Strategic behavior and price discovery

The paper analyzes the effects of strategic behavior by an insider in a price discovery process, akin to an information tatonnement, in the presence of a competitive informed sector. Such processes are used in the preopening period of continuous trading systems in several exchanges. It is found that the insider manipulates the market using a contrarian strategy in order to neutralize the effect of the trades of competitive informed agents. Furthermore, consistently with the empirical evidence available, we find that information revelation accelerates close to the opening, that the market price does not converge to the fundamental value no matter how many rounds the tatonnement has, and that the expected trading volume displays a U-shaped pattern. We also find that a market with a larger competitive sector (smaller insider) has an improved informational efficiency and an increased trading volume. The insider provides a public good (a lower informativeness of the price) for the competitive informed sector.

Minimax regret and strategic uncertainty

This paper introduces a new solution concept, a minimax regret equilibrium, which allows for the possibility that players are uncertain about the rationality and conjectures of their opponents. We provide several applications of our concept. In particular, we consider pricesetting environments and show that optimal pricing policy follows a non-degenerate distribution. The induced price dispersion is consistent with experimental and empirical observations (Baye and Morgan (2004)).

Strategic delegation in monetary unions

In monetary unions, monetary policy is typically made by delegates of the member countries. This procedure raises the possibility of strategic delegation - that countries may choose the types of delegates to influence outcomes in their favor. We show that without commitment in monetary policy, strategic delegation arises if and only if three conditions are met: shocks affecting individual countries are not perfectly correlated, risk-sharing across countries is imperfect, and the Phillips Curve is nonlinear. Moreover, inflation rates are inefficiently high. We argue that ways of solving the commitment problem, including the emphasis on price stability in the agreements constituting the European Union are especially valuable when strategic delegation is a problem.

Department of Administrative Services Strategic Plan, 2008-2011

This report outlines the strategic plan for Department of Administrative Services, including, motto, goals and mission.

Audit report on Wave 2 of the Phase II Strategic Sourcing Initiative implemented by the Department of Administrative Services

Audit report on Wave 2 of the Phase II Strategic Sourcing Initiative implemented by the Department of Administrative Services

Strategic ambiguity in electoral competition

Many have observed that political candidates running for election areoften purposefully expressing themselves in vague and ambiguous terms. In thispaper we provide a simple formal model of this phenomenon. We model theelectoral competition between two candidates as a two--stage game. In thefirst stage of the game two candidates simultaneously choose their ideologies,and in the second stage they simultaneously choose their level of ambiguity.Our results show that ambiguity, although disliked by voters, may be sustainedin equilibrium. The introduction of ambiguity as a strategic choice variablefor the candidates can also serve to explain why candidates with the sameelectoral objectives end up ``separating'', that is, assuming different ideological positions.

On forward induction and evolutionary and strategic stability

We analyze which normal form solution concepts capture the notion offorward induction, as defined by van Damme (JET, 1989) in the classof generic two player normal form games preceded by an outsideoption. We find that none of the known strategic stability concepts(including Mertens stable sets and hyperstable sets) captures this form of forward induction. On the other hand, we show that the evolutionary concept of EES set (Swinkels, JET, 1992) is always consistent with forward induction.

National Adaptation Programme of Action on Climate Change - 2008 - 2012

The archipelago of Cape Verde is made up of ten islands and nine islets and is located between latitudes 14º 28' N and 17º 12' N and longitudes 22º 40' W and 25º 22' W. It is located approximately 500 km from the Senegal coast in West Africa (Figure 1). The islands are divided into two groups: Windward and Leeward. The Windward group is composed of the islands of Santo Antão, São Vicente, Santa Luzia, São Nicolau, Sal and Boavista; and the Leeward group is composed of the islands Maio, Santiago, Fogo and Brava. The archipelago has a total land surface of 4,033 km2 and an Economic Exclusive Zone (ZEE) that extends for approximately 734,000 km2. In general, the relief is very steep, culminating with high elevations (e.g. 2,829 m on Fogo and 1,979 m on Santo Antão). The surface area, geophysical configuration and geology vary greatly from one island to the next. Cape Verde, due to its geomorphology, has a dense and complex hydrographical network. However, there are no permanent water courses and temporary water courses run only during the rainy season. These temporary water courses drain quickly towards the main watersheds, where, unless captured by artificial means, continue rapidly to lower areas and to the sea. This applies equally to the flatter islands. The largest watershed is Rabil with an area of 199.2 km2. The watershed areas on other islands extend over less than 70 km2. Cape Verde is both a least developed country (LDC) and a small island development state (SIDS). In 2002, the population of Cape Verde was estimated at approximately 451,000, of whom 52% were women and 48% men. The population was growing at an average 2.4% per year, and the urban population was estimated at 53.7 %. Over the past 15 years, the Government has implemented a successful development strategy, leading to a sustained economic growth anchored on development of the private sector and the integration of Cape Verde into the world economy. During this period, the tertiary sector has become increasingly important, with strong growth in the tourism, transport, banking and trade sectors. Overall, the quality of life indicators show substantial improvements in almost all areas: housing conditions, access to drinking water and sanitation, use of modern energy in both lighting and cooking, access to health services and education. Despite these overall socio-economic successes, the primary sector has witnessed limited progress. Weak performance in the primary sector has had a severe negative impact on the incomes and poverty risks faced by rural workers1. Moreover, relative poverty has increased significantly during the past decade. The poverty profile shows that: (i) extreme poverty is mostly found in rural areas, although it has also increased in urban areas; (ii) poverty is more likely to occur when the head of the household is a woman; (iii) poverty increases with family size; (iv) education significantly affects poverty; (v) the predominantly agricultural islands of Santo Antão and Fogo have the highest poverty rates; (vi) unemployment affects the poor more than the nonpoor; (vii) agriculture and fisheries workers are more likely to be poor than those in other sectors. Therefore, the fight against poverty and income inequalities remains one of the greatest challenges for Cape Verde authorities. The various governments of Cape Verde over the last decade have demonstrated a commitment to improving governance, notably by encouraging a democratic culture that guarantees stability and democratic changes without conflicts. This democratic governance offers a space for a wider participation of citizens in public management and consolidates social cohesion. However, there are some remaining challenges related to democratic governance and the gains must be systematically monitored. Finally, it is worth emphasizing that the country’s insularity has stimulated a movement to decentralized governance, although social inequalities and contrasts from one island to the next constitute, at the same time, challenges and opportunities.

Iowa Civil Rights Commission, Agency Performance Plan and Action Plan, 2006

Annual Report, Agency Performance plan

Iowa Civil Rights Commission, Agency Performance Plan and Action Plan, 2007

Annual Report, Agency Performance plan

Department of Human Rights, Division of Community Action Agencies Performance Plan, FY 2009

Agency Performance Plan, Department of Human Rights, Division of Community Action Agencies

Iowa Department of Corrections, Strategic Plan 2008-2012, October 2008

This report outlines the strategic plan for Iowa Department of Corrections including,goals and mission.

Commission and Division on the Status of Iowans of Asian and Pacific Islander Heritage 2007-2010 Strategic Plan, 2007

This report outlines the strategic plan for Commission and Division on the Status of Iowans of Asian and Pacific Islander Heritage (CAPI) 2007-2010 Strategic Plan including,goals and mission.