Europe is still standing. CEPS Commentary, 6 June 2014

Despite the fact that anti-establishment, mostly euro-sceptic parties won about one-fifth of the vote in the European Parliament elections last month, Daniel Gros insists that it is not quite accurate (or fair) to characterise the result as a rejection of Europe. He argues that the deeper roots of the surge of euro-sceptic and other protest parties originate with the general dissatisfaction with the state of the economy and dysfunctional national political systems. Tinkering with austerity or the fundamental right of free movement within the EU will not make much of a difference and, in his view, only reform at home, in national capitals, will stem the tide of euro-scepticism.

Political crossroads ahead in Sweden: The signs are red-green. EPIN Commentary No. 20, 31 July 2014

The political balance in Sweden was upset in this year’s elections to the European Parliament (EP). The far-right ‘Sweden Democrats’ almost tripled their vote-share and the Greens gained enough votes to become the second-largest Swedish party in the EP after the Social Democrats. Support for the current government incumbents, the Moderates, fell beyond expectation. The party will not recover in time for the national elections in September, whereas both the Greens and the Sweden Democrats are likely to repeat their EP election success. Since the Sweden Democrats are unlikely to form part of the coalition government – the election-winners will be the Greens and Social Democrats – Sweden’s political landscape is set to undergo a shift to the left.

Flashlight Europe N°2–September 2014: Is It Better To Be Alone Than Lonely Together? Scotland Is Voting On Whether Or Not To Become Independent

On 18 September 2014 the Scots are voting on whether or not to sever their ties with the UK. And the pro-independence camp is catching up fast. A survey conducted at the beginning of the month revealed that for the first time 51 percent of the Scottish electorate say that they will be casting a Yes vote, i.e. that they are in favour of independence. The outcome is now in the hands of the undecided voters, who are currently being heavily courted by the various parties. If the Scots vote in favour of independence, it is bound to cast doubt on the future of the government of David Cameron, the Conservative Party leader. Who is fighting on which side? What are the arguments? And what will happen if the Scots decide to opt out of the United Kingdom? Here are some of the things that are a distinct possibility.

Scotland and the EU: What impact of the potential in-out UK referendum on the independence debate?1 EPC Discussion Paper, 4 September 2014

Fabian Zuleeg explores the likelihood of Scottish Independence, and its potential impact on the EU–UK relations. As the Scottish independence vote is inextricably bound to the potential UK in-out referendum (and thus a potential exit of the UK from the EU), there are some potential feedback loops to the independence debate which are set to be relevant regardless of whether Scotland becomes independent or not.

Could an independent Scotland join the European Union? EPC Policy Brief, 28 May, 2014

The people of Scotland vote on 18 September 2014 in a referendum on the question "Should Scotland be an independent country?" The Scottish Government aims, if the result is 'yes', for Scotland to become independent in March 2016 and to join the main international organisations including the European Union. Would that be possible? How could Scotland join the EU? What is the link between Scotland's referendum on independence and a British referendum on EU membership?

Ukraine – Trying to build a future beyond the past. EPC Commentary, 2 June 2014

On 25 May Ukrainian businessman Petro Poroshenko became Ukraine’s fifth President, winning in the first round with some 54% of the vote, far ahead of Yulia Tymoshenko. While Poroshenko has been involved in Ukrainian politics for several years, including a short stint in the government of disposed President Viktor Yanukovych, his support and involvement in the EuroMaiden anti-government protests, along with the decision of Vitali Klitschko to drop out of the presidential race and support Poroshenko’s candidacy, were key to his success.

Turkey votes: Part II - Erdoğan reloaded. EPC Commentary, 3 April 2014

On 30 March, Turkey’s ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) scooped a significant victory in local elections, taking almost 44 percent of the vote despite accusations of corruption, undermining the rule of law, fundamental rights and freedoms. While there have been claims of election fraud and the main opposition party, the Republican People’s Party (CHP), has demanded recounts in several cities including Istanbul and Ankara, it is clear that even allowing for some level of fraud the win was substantial and more than most people expected. Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has reached a juncture. He has two choices: return to the path of democracy after a period of democratic back-sliding which included passing several controversial reforms such as a new internet law which led to the recent banning of Twitter and Youtube; or alternatively he can forge ahead with his much talked of revenge campaign against those he has accused of creating a “parallel state” and conspiring to remove him from power. Given that Erdoğan viewed this election as a referendum on his popularity and leadership there is a serious risk that he will do the latter; using the significant mandate given to him to do whatever he wants, including further cracking down on democracy.

Turkey votes: Part III - President Erdoğan - A foregone conclusion? EPC Commentary, 10 July 2014

On 1 July, after months of speculation, Turkey’s Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, announced he would run in the country’s first direct presidential elections on 10 August. Erdoğan, who has dominated Turkish politics for over a decade, is viewed as the clear favourite. With current polls suggesting he could take as much as 52% of the vote, an outright victory in the first round is possible. His main rival, Ekmeleddin İhsanoğlu, is very much the underdog. Until recently, an international diplomat with no experience in politics, he is the joint candidate of Turkey’s two main opposition parties, the Republican People’s Party (CHP) and the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP). Selahattin Demirtaş, the Co-Chairman of the Kurdish Peoples Democratic Party (HDP) is also in the race, but is not expected to make it into double digits. The Kurdish vote however, could prove to be crucial if the ballot goes to a second round on 24 August. With Erdoğan wanting to increase Presidential powers, the stakes are high. With his belief in majoritarian rule, and increasingly authoritarian style of governance there has been an erosion of democracy and civil liberties. Many observers fear this trend may increase.

Government failure, opposition success? Electoral performance in Portugal and Italy at the time of the crisis. Jean Monnet Occasional Paper 05/2014

The costs of the crisis in Southern European countries have not been only economic but political. Economic crises tend to lead to government instability and termination while political challengers are expected to exploit this contingent window of opportunity to gain an advantage over incumbents in national elections. The current crisis seems to make no exception, looking at the results of the general elections recently held in Southern Europe. However, this did not always lead to a clear victory of the main opposition parties. In most of the elections, in fact, the incumbent parties’ loss did not coincide with the official opposition’s gain. The extreme case is represented by Italy, where both the outgoing government coalition led by Silvio Berlusconi – setting aside for the moment the technocratic phase – and its main challenger, the centre left coalition, ended up losing millions of voters and a new political force, the Five Star Movement, obtained about 25 per cent of votes. On the opposite side there is Portugal. Only in Portugal did the vote increase for the centre right PSD, in fact, exceed the incumbent socialists’ loss. The present work aims at exploring the factors which might account for this significant divergence between the two cases.

Gagauzia: growing separatism in Moldova? OSW Commentary No. 129, 10.03.2014

On 2 February, the regional authorities in Gagauzia - an autonomous region of the Republic of Moldova - carried out two simultaneous referenda. In the first, local residents were asked to declare their support for the country’s integration either with the EU or with the Moscow-led Customs Union (CU); the second referendum sought their opinion on the draft law “On the deferred status of the Autonomous Region of Gagauzia”. Under the proposed legislation, if Moldova were to lose its sovereignty (for example, through the unification of Moldova and Romania, or even as some politicians have argued, through Moldova’s further integration with the EU), the autonomous region would automatically become the independent Republic of Gagauzia. As expected, the outcome of the vote has shown overwhelming support for both the CU and for the draft law. According to the figures released by Gagauzia’s Central Electoral Commission, 98.5% of the voters supported Moldova’s integration with the Customs Union, while 98% voted in favour of the ‘deferred independence’ bill. Support for closer integration with the EU was marginal, reaching just over 2%. Despite the one-sided outcome of the referendum, there is no reliable evidence to suggest that the ballot was rigged. It should also be noted that voter turnout was very high, reaching about 70%. Representatives of the Moldovan Central Electoral Commission, however, believe that the figure may have been artificially inflated by excluding many of the voters currently residing abroad from the count.

Before the parliamentary elections in Ukraine. OSW Commentary No. 149, 15.10.2014

The parliamentary elections to be held in Ukraine on 26 October will bring about deep changes in the political composition of the Verkhovna Rada, Ukraine’s parliament. It is very probable that after the elections only one or two of the five parties which are represented in the parliament today will remain, and the leading positions will be taken by groupings who were still considered marginal a year ago. The Petro Poroshenko Bloc, a party which according to polls can count on victory, did not exist a year ago and today still remains in the construction phase. It is likely that around two-thirds of the newly elected deputies will be people with no parliamentary or even no political experience. On the one hand, this may be a strong impetus to revival; but on the other the lack of experience of most of the parliamentarians may be a problem. Another source of potential problems may be the process of consolidating the internally unstable political parties which have emerged during the electoral campaign. All of the parties which will count in the upcoming elections have a pro-European programme. It is probable that the numerous supporters of an anti-Western orientation (although not necessarily a pro-Russian orientation, as recent events have shown) will be represented by very few deputies elected in single-mandate constituencies. On the one hand, this homogeneity within the Rada will facilitate the country’s reforms, including work on the new constitution, while on the other it might be a subject of permanent criticism by Moscow and its Ukrainian representatives. The elections will take place in the conditions of a growing wave of social disappointment and ongoing military actions in the eastern part of the country. Nevertheless, it can be expected that the vote will be held without any major disturbances, and its course will be transparent and fair.

Slovakia: the Eurogroup’s enfant terrible. OSW Commentary No. 63, 2011-10-14

When Slovakia’s parliament rejected the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) reform on 11 October it undermined Slovakia’s reputation as a credible partner within the EU. Moreover, Prime Minister Iveta Radicova combined the vote on the strengthening of the EFSF – a key anti-crisis mechanism in the Eurozone – with a vote of confidence for her cabinet. This eventually led to the collapse of the government. Before Slovakia’s decision, the strengthening of the EFSF had been endorsed by the national parliaments of all the eurozone countries. Slovakia, which had opted to be the last one to carry out the ratification procedure, adopted the EFSF reform only in a re-vote on 13 October, due to the support of the opposition left-wing party. However, problems with ratification have cast a shadow over the achievements of Slovakia which as one of the freshest members of the eurozone had been actively seeking to influence the creation of EU mechanisms for dealing with the debt crisis. For the past eighteen months the Slovak government, formed by conservative and liberal parties, has consistently called for the controlled bankruptcy of Greece, a tightening of the rules of the Stability and Growth Pact, and for the private sector’s participation in financing the rescue packages for indebted states. It was in part down to Slovakia that these proposals, previously regarded as extreme, were introduced into the mainstream EU debate. The constructive position presented by Slovakia’s diplomacy in recent months has brought Bratislava tangible results, such as the reduction of its contribution to the permanent anti-crisis fund, the European Stabilisation Mechanism (ESM). Thus Slovakia, which adopted the single currency on 1 January 2009, has become an informal spokesman for the new, poorer members of the eurozone.

2002 Parliamentary elections in Ukraine: Events, results and consequences; Ukraine's Parliamentary system after the elections. OSW Study 8/2003

2002 elections: On 31 March 2002, parliamentary elections were held in Ukraine. As expected, they were a major success for the centrist-rightist coalition focused around former Prime Minister Viktor Yuschenko. The communists emerged significantly weaker from the vote, and the "party of power" achieved a poor result. Yet, due to the mixed electoral law (half of the deputies were elected in single-mandate districts), the latter block, firmly supported by President Leonid Kuchma, resulted as the main force in Parliament. The results of particular parties and blocks were as follows: Viktor Yuschenko's Block received 23.57% of votes and 112 seats, the Communist Party of Ukraine - 19.98% of votes and 66 seats, the "For One Ukraine" block - 11.77% of votes and 101 seats, Yulia Tymoshenko's Block - 7.26% of votes and 22 seats, the Socialist Party of Ukraine - 6.87% of votes and 22 seats, and the Social Democratic Party of Ukraine (united) - 6.27% of votes and 24 seats. This shows how the mixed electoral regulations favour "For One Ukraine" and act against Yuschenko's block. One should note, however, that the latter gained the support of less than one quarter of voters. After the election: The dominant force in Ukraine's Verkhovna Rada, elected in March 2002, are the deputies of "One Ukraine", a fraction of the pro-presidential centre. "One Ukraine" has refused to admit any of the opposition's representatives (either from the right or left wings) into the parliament's presidium, but has accepted opposition-appointed heads of many parliamentary commissions. Viktor Yuschenko's "Our Ukraine", which has been the largest parliamentary fraction since June, attempted to proclaim itself the centre of the parliamentary majority, but its policy was awkward and inconsistent, and the main success of this club was that it didn't break up. Viktor Yuschenko's moves have been particularly incoherent and they undermined the image of Yuschenko as Ukraine's future leader, created throughout the course of the electoral campaign. In autumn, the main oligarchic groups and their representative fractions ("One Ukraine", which proved to be a useless instrument, was dissolved in June), reached a compromise with the president. It was agreed that the new prime minister should be a Donetsk clan representative (Viktor Yanukovych), and that the Dnipropetrovsk clan should appoint the president of the National Bank of Ukraine (this position went to Serhij Tihipko). The Kyiv clan obtained the President's Administration (Viktor Medvedchuk was appointed in spring) and a considerable number of parliamentary commissions. The president's interests in the government are to be protected by Mykola Azarov, former Head of the State Tax Administration. This compromise "package" was designed to secure the shares of the main oligarchic clans in the power and the president's strong position as mediator.

Public feeling in Ukraine ahead of the parliamentary election. OSW Commentary No. 89, 2012-07-12

After two and a half years under President Viktor Yanukovych and the Party of Regions, the overwhelming majority of Ukrainians are dissatisfied with the state the country’s economy is currently in and the direction it has been developing in. There has also been a significant drop in stability and social security with the general public increasingly feeling that the government has little interest in their problems. Only 16% of Ukrainians believe that the current government has performed better than their predecessors, although overall confidence in both the ruling party and the opposition remains low. Nonetheless, falling support for the president and the Cabinet does not seem to have translated into greater popularity for the country’s opposition parties; these currently enjoy the confidence of only a quarter of the electorate. The clear lack of credibility for politicians on either side of the political spectrum, coupled with an almost universal preoccupation with the bare necessities of life, has shifted the political processes in Ukraine further down the agenda for the majority of Ukrainians. Ukraine’s poor economic performance, which over the last two years has been addressed through a series of highly unpopular economic reforms, has resulted in a growing mood of discontent and increased civil activity, with the Ukrainian people reporting a greater willingness than ever to join protests on social issues. Most of them, however, have shown much less interest in political rallies. This is likely to stem from low levels of trust in the opposition and the general belief that opposition politicians are not a viable alternative to the current government. One may therefore assume that there will be little public scrutiny of the parliamentary election scheduled for 28 October, and that the likelihood of mass demonstrations during it is low. However, in the event of large-scale vote rigging and a dismissive response from the government, spontaneous unsanctioned rallies cannot be ruled out. What is more likely, however, is a series of protests after the elections, when the already difficult economic situation is further exacerbated by a predicted rise in the price of gas for Ukrainian households and a possible move to devalue the Ukrainian hryvnia.

Identity Construction in Europe: A Discursive Approach. IES WORKING PAPER 2/2010

Proposing a discursive approach to studying identity, this paper presents Positioning Theory as a theoretical framework for conceptualizing the construction of identity in discourse. The Positioning Diamond is employed to analyse the discourse surrounding the Danish Euro referendum. The analysis reveals how identities are constructed in discourse that promotes a ‘yes’ or ‘no’ vote in the referendum, highlighting the generally implicit allocation of rights and duties to actors within a specific narrative context. The penultimate section discusses appropriate criteria for evaluating discursive accounts, distinguishing between cases in which truth, normative and ethical criteria are applicable. Finally, the paper concludes with a discussion of policy considerations and recommendations.