Changes of mind in decision-making.

A decision is a commitment to a proposition or plan of action based on evidence and the expected costs and benefits associated with the outcome. Progress in a variety of fields has led to a quantitative understanding of the mechanisms that evaluate evidence and reach a decision. Several formalisms propose that a representation of noisy evidence is evaluated against a criterion to produce a decision. Without additional evidence, however, these formalisms fail to explain why a decision-maker would change their mind. Here we extend a model, developed to account for both the timing and the accuracy of the initial decision, to explain subsequent changes of mind. Subjects made decisions about a noisy visual stimulus, which they indicated by moving a handle. Although they received no additional information after initiating their movement, their hand trajectories betrayed a change of mind in some trials. We propose that noisy evidence is accumulated over time until it reaches a criterion level, or bound, which determines the initial decision, and that the brain exploits information that is in the processing pipeline when the initial decision is made to subsequently either reverse or reaffirm the initial decision. The model explains both the frequency of changes of mind as well as their dependence on both task difficulty and whether the initial decision was accurate or erroneous. The theoretical and experimental findings advance the understanding of decision-making to the highly flexible and cognitive acts of vacillation and self-correction.

Motor effort alters changes of mind in sensorimotor decision making.

After committing to an action, a decision-maker can change their mind to revise the action. Such changes of mind can even occur when the stream of information that led to the action is curtailed at movement onset. This is explained by the time delays in sensory processing and motor planning which lead to a component at the end of the sensory stream that can only be processed after initiation. Such post-initiation processing can explain the pattern of changes of mind by asserting an accumulation of additional evidence to a criterion level, termed change-of-mind bound. Here we test the hypothesis that physical effort associated with the movement required to change one's mind affects the level of the change-of-mind bound and the time for post-initiation deliberation. We varied the effort required to change from one choice target to another in a reaching movement by varying the geometry of the choice targets or by applying a force field between the targets. We show that there is a reduction in the frequency of change of mind when the separation of the choice targets would require a larger excursion of the hand from the initial to the opposite choice. The reduction is best explained by an increase in the evidence required for changes of mind and a reduced time period of integration after the initial decision. Thus the criteria to revise an initial choice is sensitive to energetic costs.

The political philosophy of Miki Kiyoshi: A close reading of the philosophical foundations of cooperative communitarianism

The thesis is a historical and philological study of the mature political theory of Miki Kiyoshi (1897-1945) focused on Philosophical Foundations of Cooperative Communitarianism (1939), a full translation of which is included. As the name suggests, it was a methodological and normative communitarianism, which critically built on liberalism, Marxism and Confucianism to realise a regional political community. Some of Miki’s Western readers have wrongly considered him a fascist ideologue, while he has been considered a humanist Marxist in Japan. A closer reading cannot support either view. The thesis argues that the Anglophone study of Japanese philosophy is a degenerating research programme ripe for revolution in the sense of returning full circle to an original point. That means returning to the texts, reading them contextually and philologically, in principle as early modern European political theory is read by intellectual historians, such as the representatives of Cambridge School history of political thought. The resulting reading builds critically on the Japanese scholarship and relates it to contemporary Western and postcolonial political theory and the East Asian tradition, particularly neo-Confucianism. The thesis argues for a Cambridge School perspective radicalised by the critical addendum of geo-cultural context, supplemented by Geertzian intercultural hermeneutics and a Saidian ‘return to philology’. As against those who have seen radical reorientations in Miki’s political thought, the thesis finds gradual progression and continuity between his neo-Kantian, existentialist, Marxian anthropology, Hegelian and finally communitarian phases. The theoretical underpinnings are his philosophical anthropology, a structurationist social theory of praxis, and a critique of liberalism, Marxism, nationalism and idealism emphasising concrete as opposed to abstract theory and the need to build on existing cultural traditions to modernise rather than westernise East Asia. This post-Western fusion was imagined to be the beginning of a true and pluralistic universalism.

Neurobiological model of visuo-spatial cognition in young Williams Syndrome children: measures of dorsal-stream and frontal function

We examine hypotheses for the neural basis of the profile of visual cognition in young children with Williams syndrome (WS). These are: (a) that it is a consequence of anomalies in sensory visual processing; (b) that it is a deficit of the dorsal relative to the ventral cortical stream; (c) that it reflects deficit of frontal function, in particular of fronto-parietal interaction; (d) that it is related to impaired function in the right hemisphere relative to the left. The tests reported here are particularly relevant to (b) and (c). They form part of a more extensive programme of investigating visual, visuospatial, and cognitive function in large group of children with WS children, aged 8 months to 15 years. To compare performance across tests, avoiding floor and ceiling effects, we have measured performance in children with WS in terms of the ‘age equivalence’ for typically developing children. In this paper the relation between dorsal and ventral function was tested by motion and form coherence thresholds respectively. We confirm the presence of a subgroup of children with WS who perform particularly poorly on the motion (dorsal) task. However, such performance is also characteristic of normally developingchildren up to 5 years: thus the WS performance may reflect an overall persisting immaturity of visuospatial processing which is particularly evident in the dorsal stream. Looking at the performance on the global coherence tasks of the entire WS group, we find that there is also a subgroup who have both high form and motion coherence thresholds, relative to the performance of children of the same chronological age and verbal age on the BPVS, suggesting a more general global processing deficit. Frontal function was tested by a counterpointing task, ability to retrieve a ball from a ‘detour box’, and the Stroop-like ‘day-night’ task, all of which require inhibition of a familiar response. When considered in relation to overall development as indexed by vocabulary, the day-night task shows little specific impairment, the detour box shows a significant delay relative to controls, and the counterpointing task shows a marked and persistent deficit in many children. We conclude that frontal control processes show most impairment in WS when they are associated with spatially directed responses, reflecting a deficit of fronto-parietal processing. However, children with WS may successfully reduce the effect of this impairment by verbally mediated strategies. On all these tasks we find a range of difficulties across individual children and a small subset of WS who show very good performance, equivalent to chronological age norms of typically developing children. Neurobiological models of visuo-spatial cognition in children with WS p.4 Overall, we conclude that children with WS have specific processing difficulties with tasks involving frontoparietal circuits within the spatial domain. However, some children with WS can achieve similar performance to typically developing children on some tasks involving the dorsal stream, although the strategies and processing may be different in the two groups.

Imitation and 'theory of mind' competencies in discrimination of autism from other neurodevelopmental disorders

Several studies have reported imitative deficits in autism spectrum disorder (ASD). However, it is still debated if imitative deficits are specific to ASD or shared with clinical groups with similar mental impairment and motor difficulties. We investigated whether imitative tasks can be used to discriminate ASD children from typically developing children (TD) and children with general developmental delay (GDD). We applied discriminant function analyses to the performance of these groups on three imitation tasks and tests of dexterity, motor planning, verbal skills, theory of mind (ToM). Analyses revealed two significant dimensions. The first represented impairment of dexterity and verbal ability, and discriminated TD from GDD children. Once these differences were accounted for, differences in ToM and the three imitation tasks accounted for a significant proportion of the remaining intergroup variance and discriminated the ASD group from other groups. Further analyses revealed that inclusion of imitative tasks increased the specificity and sensitivity of ASD classification and that imitative tasks considered alone were able to reliably discriminate ASD, TD and GDD. The results suggest that imitation and theory of mind impairment in autism may stem from a common domain of origin separate from general cognitive and motor skill.