulation in the form of an embrace of a macroprudential frame. In contrast in the field of macroeconomic policy - both monetary and fiscal policy, many pre-crash beliefs remain prominent, there is evidence of ideational stickiness and inertia, and despite some policy experimentation, overarching policy frameworks and their rationales have not been overhauled. The article applies Peter Hall’s framework of three orders of policy changes to help illuminate and explain the variation in patterns of change in the fields of financial regulation and macroeconomic policy since the financial crash of 2008. The different patterns of ideational change in macroeconomic policy and financial regulation in the post-crash period can be explained by timing and variety of crisis; sequencing of policy change; and institutional political differences between micro policy sub systems and macro policy systems.

Macroeconomic impacts of politics and policy: Applications to financial and real markets

A PhD Dissertation, presented as part of the requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy from the NOVA - School of Business and Economics

The role of income inequality on fiscal multipliers

A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Double Degree in Economics from the Nova School of Business and Economics and University of Maastricht

US fiscal dynamics in political perspective

Given the importance of fiscal balance for ensuring a sustainable fiscal policy, we conduct an empirical examination of fiscal dynamics in the United States in response to unsustainable budget deviations. We concentrate on the role of political factors, namely the Republican - Democrat presidential divide, in determining the fiscal response to budget disequilibria. Making use of an asymmetric cointegration framework, we explore politically motivated fiscal asymmetries in the US, from Eisenhower to Obama. We conclude that political factors such as the government’s political quadrant and the timing of elections are important determinants of the fiscal response to unsustainable budget deviations.

Incidencia de la política de autonomía fiscal de los Estados miembros de la UE en el comercio intrazona. Estudio de caso: El Impuesto Excepcional de Crisis húngaro en su relación comercial con Austria y Alemania. Período 2010-2011

En el año 2010 el gobierno húngaro implementó el Impuesto Excepcional de Crisis, que grava a las empresas del sector de telecomunicaciones, energía y agroalimentario con el fin de hacer frente a los graves problemas fiscales que aquejaban a Hungría. Dicho impuesto se enmarca dentro de la política de autonomía fiscal de los Estados miembros de la UE, ya que cada gobierno tiene potestad para determinar la cuantía de los impuestos sobre las empresas con el fin de que se puedan cumplir los intereses económicos nacionales; aun así, dicha autonomía se basa en el respeto al tratado de Maastricht y al pacto de estabilidad y crecimiento, que establecen que las políticas fiscales de los Estados miembros deben estar en armonía con la libre circulación de mercancías, servicios y capitales, así como un trato equitativo a todas las empresas, ya sean nacionales o extranjeras. Este gravamen recae principalmente en empresas ligadas al sector de las exportaciones en Hungría, con nacionalidad de Austria y Alemania, los principales socios comerciales de Hungría, afectando de esta forma las relaciones comerciales de los actores en mención. Así, el trabajo analiza las implicaciones que tiene dicho impuesto para la consecución del interés económico de Hungría, a partir de su incidencia en las metas fiscales y el comercio que este Estado tiene con Austria y Alemania.

The challenges of Europe's fourfold union. Bruegel Policy Contribution 2012/13, 16 August 2012

Five years after the first tremors in Europe’s banking system, what makes the crisis unique is the absence of a democratically accountable decision-making framework; there is an 'executive deficit' that compounds Europe’s democratic deficit. The author argues that the only way to resolve the crisis successfully is a sustained effort to achieve a 'fourfold union' agenda: banking union, fiscal union, competitiveness union and political union. Progress must be made in parallel on each of the four components. In particular, successful progress towards banking union requires a combination of short term action, including the establishment of a temporary resolution authority to identify undercapitalised banks and to restructure them, and longer-term measures, including the creation of permanent authorities for supervision, resolution and deposit insurance.