984 resultados para Public goods game
Resumo:
International Journal of Engineering and Industrial Management, nº 1, p. 195-208
Resumo:
Progress in Industrial Ecology, An International Journal, nº 4(5), p. 363-381
Resumo:
Journal of Cleaner Production, nº 17, p. 36-52
Resumo:
Electricity markets are complex environments, involving a large number of different entities, with specific characteristics and objectives, making their decisions and interacting in a dynamic scene. Game-theory has been widely used to support decisions in competitive environments; therefore its application in electricity markets can prove to be a high potential tool. This paper proposes a new scenario analysis algorithm, which includes the application of game-theory, to evaluate and preview different scenarios and provide players with the ability to strategically react in order to exhibit the behavior that better fits their objectives. This model includes forecasts of competitor players’ actions, to build models of their behavior, in order to define the most probable expected scenarios. Once the scenarios are defined, game theory is applied to support the choice of the action to be performed. Our use of game theory is intended for supporting one specific agent and not for achieving the equilibrium in the market. MASCEM (Multi-Agent System for Competitive Electricity Markets) is a multi-agent electricity market simulator that models market players and simulates their operation in the market. The scenario analysis algorithm has been tested within MASCEM and our experimental findings with a case study based on real data from the Iberian Electricity Market are presented and discussed.
Resumo:
Journal of Environmental Management, nº 82 p. 410–432
Resumo:
Master Erasmus Mundus Crossways in European Humanities
Resumo:
Dissertation submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the Degree of Master of Science in Geospatial Technologies
Resumo:
Neste artigo é analisada a construção do conhecimento matemático num jardim de infância do Porto, através do jogo; em particular, tratamos as formas geométricas e os diagramas de Carroll. Estes temas foram abordados, de uma forma integrada, numa atividade que também envolveu a expressão motora. Esta estratégia revelou-se uma boa forma de motivar as crianças do grupo para conteúdos complexos. Debruçamo-nos neste artigo sobre as fases de observação, planificação, ação e avaliação da atividade. Concluímos que os objetivos traçados foram ao encontro das necessidades e interesses das crianças e que a atividade contribuiu para o seu desenvolvimento integral e integrado.
Resumo:
Dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for degree of Master in Statistics and Information Management.
Resumo:
The visceral larva migrans (VLM) is a syndrome observed in human infection with helminth larval eggs such as the Toxocara spp. that usually infects dogs and cats. Among the risk factors involved in the occurrence of VLM, particularly important is the size of these animal populations. Sorocaba is a city with a dog population twice as large as that recommended by the World Health Organization. This fact has led to a survey of the presence of Toxocara spp. eggs in public square soils of this city. Thirty squares were selected, fifteen located in the outskirts of the city and fifteen downtown. Soil samples were collected from five distinct sites in the same area. The material was homogenized and drained and 100 g was mixed with a saturated solution of magnesium sulfate and 5% potassium iodine. The floating material was analyzed under the light microscope. Toxocara spp. eggs were found in 16 squares, nine of which were located in the outskirts of the city and seven downtown. It was concluded that Sorocaba squares present a high rate of contamination with Toxocara spp. eggs. The squares in the outskirts of the city presented a higher occurrence of these eggs in comparison with those downtown, although the difference was not statistically significant (p > 0.05).
Resumo:
Uma interface cérebro-computador (BCI) não é mais do que um dispositivo que lê e analisa ondas cerebrais e as converte em ações sobre um computador. Com a evolução das BCI e a possibilidade de acesso às mesmas por parte do público começou a ser possível o uso de BCIs para fins lúdicos. Nesse sentido nesta tese foi feito um estudo sobre interfaces cérebro-computador, o que são, que tipos de BCI existem, o seu uso para entretenimento, as suas limitações e o futuro deste tipo de interfaces. Foi ainda criado um software lúdico controlado por BCI (Emotiv EPOC) que é composto por um jogo tipo Pong e um reprodutor de música. O reprodutor de música através de BCI classifica e recomenda músicas ao utilizador. Com esta tese foi possível chegar à conclusão que é possível utilizar BCI para entretenimento (jogos e recomendação de conteúdos) apesar de se ter verificado que para jogos os dispositivos tradicionais de controlo (rato e teclado) ainda têm uma precisão muito superior.
Resumo:
Competition between public and private firms exists in a range of industries like telecommunications, electricity, natural gas, airlines industries, as weel as services including hospitals, banking and education. Some authors studied mixed oligopolies under Cournot competition (firms move simultaneously) and some others considered Stackelberg models (firms move sequentially). Tomaru [1] analyzed, in a Cournot model, how decision-making upon cost-reducing R&D investment by a domestic public firm is affected by privatization when competing in the domestic market with a foreign firm. He shows that privatization of the domestic public firm lowers productive efficiency and deteriorates domestic social welfare. In this paper, we examine the same question but in a Stackelberg formulation instead of Cournot. The model is a three-stage game. In the first stage, the domestic firm chooses the amount of cost-reducing R&D investment. Then, the firms compete à la Stackelberg. Two cases are considered: (i) The domestic firm is the leader; (ii) The foreign firm is the leader. We show that the results obtained in [1] for Cournot competition are robust in the sence that they are also true when firms move sequentially.
Resumo:
Consideramos um mercado no qual competem uma empresa pública e uma empresa privada, decidindo, de forma sequencial, as quantidades a produzir. O governo impõe um imposto sobre as quantidades comercializadas, de acordo com uma função que consiste numa soma ponderada entre o bem-estar público e a receita total obtida pela aplicação desse imposto. O objetivo deste trabalho é estudar o efeito da privatização da empresa pública, (i) quando a empresa líder é a empresa pública; e (ii) quando a empresa líder é a empresa privada. Além disso, fazemos uma comparação entre os resultados obtidos nos dois modelos estudados.
Resumo:
Trabalho de Projeto apresentado ao Instituto de Contabilidade e Administração do Porto para a obtenção do grau de Mestre em Contabilidade e Finanças, sob orientação de Amélia Cristina Ferreira da Silva
Resumo:
In this paper, we consider a Stackelberg duopoly competition with differentiated goods and with unknown costs. The firms' aim is to choose the output levels of their products according to the well-known concept of perfect Bayesian equilibrium. There is a firm ( F1 ) that chooses first the quantity 1 q of its good; the other firm ( F2 ) observes 1 q and then chooses the quantity 2 q of its good. We suppose that each firm has two different technologies, and uses one of them following a probability distribution. The use of either one or the other technology affects the unitary production cost. We show that there is exactly one perfect Bayesian equilibrium for this game. We analyse the advantages, for firms and for consumers, of using the technology with the highest production cost versus the one with the cheapest cost.