Multitask learning with expert advice

We consider the problem of prediction with expert advice in the setting where a forecaster is presented with several online prediction tasks. Instead of competing against the best expert separately on each task, we assume the tasks are related, and thus we expect that a few experts will perform well on the entire set of tasks. That is, our forecaster would like, on each task, to compete against the best expert chosen from a small set of experts. While we describe the “ideal” algorithm and its performance bound, we show that the computation required for this algorithm is as hard as computation of a matrix permanent. We present an efficient algorithm based on mixing priors, and prove a bound that is nearly as good for the sequential task presentation case. We also consider a harder case where the task may change arbitrarily from round to round, and we develop an efficient approximate randomized algorithm based on Markov chain Monte Carlo techniques.

A learning-based approach to reactive security

Despite the conventional wisdom that proactive security is superior to reactive security, we show that reactive security can be competitive with proactive security as long as the reactive defender learns from past attacks instead of myopically overreacting to the last attack. Our game-theoretic model follows common practice in the security literature by making worst-case assumptions about the attacker: we grant the attacker complete knowledge of the defender’s strategy and do not require the attacker to act rationally. In this model, we bound the competitive ratio between a reactive defense algorithm (which is inspired by online learning theory) and the best fixed proactive defense. Additionally, we show that, unlike proactive defenses, this reactive strategy is robust to a lack of information about the attacker’s incentives and knowledge.

A unifying view of multiple kernel learning

Recent research on multiple kernel learning has lead to a number of approaches for combining kernels in regularized risk minimization. The proposed approaches include different formulations of objectives and varying regularization strategies. In this paper we present a unifying optimization criterion for multiple kernel learning and show how existing formulations are subsumed as special cases. We also derive the criterion’s dual representation, which is suitable for general smooth optimization algorithms. Finally, we evaluate multiple kernel learning in this framework analytically using a Rademacher complexity bound on the generalization error and empirically in a set of experiments.

Multiview point cloud kernels for semisupervised learning [Lecture Notes]

In semisupervised learning (SSL), a predictive model is learn from a collection of labeled data and a typically much larger collection of unlabeled data. These paper presented a framework called multi-view point cloud regularization (MVPCR), which unifies and generalizes several semisupervised kernel methods that are based on data-dependent regularization in reproducing kernel Hilbert spaces (RKHSs). Special cases of MVPCR include coregularized least squares (CoRLS), manifold regularization (MR), and graph-based SSL. An accompanying theorem shows how to reduce any MVPCR problem to standard supervised learning with a new multi-view kernel.

Correction to “The Importance of Convexity in Learning With Squared Loss” [Sep 98 1974-1980]

The paper "the importance of convexity in learning with squared loss" gave a lower bound on the sample complexity of learning with quadratic loss using a nonconvex function class. The proof contains an error. We show that the lower bound is true under a stronger condition that holds for many cases of interest.

Open problems in the security of learning

Machine learning has become a valuable tool for detecting and preventing malicious activity. However, as more applications employ machine learning techniques in adversarial decision-making situations, increasingly powerful attacks become possible against machine learning systems. In this paper, we present three broad research directions towards the end of developing truly secure learning. First, we suggest that finding bounds on adversarial influence is important to understand the limits of what an attacker can and cannot do to a learning system. Second, we investigate the value of adversarial capabilities-the success of an attack depends largely on what types of information and influence the attacker has. Finally, we propose directions in technologies for secure learning and suggest lines of investigation into secure techniques for learning in adversarial environments. We intend this paper to foster discussion about the security of machine learning, and we believe that the research directions we propose represent the most important directions to pursue in the quest for secure learning.