Auditor's engagement risk and audit fees:the role of the audit firm alumni

This study explores the effect of the association of audit firm alumni with their alma mater on audit prices. The tests indicate that there is a moderate reduction of up to 21% in the level of audit fee when alumni (i.e., former employees) of the incumbent audit firm sit on the client board of directors which is consistent with the engagement risk theory. This suggests that there is an 'alumni effect' in the market for audit services. The findings hold only in the large company segment of the market. The results are robust to different model specifications and alternative samples. The sample comprises all executive and non-executive directors who run the UK quoted companies and are simultaneously ICAEW qualified chartered accountants. The study's implications for the accounting profession and the regulators are also discussed. © 2007 The Author Journal compilation © 2007 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

An empirical investigation of price competition and industry specialisation in NHS audit services

The NHS audit market is regulated by the Audit Commission (AC) and has unique features. We develop a model for audit fees that includes rigorous analysis of the type of auditor. Poor financial standing does not give rise to higher audit fees. Despite regulation the study supports the existence of a Big Five price premium on the audit fee, but only one firm has a premium. We found no premium due to industry specialisation. The removal of performance audit from AC regulation will require improved audit fee reporting and control.

The market for professional services in Indonesia

This paper reports the results of a study which investigates the market for professional services in Indonesia, a country which has not been investigated in the by audit fee literature prior. A well-developed research model used in the prior literature has also been applied in this study, and the empirical findings suggest broad similarities in the pricing of professional services in Indonesia and other countries previously studied. In addition to extending the results of prior research to a country not previously studied, this paper examines whether the large auditors fee premium documented in other countries exists in Indonesia, especially after the major Asian financial crisis of 1997/98, since then almost all companies in this geographical area exercise tight budget controls. The results suggest that no audit fee premium is accrued to Indonesian Big 5 auditors, in contrast to the large audit firm fee premium documented in many other countries.

External audit in the National Health Service in England and Wales:a study of an oversight body's control of auditor remuneration

In the National Health Service (NHS) in England and Wales an oversight body, the Audit Commission (AC), defines the scope of the external auditors’ work, appoints the auditors and has oversight of their fees and audit quality. This heavily regulated audit regime mitigates some of the deficiencies observed in high profile corporate failures. Independence, it has been argued, is influenced by the total auditor remuneration paid by the client. In this study we examine total auditor remuneration in a regulated market which seeks to ensure audit independence and audit quality. In particular we undertake rigorous analysis of auditor remuneration by the type of auditor: We place emphasis on the differentiation between private sector firms and the AC’s in-house auditors (District Audit). Individual private audit firms charge premiums (up to 16%) for particular audit work in identified locations, but no premiums were found when we examined total auditor remuneration. The regime appears to permit efficient operation of the audit market while safeguarding both audit independence and standards.

The Audit Commission:guiding, steering and regulating local government

How does the non-executant state ensure that its agents are fulfilling their obligations to deliver nationally determined policies? In the case of elected local government in England and Wales, this function is carried out by the Audit Commission (AC) for Local Authorities and the Health Service for England and Wales. Since being established in 1983, it is the means by which local authorities are held to account by central government, both for its own purposes and on behalf of other interested stakeholders. Although the primary function of the AC is to ensure that local authorities are fulfilling their obligations, it does so by using different methods. By acting as a regulator, an independent expert, an opinion former and a mediator, the AC steers local authorities to ensure that they are compliant with the regulatory regime and are implementing legislation properly.

Audit committees in Scottish local authorities 1998-2005

During the last 15 years corporate governance has become increasingly prominent in the public sector. The Audit Commission's 1993 report on probity in local government recommended the establishment of audit committees. However, progress on this was slow, as demonstrated by a survey of Scottish local authorities by the authors in 1998. Recent major changes in government in Scotland at both a local and national level have prompted councils to improve the accountability, openness and integrity of their operations. One major aspect of this exercise was the formation of scrutiny committees to provide objective scrutiny of the process and audit committees were the most common vehicle for this. This article explores recent developments in Scottish local government and their impact on audit committees. The article also reports the results of a 2005 survey of Scottish local authorities and compares these with the 1998 survey. This indicates a significant growth in the number of audit committees in Scottish councils and although the level of their perceived effectiveness is patchy, they are a more important feature of local government than they were in 1998.

Secondary market pricing behaviour around UK bond auctions

Using an event study approach, this article reports evidence that the UK Treasury bond market displayed anomalous pricing behaviour in the secondary market both immediately before and after auctions of seasoned bonds. Using a benchmark return derived from the behaviour of the underlying yield curve, the market offered statistically and economically significant excess returns, around the auctions held between 1992 and 2004. A cross-sectional analysis of the cumulative excess returns shows that the excess demand at the auctions is a key determinant of this excess return.

Audit accountability and government, White and Hollingsworth

Audit accountability and government, Fidelma White and Kathryn Hollingsworth, Claredon Press, 1999. 221 pp. £45.00