Multi-species and multi-interest management: An ecosystem approach to market squid (Loligo opalescens) harvest in California

Market squid (Loligo opalescens) plays a vital role in the California ecosystem and serves as a major link in the food chain as both a predator and prey species. For over a century, market squid has also been harvested off the California coast from Monterey to San Pedro. Expanding global markets, coupled with a decline in squid product from other parts of the world, in recent years has fueled rapid expansion of the virtually unregulated California fishery. Lack of regulatory management, in combination with dramatic increases in fishing effort and landings, has raised numerous concerns from the scientific, fishing, and regulatory communities. In an effort to address these concerns, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration’s (NOAA) Channel Islands National Marine Sanctuary (CINMS) hosted a panel discussion at the October 1997 California Cooperative Oceanic and Fisheries Investigations (CalCOFI) Conference; it focused on ecosystem management implications for the burgeoning market squid fishery. Both panel and audience members addressed issues such as: the direct and indirect effects of commercial harvesting upon squid biomass; the effects of harvest and the role of squid in the broader marine community; the effects of environmental variation on squid population dynamics; the sustainability of the fishery from the point of view of both scientists and the fishers themselves; and the conservation management options for what is currently an open access and unregulated fishery. Herein are the key points of the ecosystem management panel discussion in the form of a preface, an executive summary, and transcript. (PDF contains 33 pages.)

Breeding programs on Atlantic salmon in Norway: lessons learned

An early establishment of selective breeding programs on Atlantic salmon has been crucial for the success of developing efficient and sustainable salmon farming in Norway. A national selective breeding program was initiated by AKVAFORSK at the beginning of the 1970s, by collecting fertilized eggs from more than 40 Norwegian river populations. Several private selective breeding programs were also initiated in the 1970s and 1980s. While these private programs were initiated using individual selection (i.e. massselection) to genetically improve growth, the national program was designed to gradually include all economically important traits in the breeding objective (i.e. growth, age at sexual maturation, disease resistance and quality traits) using a combined family and within-family selection strategy. Independent of which selection strategy and program design used, it is important to secure and maintain a broad genetic variation in the breeding populations to maximize selection response. It has been documented that genetically improved salmon from the national selective breeding program grow twice as fast as wild Atlantic salmon and require 25 per cent less feed, while salmon representing the private breeding programs all show an intermediate growth performance. As a result of efficient dissemination of genetically improved Atlantic salmon, the Norwegian salmon farming industry has reduced its feed costs by more than US$ 230 million per year! The national selective breeding program on Atlantic salmon was commercialized into a breeding company (AquaGen) in 1992. Five years later, several private companies and the AKVAFORSK Genetics Center (AFGC) established a second breeding company (SalmoBreed) using breeding candidates from one of the private breeding programs. These two breeding companies have similar products, but different strategies on how to organize the breeding program and to disseminate the genetically improved seed to the Norwegian salmon industry. Greater competition has increased the necessity to document the genetic gain obtained from the different programs and to market the economic benefits of farming the genetically improved breeds. Both breeding companies have organized their dissemination to get a sufficient share of the economic benefits in order to sustain and improve their breeding programs.

The Economics of Gasification: A Market-Based Approach

This paper deals with the economics of gasification facilities in general and IGCC power plants in particular. Regarding the prospects of these systems, passing the technological test is one thing, passing the economic test can be quite another. In this respect, traditional valuations assume constant input and/or output prices. Since this is hardly realistic, we allow for uncertainty in prices. We naturally look at the markets where many of the products involved are regularly traded. Futures markets on commodities are particularly useful for valuing uncertain future cash flows. Thus, revenues and variable costs can be assessed by means of sound financial concepts and actual market data. On the other hand, these complex systems provide a number of flexibility options (e.g., to choose among several inputs, outputs, modes of operation, etc.). Typically, flexibility contributes significantly to the overall value of real assets. Indeed, maximization of the asset value requires the optimal exercise of any flexibility option available. Yet the economic value of flexibility is elusive, the more so under (price) uncertainty. And the right choice of input fuels and/or output products is a main concern for the facility managers. As a particular application, we deal with the valuation of input flexibility. We follow the Real Options approach. In addition to economic variables, we also address technical and environmental issues such as energy efficiency, utility performance characteristics and emissions (note that carbon constraints are looming). Lastly, a brief introduction to some stochastic processes suitable for valuation purposes is provided.

Market survey of the periwinkle Tympanotonus fuscatus in Rivers State: Sizes, prices, trade routes and exploitation levels

Tympanotonus fuscatus was collected from 23 markets through Rivers State (Nigeria), a few in neighbouring states, and from an unexploited population at Buguma. The size distribution of shells was determined,and information on prices and trade routes was also obtained. The mean shell length of specimens from the unexploited Buguma population was 46.4 mm, compared to 30.4 mm for the Buguma market samples. Mean sizes in other markets showed a geographic pattern: the smallest were from the Adoni-Ogoni-Opobo sector (28.1-30.9); the largest were from the Nembe-Brass sector (37.7-44.2) and Bendel State (35.7-45.6); The results suggest the population structure of Tympanotonus in much of Rivers State has been strongly impacted by overharvesting. They show that local market as well as some in Cross River State, are increasingly being supplied by road with specimens from the Benin River area of Bendel State. Differences between shell types; and relations between shell size, selling price and market distance from source, are also discussed

The market for processed foodstuffs in Nigeria: The case of canned fish

This paper highlights the potential contribution of the processed food industry (especially with regard to prepared and preserved fish) to the domestic industrial sector. Data for the study were collected from a sample of 85 retail canned fish sellers in South-Western Nigeria (45 and 40 respondents in Oyo and Lagos states respectively). Approaches were also made to government officials and merchant-agents connected with the importation, trade-regulation and distribution of fish in Nigeria. The study examined, in considerable detail, the marketing channels, services, prices and margins of canned fish in the area of study. The paper concludes that efforts should be made to encourage local processing and canning of fish not only to save on foreign exchange and importation costs but also to be able to meet the rapidly growing demand for this product in the country

Essays on economics networks

This thesis belongs to the growing field of economic networks. In particular, we develop three essays in which we study the problem of bargaining, discrete choice representation, and pricing in the context of networked markets. Despite analyzing very different problems, the three essays share the common feature of making use of a network representation to describe the market of interest.

In Chapter 1 we present an analysis of bargaining in networked markets. We make two contributions. First, we characterize market equilibria in a bargaining model, and find that players' equilibrium payoffs coincide with their degree of centrality in the network, as measured by Bonacich's centrality measure. This characterization allows us to map, in a simple way, network structures into market equilibrium outcomes, so that payoffs dispersion in networked markets is driven by players' network positions. Second, we show that the market equilibrium for our model converges to the so called eigenvector centrality measure. We show that the economic condition for reaching convergence is that the players' discount factor goes to one. In particular, we show how the discount factor, the matching technology, and the network structure interact in a very particular way in order to see the eigenvector centrality as the limiting case of our market equilibrium.

We point out that the eigenvector approach is a way of finding the most central or relevant players in terms of the “global” structure of the network, and to pay less attention to patterns that are more “local”. Mathematically, the eigenvector centrality captures the relevance of players in the bargaining process, using the eigenvector associated to the largest eigenvalue of the adjacency matrix of a given network. Thus our result may be viewed as an economic justification of the eigenvector approach in the context of bargaining in networked markets.

As an application, we analyze the special case of seller-buyer networks, showing how our framework may be useful for analyzing price dispersion as a function of sellers and buyers' network positions.

Finally, in Chapter 3 we study the problem of price competition and free entry in networked markets subject to congestion effects. In many environments, such as communication networks in which network flows are allocated, or transportation networks in which traffic is directed through the underlying road architecture, congestion plays an important role. In particular, we consider a network with multiple origins and a common destination node, where each link is owned by a firm that sets prices in order to maximize profits, whereas users want to minimize the total cost they face, which is given by the congestion cost plus the prices set by firms. In this environment, we introduce the notion of Markovian traffic equilibrium to establish the existence and uniqueness of a pure strategy price equilibrium, without assuming that the demand functions are concave nor imposing particular functional forms for the latency functions. We derive explicit conditions to guarantee existence and uniqueness of equilibria. Given this existence and uniqueness result, we apply our framework to study entry decisions and welfare, and establish that in congested markets with free entry, the number of firms exceeds the social optimum.

Linking Reduced Deforestation and a Global Carbon Market: Impacts on Costs, Financial Flows, and Technological Innovation

25 p.

Market Instruments and CO2 Mitigation: A General Equilibrium Analysis for Spain

25 p.

Cooperative and market-based solutions to pollution abatement problems

This work concerns itself with the possibility of solutions, both cooperative and market based, to pollution abatement problems. In particular, we are interested in pollutant emissions in Southern California and possible solutions to the abatement problems enumerated in the 1990 Clean Air Act. A tradable pollution permit program has been implemented to reduce emissions, creating property rights associated with various pollutants.

Before we discuss the performance of market-based solutions to LA's pollution woes, we consider the existence of cooperative solutions. In Chapter 2, we examine pollutant emissions as a trans boundary public bad. We show that for a class of environments in which pollution moves in a bi-directional, acyclic manner, there exists a sustainable coalition structure and associated levels of emissions. We do so via a new core concept, one more appropriate to modeling cooperative emissions agreements (and potential defection from them) than the standard definitions.

However, this leaves the question of implementing pollution abatement programs unanswered. While the existence of a cost-effective permit market equilibrium has long been understood, the implementation of such programs has been difficult. The design of Los Angeles' REgional CLean Air Incentives Market (RECLAIM) alleviated some of the implementation problems, and in part exacerbated them. For example, it created two overlapping cycles of permits and two zones of permits for different geographic regions. While these design features create a market that allows some measure of regulatory control, they establish a very difficult trading environment with the potential for inefficiency arising from the transactions costs enumerated above and the illiquidity induced by the myriad assets and relatively few participants in this market.

It was with these concerns in mind that the ACE market (Automated Credit Exchange) was designed. The ACE market utilizes an iterated combined-value call market (CV Market). Before discussing the performance of the RECLAIM program in general and the ACE mechanism in particular, we test experimentally whether a portfolio trading mechanism can overcome market illiquidity. Chapter 3 experimentally demonstrates the ability of a portfolio trading mechanism to overcome portfolio rebalancing problems, thereby inducing sufficient liquidity for markets to fully equilibrate.

With experimental evidence in hand, we consider the CV Market's performance in the real world. We find that as the allocation of permits reduces to the level of historical emissions, prices are increasing. As of April of this year, prices are roughly equal to the cost of the Best Available Control Technology (BACT). This took longer than expected, due both to tendencies to mis-report emissions under the old regime, and abatement technology advances encouraged by the program. Vve also find that the ACE market provides liquidity where needed to encourage long-term planning on behalf of polluting facilities.