Union Formation and Bargaining Rules in the Labor Market

This paper analyzes union formation in a model of bargaining between a firm and several unions. We address two questions: first, the optimal configuration of unions (their number and size) and, second, the impact of the bargaining pattern (simultaneous or sequential). For workers, grouping into several unions works as a price discrimination device which, at the same time, decreases their market power. The analysis shows that optimal union configuration depends on the rules that regulate the bargaining process (monopoly union, Nash bargaining or right to manage).

Should Fiscal Policy be different in a Non-Competitive Framework?

Published as an article in: Journal of Monetary Economics, 2003, vol. 50, issue 6, pages 1311-1331.

Optimal Fiscal Policy with Rationing in the Labor Market

Published as an article in: Topics in Macroeconomics, 2005, vol. 5, issue 1, article 17.

Switching Regimes in the Term Structure of Interest Rates During U.S. Post-War: A case for the Lucas proof equilibrium?

Published as an article in: Studies in Nonlinear Dynamics & Econometrics, 2004, vol. 8, issue 1, pages 5.

Materiales vascos del legado de Wilhelm von Humboldt: la relevancia de Astarloa y el Plan de Lenguas

Este artículo es traducción del original alemán «Zum Stellenwert Astarloas und des Plan de Lenguas», publicado en B. Hurch (ed.), Die baskischen Materialien aus dem Nachlaß Wilhelm von Humboldts. Astarloa, Charpentier, Fréret, Aizpitarte und anderes. Paderborn: Schöningh, pp. 21-42. La traducción al español es obra de Oroitz Jauregi y ha sido revisada por Ricardo Gómez y Bernhard Hurch.

Asymmetric flow networks

This paper provides a new model of network formation that bridges the gap between the two benchmark models by Bala and Goyal, the one-way flow model, and the two-way flow model, and includes both as particular extreme cases. As in both benchmark models, in what we call an "asymmetric flow" network a link can be initiated unilaterally by any player with any other, and the flow through a link towards the player who supports it is perfect. Unlike those models, in the opposite direction there is friction or decay. When this decay is complete there is no flow and this corresponds to the one-way flow model. The limit case when the decay in the opposite direction (and asymmetry) disappears, corresponds to the two-way flow model. We characterize stable and strictly stable architectures for the whole range of parameters of this "intermediate" and more general model. We also prove the convergence of Bala and Goyal's dynamic model in this context.

Resale in Auctions with Financial Constraints

This paper analyzes auctions where bidders face nancial constraints that may force them to resell part of the property of the good (or subcontract part of a project) at a resale market. First we show that the ine¢ cient speculative equilibria of second- price auctions (Garratt and Tröger, 2006) generalizes to situations with partial resale where only the high value bidder is nancially constrained. However, when all players face nancial constraints the ine¢ cient speculative equilibria disappear. Therefore, for auctioning big facilities or contracts where all bidders are nancially constrained and there is a resale market, the second price auction remains a simple and appropriate mechanism to achieve an e¢ cient allocation.

Selectivity, pulse fishing and endogenous lifespan in Beverton-Holt models

Optimal management in a multi-cohort Beverton-Holt model with any number of age classes and imperfect selectivity is equivalent to finding the optimal fish lifespan by chosen fallow cycles. Optimal policy differs in two main ways from the optimal lifespan rule with perfect selectivity. First, weight gain is valued in terms of the whole population structure. Second, the cost of waiting is the interest rate adjusted for the increase in the pulse length. This point is especially relevant for assessing the role of selectivity. Imperfect selectivity reduces the optimal lifespan and the optimal pulse length. We illustrate our theoretical findings with a numerical example. Results obtained using global numerical methods select the optimal pulse length predicted by the optimal lifespan rule.

Games with perceptions

We assume that 2 x 2 matrix games are publicly known and that players perceive a dichotomous characteristic on their opponents which defines two types for each player. In turn, each type has beliefs concerning her opponent's types, and payoffs are assumed to be type-independent. We analyze whether the mere possibility of different types playing different strategies generates discriminatory equilibria. Given a specific information structure we find that in equilibrium a player discriminates between her types if and only if her opponent does so. We also find that for dominant solvable 2x2 games no discriminatory equilibrium exists, while under different conditions of concordance between players' beliefs discrimination appears for coordination and for competitive games. A complete characterization of the set of Bayesian equilibria is provided.

The von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets for 2x2 games

We analyze the von Neumann and Morgenstern stable sets for the mixed extension of 2 2 games when only single profitable deviations are allowed. We show that the games without a strict Nash equilibrium have a unique vN&M stable set and otherwise they have infinite sets.

A note on bargaining power and managerial delegation in multimarket oligopolies

In a two-stage delegation game model with Nash bargaining between a manager and an owner, an equivalence result is found between this game and Fershtman and Judd's strategic delegation game (Fershtman and Judd, 1987). Interestingly, although both games are equivalent in terms of profits under certain conditions, managers obtain greater rewards in the bargaining game. This results in a redistribution of profits between owners and managers.

Metabolic efficiency with fast spiking in the squid axon

Fundamentally, action potentials in the squid axon are consequence of the entrance of sodium ions during the depolarization of the rising phase of the spike mediated by the outflow of potassium ions during the hyperpolarization of the falling phase. Perfect metabolic efficiency with a minimum charge needed for the change in voltage during the action potential would confine sodium entry to the rising phase and potassium efflux to the falling phase. However, because sodium channels remain open to a significant extent during the falling phase, a certain overlap of inward and outward currents is observed. In this work we investigate the impact of ion overlap on the number of the adenosine triphosphate (ATP) molecules and energy cost required per action potential as a function of the temperature in a Hodgkin–Huxley model. Based on a recent approach to computing the energy cost of neuronal action potential generation not based on ion counting, we show that increased firing frequencies induced by higher temperatures imply more efficient use of sodium entry, and then a decrease in the metabolic energy cost required to restore the concentration gradients after an action potential. Also, we determine values of sodium conductance at which the hydrolysis efficiency presents a clear minimum.

Coalitional games with veto players: Myopic and farsighted behavior

This paper studies an allocation procedure for coalitional games with veto players. The procedure is similar to the one presented by Dagan et al. (1997) for bankruptcy problems. According to it, a player, the proposer, makes a proposal that the remaining players must accept or reject, and con ict is solved bilaterally between the rejector and the proposer. We allow the proposer to make sequential proposals over several periods. If responders are myopic maximizers (i.e. consider each period in isolation), the only equilibrium outcome is the serial rule of Arin and Feltkamp (2012) regardless of the order of moves. If all players are farsighted, the serial rule still arises as the unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome if the order of moves is such that stronger players respond to the proposal after weaker ones.

New Oncogenic Drivers in Hepatocellular Carcinoma: Role of the RNA Binding Protein Hu antigen R

156 p. : graf.

A study of changes in fishing effort, abundance, and yield for yellowfin and skipjack tuna in the Eastern Tropical Pacific Ocean

ENGLISH: The rapid growth of the Eastern Pacific fishery for yellowfin and skipjack tuna since the end of World War II has given rise to questions concerning the rational utilization of these resources. As part of the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission's program of research designed to investigate these problems, a study was undertaken to determine from the historical records of the fishery the effects of fishing upon the stocks of yellowfin and skipjack tuna of the Eastern Pacific region and to evaluate the present condition of these stocks with respect to the maximum equilibrium yield. SPANISH: EI rápido crecimiento, desde la terminación de la Segunda Guerra Mundial, de la pesquería de atún aleta amarilla y barrilete en el Pacifico Oriental, ha dado lugar a que se hagan algunos comentarios sabre la racional utilización de estos recursos. Como parte del programa de la Comisión Interamericana del Atún Tropical designado para la investigación de estos problemas, un estudio fué llevado a cabo para determinar, de los informes historicós de la pesquería, los efectos de la pesca sobre los stocks de atún aleta amarilla y barrilete de la región del Pacifico Oriental y para evaluar la presente condición de estos stocks con respecto al máximo rendimiento de equilibria. (PDF contains 123 pages.)