[Reorganization and consolidation of the Illinois Dept. of Insurance, Illinois Office of Banks and Real Estate, Illinois Dept. of Professional Regulation, and the Illinois Dept. of Financial Institutions into the Illinois Dept. of Financial and Professional Regulation]

As part of the Governor's effort to streamline State government through improvements in the efficiency and effectiveness of operations, Executive Order 2004-06 ("EO6") provided for the reorganization (consolidation) of the Department of Insurance, Office of Banks and Real Estate, Department of Professional Regulation and Department of Financial Institutions. Through EO6 the four predecessor Agencies were abolished and a single new agency, The Department of Financial and Professional Regulation (hereafter referred to as "IDFPR") was created. The purpose of the consolidation of the four regulatory agencies was to allow for certain economies of scale to be realized primarily within the executive management and administrative functions. Additionally, the consolidation would increases the effectiveness of operations through the integration of certain duplicative functions within the four predecessor agencies without the denegration of the frontline functions. Beginning on or about July 1, 2004, the IDFPR began consolidation activities focusing primarily on the administrative functions of Executive Management, Fiscal and Accounting, General Counsel, Human Resources, Information Technology and Other Administrative Services. The underlying premise of the reorganization was that all improvements could be accomplished without the denegration of the frontline functions of the predecessor agencies. Accordingly, all powers, duties, rights, responsibilities and functions of the predecessor agencies migrated to IDFPR and the reorganization activities commenced July 1, 2004.

Financial Services Regulatory Relief Act of 2006 : report (to accompany S. 2856).

"May 18, 2006."

Financial innovation and engineering in Islamic financial institutions

Drawing from work found in the financial innovation literature, the main objective of this research is to explore the effect of religious orientation towards financial innovation and engineering in Islamic Financial Institutions (IFIs). The research also examines what constitutes this religious orientation and how it is enacted in the innovation process. Religious orientation towards financial innovation is conceptualised and defined, as a system, in this research study. In order to achieve this objective, the study employs multiple theoretical perspectives to develop its theoretical framework. It combines innovation orientation theory with the theory on boundary objects to explore the role of religion in the financial innovation processes in IFIs. Religious orientation

"Policy externalisation" inherent failure : international financial institutions' conditionality in developing countries

Conditionalities – i.e. ‘exchanging finance for policy reform’ in an asymmetrical relationship between the ‘donor’ and the ‘recipient’ – are central mechanisms of the reform programmes of international financial institutions (IFIs). As they are imposed by outside entities, they can also be viewed as ‘policy externalisation’, which is paradoxically a massive intrusion in the shaping of a country’s domestic policies. The resilience of such devices is remarkable, however. Indeed, in the early 1980s, many developing countries were facing balance of payments difficulties and called upon these international financial institutions for financial relief. In exchange for this relief, they devised economic reforms (fiscal, financial, monetary), which were the conditions for their lending. These reforms were not associated with better economic performance, and this led the IFIs to devise in the 1990s different reforms, which this time targeted the functioning of the government and its ‘governance’, economic problems being explained by governments’ characteristics (e.g., rent-seekers). The paper demonstrates the limitations of the device of conditionality, which is a crucial theoretical and policy issue given its stability across time and countries. These limitations stem from: i) the concept of conditionality per se - the mechanism of exchanging finance for reform; ii) the contents of the prescribed reforms given developing countries economic structure (typically commodity-based export structures) and the weakness of the concept of ‘governance’ in view of these countries’ political economies; and iii) the intrinsic linkages between economic and political conditionalities, whose limitations thus retroact on each other, in particular regarding effectiveness and credibility.

Trends in Financial Intermediation by the Banking System in Kerala

The study documents the long-term trends in financial intermediation by the principal player in Kerala’s credit system i.e., banking. The process of financial intermediation by the banking system, involving mobilization of deposits from savers and disbursal of credit to investors, is considered to be crucial in the process of economic development. The objective of the study is to explore the interrelationship between financial intermediation and economic growth in Kerala. In order to pursue this objective, the study examine, the trends in intermediation by the banking system in Kerala over a long period, the trend and pattern of bank deposits and credit in the State and Kerala’s economic growth, the trend in the growth and performance of financial intermediaries like the All India Financial Institutions, the links between banking and economic variables, and the difference in the growth trends of banking and economic variables between Kerala and India and the probable reasons for the difference

Multilateral banking and development financing in a context of financial volatility

Includes bibliography

The Challenges of the EU Banking Union - will it succeed in dealing with the next financial crisis? Bruges European Economic Policy Briefings 36/2015

The EU Banking Union combines micro- and macro-prudential regulation. It aims at breaking the “doom loop” between banks and sovereign debt, promoting financial stability and mitigating the next financial shock to the real EU economy, at the lowest possible cost to the financial institutions and to the taxpayers. Success, or failure, is determined by how the banking union copes with the challenges to its two main pillars, the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) and the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM). Under the SSM, in its new supervisory role, the ECB may be subject to conflicts between the objectives of price and financial stability, and the single-supervisor role may be sub-optimal. Two regulators might have been preferable and more focus on ECB accountability will now be required. The shock-absorbing Single Resolution Fund (SRF), which is part of the SRM, may not have the capacity to deal with a crisis of the size of the one of 2008. Especially as the nature and severity of a future financial crisis cannot be forecasted. The design of the banking union is not the result of theoretical studies, but a political compromise to deal with an acute crisis. The theoretical studies that are included in this paper are not supportive of the banking union in its current form. Nevertheless, there is a good chance that the EU Banking Union may succeed, as ECB supervision of the 123 systemically important banks should contain potential demands on the SRM. In the event of a crisis that is too severe for the banking union to absorb with its current capability, the crucial assumption is that there is political will to rapidly provide new resources. The same applies, if a major financial crisis develops before the banking union is fully operational.

The Challenges of the EU Banking Union - will it succeed in dealing with the next financial crisis? Bruges European Economic Policy (BEEP) Briefings 36/2015

The EU Banking Union combines micro- and macro-prudential regulation. It aims at breaking the “doom loop” between banks and sovereign debt, promoting financial stability and mitigating the next financial shock to the real EU economy, at the lowest possible cost to the financial institutions and to the taxpayers. Success, or failure, is determined by how the banking union copes with the challenges to its two main pillars, the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) and the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM). Under the SSM, in its new supervisory role, the ECB may be subject to conflicts between the objectives of price and financial stability, and the single-supervisor role may be sub-optimal. Two regulators might have been preferable and more focus on ECB accountability will now be required. The shock-absorbing Single Resolution Fund (SRF), which is part of the SRM, may not have the capacity to deal with a crisis of the size of the one of 2008. Especially as the nature and severity of a future financial crisis cannot be forecasted. The design of the banking union is not the result of theoretical studies, but a political compromise to deal with an acute crisis. The theoretical studies that are included in this paper are not supportive of the banking union in its current form. Nevertheless, there is a good chance that the EU Banking Union may succeed, as ECB supervision of the 123 systemically important banks should contain potential demands on the SRM. In the event of a crisis that is too severe for the banking union to absorb with its current capability, the crucial assumption is that there is political will to rapidly provide new resources. The same applies, if a major financial crisis develops before the banking union is fully operational.

Effects of information technology on financial services systems : hearing before the Committee on Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs, House of Representatives, Ninety-eighth Congress, second session, September 12, 1984.

Mode of access: Internet.