Factor Proportions and the Growth of World Trade

Most of the expansion of global trade during the last three decades has been of the North-South kind - between capital-abundant developed and labour-abundant developing countries. Based on this observation, I argue that the recent growth of world trade is best understood from a factor-proportions perspective. I present novel evidence documenting that differences in capital-labour ratios across countries have increased in the wake of two shocks to the global economy: i) the opening up of China and ii) financial globalisation and the resulting upstream capital flows towards capital-abundant regions. I analyse their impact on specialisation and the volume of trade in a dynamic model which combines factor-proportions trade in goods with international trade in financial assets. Calibrating this model, I find that it can account for 60% of world trade growth between 1980 and 2007. It is also capable of predicting international investment patterns which are consistent with the data

The international trade as the sole engine of growth for an economy

Can international trade act as the sole engine of growth for an economy? If yes, what are the mechanisms through which trade operates in transmitting permanent growth? This paper answers these questions with two simple two-country models, in which only one country enjoys sustained growth in autarky. The models differ in the assumptions on technical change, which is either labour- or capital-augmenting. In both cases, the stagnant economy imports growth by trading. In the first model, growth is transmitted because of permanent increases in the trade volume. In the alternative framework, the stagnant economy imports sustained growth because its terms of trade permanently improve.

FDI, Trade Costs and Regional Asymmetries

We set up a trade model where three countries compete for an exogenous number of firms. Our innovation lies in the geography of the model. Of the three countries, one is the hub through which all trade takes place. First, we establish the natural geography of the region, which is given by the equilibrium distribution of industrial activity in the absence of taxes or subsidies. We then examine the implications for corporate taxes when the countries compete with each other to attract firms. We find that, even when all countries are the same size, the centrality of the hub gives it an advantage in tax setting, such that its equilibrium tax can be larger than that of the spokes and yet it still attracts a disproportionate share of industry. Thus geographic advantage in tax competition has a second dimension, centrality in addition to size.

Picking the Right Budget Constraint for Scotland

This position paper considers the devolution of further fiscal powers to the Scottish Parliament in the context of the objectives and remit of the Smith Commission. The argument builds on our discussion of fiscal decentralization made in our previous published work on this topic. We ask what sort of budget constraint the Scottish Parliament should operate with. A soft budget constraint (SBC) allows the Scottish Parliament to spend without having to consider all of the tax and, therefore, political consequences, of that spending, which is effectively the position at the moment. The incentives to promote economic growth through fiscal policy – on both the tax and spending sides are weak to non-existent. This is what the Scotland Act, 1998, and the continuing use of the Barnett block grant, gave Scotland. Now other budget constraints are being discussed – those of the Calman Commission (2009) and the Scotland Act (2012), as well as the ones offered in 2014 by the various political parties – Scottish Conservatives, Scottish Greens, Scottish Labour, the Scottish Liberal Democrats and the Scottish Government. There is also the budget constraint designed by the Holtham Commission (2010) for Wales that could just as well be used in Scotland. We examine to what extent these offer the hard budget constraint (HBC) that would bring tax policy firmly into the realm of Scottish politics, asking the Scottish electorate and Parliament to consider the costs to them of increasing spending in terms of higher taxes; or the benefits to them of using public spending to grow the tax base and own-sourced taxes? The hardest budget constraint of all is offered by independence but, as is now known, a clear majority of those who voted in the referendum did not vote for this form of budget constraint. Rather they voted for a significant further devolution of fiscal powers while remaining within a political and monetary union with the rest of the UK, with the risk pooling and revenue sharing that this implies. It is not surprising therefore that none of the budget constraints on offer, apart from the SNP’s, come close to the HBC of independence. However, the almost 25% fall in the price of oil since the referendum, a resource stream so central to the SNP’s economic policy making, underscores why there is a need for a trade off between a HBC and risk pooling and revenue sharing. Ranked according to the desirable characteristic of offering something approaching a HBC the least desirable are those of the Calman Commission, the Scotland Act, 2012, and Scottish Labour. In all of these the ‘elasticity’ of the block grant in the face of failure to grow the Scottish tax base is either not defined or is very elastic – meaning that the risk of failure is shuffled off to taxpayers outside of Scotland. The degree of HBC in the Scottish Conservative, Scottish Greens and Scottish Liberal Democrats proposals are much more desirable from an economic growth point of view, the latter even embracing the HBC proposed by the Holtham Commission that combines serious tax policy with welfare support in the long-run. We judge that the budget constraint in the SNP’s proposals is too hard as it does not allow for continuation of the ‘welfare union’ in the UK. We also consider that in the case of a generalized UK economic slow requiring a fiscal stimulus that the Scottish Parliament be allowed increased borrowing to be repaid in the next economic upturn.

Unionisation, International Integration and Selection

We study how unionisation affects competitive selection between heterogeneous firms when wage negotiations can occur at the firm or at the profit-centre level. With productivity specific wages, an increase in union power has: (i) a selection-softening; (ii) a counter-competitive; (iii) a wage-inequality; and (iv) a variety effect. In a two-country asymmetric setting, stronger unions soften competition for domestic firms and toughen it for exporters. With profit-centre bargaining, we show how trade liberalisation can affect wage inequality among identical workers both across firms (via its effects on competitive selection) and within firms (via wage discrimination across destination markets).

Cognition, Resources, and Institutions in the Explanation of Attitudes to Free Trade

This article proposes a framework for the analysis of attitudes to foreign trade policies that challenges the traditional skill-endowment approach. The traditional approach assumes informed individuals who calculate the costs and benefits of alternative policies. We propose that individuals lack information and that their positions rest on economic vulnerability, as mediated through risk-aversion. We also stress the role of environmental signals and political endorsements in guiding individuals' views on trade policy. We test this alternative approach with a Spanish survey conducted in May 2009 and the ISSP survey conducted in 2003 in a large number of less developed and more developed countries. The Spanish data show that the population is largely uninformed and that their ideas about the consequences of free trade policy do not explain attitudes among different socio-demographic groups. Meanwhile, the ISSP data contradict important aspects of the traditional approach and are consistent with the alternative approach.

Migration and trade: Theory with an Application to the Eastern- Western European Integration

The remarkable increase in trade flows and in migratory flows of highly educated people are two important features of globalization of the last decades. This paper extends a two-country model of inter- and intraindustry trade to a rich environment featuring technological differences, skill differences and the possibility of international labor mobility. The model is used to explain the patterns of trade and migration as countries remove barriers to trade and to labor mobility. We parameterize the model to match the features of the Western and Eastern European members of the EU and analyze first the effects of the trade liberalization which occured between 1989 and 2004, and then the gains and losses from migration which are expected to occur if legal barriers to labor mobility are substantially reduced. The lower barriers to migration would result in significant migration of skilled workers from Eastern European countries. Interestingly, this would not only benefit the migrants and most Western European workers but, via trade, it would also benefit the workers remaining in Eastern Europe. Key Words: Skilled Migration, Gains from Variety, Real Wages, Eastern-Western Europe. JEL Codes: F12, F22, J61.

Trade liberalization, competition and growth

Increasing evidence support the claim that international trade enhances innovation and productivity growth through an increase in competition. This paper develops a two-country endogenous growth model, with firm specific R&D and a continuum of oligopolistic sectors under Cournot competition to provide a theoretical support to this claim. Since countries are assumed to produce the same set of varieties, trade openness makes markets more competitive, reducing prices and increasing quantities. Under Cournot competition, trade is pro-competitive. Since firms undertake cost reducing innovations, the increase in production induced by a more competitive market push firms to innovate more. Consequently, a reduction on trade barriers enhances growth by reducing domestic firm's market power.

Public particiation and the legitimacy of intergovernmental decision-making : a focus on the World Trade Organization

The legitimacy of the WTO's decision-making process has always been questioned, and many have advocated public participation mechanisms as a remedy. The present study considers the limits and potential of these mechanisms by advancing a conceptual framework, which distinguishes the four 'implementation parameters' of public participation: the goal, the object, the modalities, and the actors. It addresses the issue of legitimacy by considering to what extent, and by virtue of which legal developments, one can see implementing the democratic principle as a goal for public participation in the context of the WTO. By analyzing the institutional structure of the WTO and its different types of decisions, it then outlines how this goal should influence the object and modalities of public participation, which decision-making procedures should be opened to public participation, and how the mechanisms should be implemented in practice. Finally, it suggests speciflrc amendments to existing WTO affangements on public participation

Trade, firm selection, and innovation: the competition channel

The availability of rich firm-level data sets has recently led researchers to uncover new evidence on the effects of trade liberalization. First, trade openness forces the least productive firms to exit the market. Secondly, it induces surviving firms to increase their innovation efforts and thirdly, it increases the degree of product market competition. In this paper we propose a model aimed at providing a coherent interpretation of these findings. We introducing firm heterogeneity into an innovation-driven growth model, where incumbent firms operating in oligopolistic industries perform cost-reducing innovations. In this framework, trade liberalization leads to higher product market competition, lower markups and higher quantity produced. These changes in markups and quantities, in turn, promote innovation and productivity growth through a direct competition effect, based on the increase in the size of the market, and a selection effect, produced by the reallocation of resources towards more productive firms. Calibrated to match US aggregate and firm-level statistics, the model predicts that a 10 percent reduction in variable trade costs reduces markups by 1:15 percent, firm surviving probabilities by 1 percent, and induces an increase in productivity growth of about 13 percent. More than 90 percent of the trade-induced growth increase can be attributed to the selection effect.

Divergent Reactions to Globalization: Labor Unions and the Nafta and the EU Enlargement Process

The 1990s witnessed the launching of two ambitious trade regionalization plans, the Nafta and EU enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe. In contrast to previous projects for the creation or expansion of regional trade blocs, these two projects concerned states at dramatically different levels of economic development: The Nafta involved the very wealthy economies of Canada and the USA and the significantly poorer economy of Mexico, whereas EU enlargement involved the very wealthy economy of the 15 member-state European Union and the significantly poorer economies of former Communist states in Central and Eastern Europe. Ultimately, the Nafta and EU enlargement are responses to the challenges of globalization. Paradoxically, however, they have been met with radically different societal reactions in the wealthy partners that participated in the launching of these processes. This paper focuses on the reaction by labor unions on both sides of the Atlantic. I conclude that while labor relations and welfare institutions constrained the trade policy choices made by labor unions in the United States and Europe, they do not tell the whole story. It would seem that United States labor unions were more sensitive to the potential risks for workers associated to the liberalization of trade than were their European counterparts.