Spatial competition between two candidates of different quality: the effects of candidate ideology and private information

This paper examines competition in a spatial model of two-candidate elections, where one candidate enjoys a quality advantage over the other candidate. The candidates care about winning and also have policy preferences. There is two-dimensional private information. Candidate ideal points as well as their tradeoffs between policy preferences and winning are private information. The distribution of this two-dimensional type is common knowledge. The location of the median voter's ideal point is uncertain, with a distribution that is commonly known by both candidates. Pure strategy equilibria always exist in this model. We characterize the effects of increased uncertainty about the median voter, the effect of candidate policy preferences, and the effects of changes in the distribution of private information. We prove that the distribution of candidate policies approaches the mixed equilibrium of Aragones and Palfrey (2002a), when both candidates' weights on policy preferences go to zero.

Accuracy vs. simplicity: a complex trade-off

Inductive learning aims at finding general rules that hold true in a database. Targeted learning seeks rules for the predictions of the value of a variable based on the values of others, as in the case of linear or non-parametric regression analysis. Non-targeted learning finds regularities without a specific prediction goal. We model the product of non-targeted learning as rules that state that a certain phenomenon never happens, or that certain conditions necessitate another. For all types of rules, there is a trade-off between the rule's accuracy and its simplicity. Thus rule selection can be viewed as a choice problem, among pairs of degree of accuracy and degree of complexity. However, one cannot in general tell what is the feasible set in the accuracy-complexity space. Formally, we show that finding out whether a point belongs to this set is computationally hard. In particular, in the context of linear regression, finding a small set of variables that obtain a certain value of R2 is computationally hard. Computational complexity may explain why a person is not always aware of rules that, if asked, she would find valid. This, in turn, may explain why one can change other people's minds (opinions, beliefs) without providing new information.

Information-sharing implications of horizontal mergers

We analyze the effects of uncertainty and private information on horizontal mergers. Firms face uncertain demands or costs and receive private signals. They may decide to merge sharing their private information. If the uncertainty parameters are independent and the signals are perfect, uncertainty generates an informational advantage only to the merging firms, increasing merger incentives and decreasing free-riding effects. Thus, mergers become more profitable and stable. These results generalize to the case of correlated parameters if the correlation is not very severe, and for perfect correlation if the firms receive noisy signals. From the normative point of view, mergers are socially less harmful compared to deterministic markets and may even be welfare enhancing. If the signals are, instead, publicly observed, uncertainty does not necessarily give more incentives to merge, and mergers are not always less socially harmful.

Asymmetric demand information in uniform and discriminatory call auctions: an experimental analysis motivated by electricity markets

We study the outcomes of experimental multi-unit uniform and discriminatory auctions with demand uncertainty. Our study is motivated by the ongoing debate about market design in the electricity industry. Our main aim is to compare the effect of asymmetric demand-information between sellers on the performance of the two auction institutions. In our baseline conditions all sellers have the same information, whereas in our treatment conditions some sellers have better information than others. In both information conditions we find that average transaction prices and price volatility are not significantly different under the two auction institutions. However, when there is asymmetric information among sellers the discriminatory auction is significantly less efficient. These results are not in line with the typical arguments made in favor of discriminatory pricing in electricity industries; namely, lower consumer prices and less price volatility. Moreover, our results provide some indication that discriminatory auctions reduce technical efficiency relative to uniform auctions.

Interactions between product and labour market reforms

Labour market reforms face very often opposition from the employed workers, because it normally reduces their wages. Also product market regulations are regularly biased towards too much benefitting the firms. As a result there remain many frictions in both the labour and product markets that hinder an optimal functioning of the economy. These issues have recently received a lot of attention in the economics literature and scholars have been looking for politically viable reforms in both markets. However, despite its potential importance, there has been done virtually no research on the interaction between reforms in product and labour markets. We find that when combining reforms, the opposition for reforms decreases considerably. This is because there exist complementarities and the gains in total welfare can be more evenly distributed over the interest groups. Moreover, the interaction of reforms offers a way out for the so-called 'sclerosis' effect.

General equilibrium with asymmetric information: a dual approach

We study markets where the characteristics or decisions of certain agents are relevant but not known to their trading partners. Assuming exclusive transactions, the environment is described as a continuum economy with indivisible commodities. We characterize incentive efficient allocations as solutions to linear programming problems and appeal to duality theory to demonstrate the generic existence of external effects in these markets. Because under certain conditions such effects may generate non-convexities, randomization emerges as a theoretic possibility. In characterizing market equilibria we show that, consistently with the personalized nature of transactions, prices are generally non-linear in the underlying consumption. On the other hand, external effects may have critical implications for market efficiency. With adverse selection, in fact, cross-subsidization across agents with different private information may be necessary for optimality, and so, the market need not even achieve an incentive efficient allocation. In contrast, for the case of a single commodity, we find that when informational asymmetries arise after the trading period (e.g. moral hazard; ex post hidden types) external effects are fully internalized at a market equilibrium.

Mediation incomplete information bargaining with filtered communication

We analyze a continuous-time bilateral double auction in the presence of two-sided incomplete information and a smallest money unit. A distinguishing feature of our model is that intermediate concessions are not observable by the adversary: they are only communicated to a passive auctioneer. An alternative interpretation is that of mediated bargaining. We show that an equilibrium using only the extreme agreements always exists and display the necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of (perfect Bayesian) equilibra which yield intermediate agreements. For the symmetric case with uniform type distribution we numerically calculate the equilibria. We find that the equilibrium which does not use compromise agreements is the least efficient, however, the rest of the equilibria yield the lower social welfare the higher number of compromise agreements are used.

Allocative and productive efficiency in REE with asymetric information

We characterize the divergence between informational and economic efficiency in a rational expectations competitive market with asymmetric information about the costs of production. We find that prices may contain too much or too little information with respect to incentive efficient allocations depending on whether the main role of the price is, respectively, the traditional as index of scarcity or informational. Only when REE degenerate to Cournot equilibria the market solution does not show llocative inefficiency. With multidimensional uncertainty we find that the REE price does not have in general the incentive efficient information mix: It pays to sacrifice allocative efficiency at the REE to improve productive efficiency.

Mythological Information

Combined media on photographic paper. 65" x 56" Private Collection

Information networks and worker recruitment

This paper studies experimentally how the existence of social information networks affects the ways in which firms recruit new personnel. Through such networks firms learn about prospective employees' performance in previous jobs. Assuming individualistic preferences social networks are predicted not to affect overall labor market behavior, while with social preferences the prediction is that when bilaterally negotiated: (i) wages will be higher and (ii) that workers in jobs with incomplete contracts will respond with higher effort. Our experimental results are consistent with the social preferences view, both for the case of excess demand and excess supply of labor. In particular, the presence of information networks leads to more efficient allocations.

Bioequivalence of meat products treated with high pressure processing

The effects of high pressure on the composition of food products have not been evaluated extensively. Since, it is necessary to take in consideration the possible effects in basis to the changes induced in the bio molecules by the application of high pressures. The main effect on protein is the denaturation, because the covalent bonds are not affected; however hydrogen bonding, hydrophobic and intermolecular interactions are modified or destroyed. 1 High pressure can modify the activity of some enzymes. If this is done the proteolysis and lipolysis could be more or less intense and the content of free amino acids and fatty acids will be different. This could be related to the bioavailability of these compounds. Low pressures (100 MPa) have been shown to activate some enzymes (monomeric enzymes). Higher pressures induce loss of the enzyme activity. However some enzymes are very stable (ex. Lipase ~ 600 - 1000 MPa). Lipoxygenase is less stable, and there is little information about the effects on antioxidant enzymes. Other important issue is the influence of high pressure on oxidation susceptibility. This could modify the composition of lipids if the degree of the oxidation would have been higher or lower than in the traditional product. Pressure produces the damage of cell membranes favouring the contact between substrates and enzymes, exposure to oxidation of membrane fatty acids and loos of the efficiency of vitamin E. These effects can also affect to protein oxidation. In this study different compounds were analysed to establish the differences between non-treated and high-pressure treated products.

Documentation and sport information: the challenges and opportunities brought by new technologies

This text corresponds to the contents of the seminar “Information Services at the Sport Institutions” held by the author as part of the programme of activities of the Invited Professor of Olympism of the International Chair in Olympism (IOC-UAB) in 2001. The seminar discusses the potential of technologies such as the Internet in sports documentation.

The Olympic Movement and Information Society: New Internet Challenges and Opportunities

Article describing the current situation of the Internet, the use of Internet by sport institutions, and the relationship between the Internet and the Olympic Games, and the Olympic Movement. This paper was presented at the International Symposium on Television in the Olympic Games held in Lausanne in October 1998.

Multi-product firms and product variety

The goal of this paper is to study the role of multi-product firms in the market provision of product variety. The analysis is conducted using the spokes model of non-localized competition proposed by Chen and Riordan (2007). Firstly, we show that multi-product firms are at a competitive disadvantage vis-a-vis single-product firms and can only emerge if economies of scope are sufficiently strong. Secondly, under duopoly product variety may be higher or lower with respect to both the first best and the monopolistically competitive equilibrium. However, within a relevant range of parameter values duopolists drastically restrict their product range in order to relax price competition, and as a result product variety is far below the efficient level.