Identification of an 11-kDa FKBP12-rapamycin-binding domain within the 289-kDa FKBP12-rapamycin-associated protein and characterization of a critical serine residue.

Complexed with its intracellular receptor, FKBP12, the natural product rapamycin inhibits G1 progression of the cell cycle in a variety of mammalian cell lines and in the yeast Saccharomyces cerevisae. Previously, a mammalian protein that directly associates with FKBP12-rapamycin has been identified and its encoding gene has been cloned from both human (designated FRAP) [Brown, E.J., Albers, M.W., Shin, T.B., Ichikawa, K., Keith, C.T., Lane, W.S. & Schreiber, S.L. (1994) Nature (London) 369, 756-758] and rat (designated RAFT) [Sabatini, D.M., Erdjument-Bromage, H., Lui, M., Tempst, P. & Snyder, S.H. (1994) Cell 78, 35-43]. The full-length FRAP is a 289-kDa protein containing a putative phosphatidylinositol kinase domain. Using an in vitro transcription/translation assay method coupled with proteolysis studies, we have identified an 11-kDa FKBP12-rapamycin-binding domain within FRAP. This minimal binding domain lies N-terminal to the kinase domain and spans residues 2025-2114. In addition, we have carried out mutagenesis studies to investigate the role of Ser2035, a potential phosphorylation site for protein kinase C within this domain. We now show that the FRAP Ser2035-->Ala mutant displays similar binding affinity when compared with the wild-type protein, whereas all other mutations at this site, including mimics of phosphoserine, abolish binding, presumably due to either unfavorable steric interactions or induced conformational changes.

Banking Union with a Sovereign Virus. The self-serving regulatory treatment of sovereign debt in the euro area. CEPS Policy Brief No. 289, 27 March 2013

In many eurozone countries, domestic banks often hold more than 20% of domestic public debt, which is an unsatisfactory situation given that banks are highly leveraged and that sovereign debt is inherently subject to default risk within the euro area. This paper by Daniel Gros finds, however, that the relative concentration of public debt on bank balance sheets is not just a result of the euro crisis, for there are strong additional incentives for banks in some countries to increase their sovereign. His contribution discusses a number of these regulatory incentives – the most important of which is specific to the euro area – and explores ways in which euro area banks can be weaned from massive investments in government bonds.