Letter from William Croswell to Sarah C. Bumstead, 1832 September 10

Brief letter concerning the repayment of a loan.

Letter from Samuel Willard, Harvard College, Cambridge, Massachusetts, to William Willard, Petersham, Massachusetts, November 30, 1802

Willard discusses President Willard’s son Sheafe, who he has been tutoring, explains his education and argues for well-rounded studies. He also mentions that Doctor Aaron Dexter, a lecturer on chemistry, gave him a recipe for paint “which I enclose [separately] in this letter,” as well as a recipe for mortar. He explains that his vacation plans are to teach at a school in Groton for eighteen dollars a month, and asks for a loan from his parents to pay a bill.

Counter bond, 1724/5 January 22

Handwritten counter bond between Samuel Whittemore and Andrew Bordman, securing Whittemore's loan from Nathaniel Hancock and James Reade.

Counter bond, 1728 June 5

Handwritten counter bond between Francis Foxcroft and Jonathan Remington, securing Foxcroft's loan from Andrew Bordman.

Counter bond, 1731 August 4

Handwritten counter bond between Stephen Palmer and Samuel Whittemore, and Edward Hutchinson, securing Stephen Palmer and Samuel Whittemore's loan from William Brattle and Andrew Bordman.

Account books of Thomas Cradock, 1786-1818 (inclusive)

Account books listing patients, medicines administered, and fees charged by Dr. Thomas Cradock (1752-1821), primarily in Maryland, from 1786 to 1818. In addition to recording names, Cradock occasionally noted demographic information, the patient's location, or their occupation: from 1813 to 1816, he treated Richard Gent, a free African-American man; in 1813, he attended to John Bell, who lived in the Foggy Bottom neighborhood of Washington, D.C. Cradock further noted if the patient was a slave and the name of his or her owner. He would also administer care on behalf of corporate entities, such as Powhatan Factory, which apparently refused him payment. He also sometimes included a diagnosis: in the cases of a Mr. Rowles and Mrs. Violet West, he administered unspecified medicines for gonorrhea at a cost of ten dollars. Commonly prescribed drugs included emetics, cathartics, and anodynes. Cradock also provided smallpox vaccination for his patients. He accepted both cash and payment-in-kind. Tipped into the first volume is an envelope containing a letter from the Medical and Chirurgical Faculty of Maryland to Mrs. Thomas Craddock in 1899 requesting a loan of portrait of Dr. Thomas Craddock [sic]. The three volumes also each contain an index to patient names.

Roads, Catskill Mountains, New York, 1892 (Raster Image)

This layer is a georeferenced raster image of the historic paper map entitled: Van Loan's road map of the Catskills and vicinity : all of Greene County, most of Ulster and Delaware counties, and large portions of Albany, Schoharie, Otsego, and Sullivan counties. It was published by Walton Van Loan in 1892. Scale [1:221,760]. The image inside the map neatline is georeferenced to the surface of the earth and fit to the Universal Transverse Mercator (UTM) Zone 18N NAD83 projection. All map collar and inset information is also available as part of the raster image, including any inset maps, profiles, statistical tables, directories, text, illustrations, index maps, legends, or other information associated with the principal map. This map shows features such as roads (with distances), railroads, drainage, township and county boundaries, post offices, and more. Relief is shown by hachures and spot heights. This layer is part of a selection of digitally scanned and georeferenced historic maps from The Harvard Map Collection as part of the Imaging the Urban Environment project. Maps selected for this project represent major urban areas and cities of the world, at various time periods. These maps typically portray both natural and manmade features at a large scale. The selection represents a range of regions, originators, ground condition dates, scales, and purposes.

Can Europe recover without credit? Bruegel Policy Contribution 2013/03, 15 February 2013

• Data from 135 countries covering five decades suggests that creditless recoveries, in which the stock of real credit does not return to the pre-crisis level for three years after the GDP trough, are not rare and are characterised by remarkable real GDP growth rates: 4.7 percent per year in middle-income countries and 3.2 percent per year in high-income countries. • However, the implications of these historical episodes for the current European situation are limited, for two main reasons: • First, creditless recoveries are much less common in high-income countries, than in low-income countries which are financially undeveloped. European economies heavily depend on bank loans and research suggests that loan supply played a major role in the recent weak credit performance of Europe. There are reasons to believe that, despite various efforts, normal lending has not yet been restored.Limited loan supply could be disruptive for the European economic recovery andthere has been only a minor substitution of bank loans with debt securities. • Second, creditless recoveries were associated with significant real exchange rate depreciation, which has hardly occurred so far in most of Europe. This stylised fact suggests that it might be difficult to re-establish economic growth in the absence of sizeable real exchange rate depreciation, if credit growth does not return.

Portugal. In economics, we call it conflict of interest! CEPS Commentary, 12 April 2013

Faced with limited options for coming up with the funds needed to pay off the next instalment on its bailout loan, Portugal is advised in this Commentary by economist Leonor Coutinho to trim the number of public sector employees, in combination with an increase in public sector working hours, among the lowest in Europe. In her view, these measures will have the best long-term implications both in terms of fiscal sustainability and of labour productivity, and may finally allow the country to resume the catching-up process that has been stalled since the start of EMU.

The distribution of debt across euro area countries : The role of individual characteristics, institutions and credit conditions. National Bank of Belgium Working Paper No. 252, December 2013

The aim of this paper is twofold. First, we present an up-to-date assessment of the differences across euro area countries in the distributions of various measures of debt conditional on household characteristics. We consider three different outcomes: the probability of holding debt, the amount of debt held and, in the case of secured debt, the interest rate paid on the main mortgage. Second, we examine the role of legal and economic institutions in accounting for these differences. We use data from the first wave of a new survey of household finances, the Household Finance and Consumption Survey, to achieve these aims. We find that the patterns of secured and unsecured debt outcomes vary markedly across countries. Among all the institutions considered, the length of asset repossession periods best accounts for the features of the distribution of secured debt. In countries with longer repossession periods, the fraction of people who borrow is smaller, the youngest group of households borrow lower amounts (conditional on borrowing), and the mortgage interest rates paid by low-income households are higher. Regulatory loan-to-value ratios, the taxation of mortgages and the prevalence of interest-only or fixed-rate mortgages deliver less robust results.

The long haul: managing exit from financial assistance. Bruegel Policy Contribution Issue 2014/03, 20 February 2014

Countries can make a clean exit from financial assistance, or enter a new programme or a precautionary programme, depending on the sustainability of their public debt and their vulnerability to shocks. Ireland made a clean exit in December 2013, supported by significant budgetary and current-account adjustment and signs of economic recovery. But Irish debt sustainability is not guaranteed and prudence will be needed to avoid future difficulties. A clean exit for Portugal is not recommended when its programme ends in May 2014, because compared to Ireland it faces higher interest rates, has poorer growth prospects and has probably less ability to generate a consistently high primary surplus. A precautionary arrangement would be advisable. In case debt sustainability proves difficult to achieve later, some form of debt restructuring may prove necessary. It is unlikely that Greece will be able to exit its programme in December 2014. A third programme should be put in place to take Greece out of the market until 2030, accompanied by enhanced budgetary and structural reform commitments by Greece, a European boost to economic growth in the euro-area periphery and willingness on the part of lenders to reduce loan charges below their borrowing costs, should public debt levels prove unsustainable despite Greece meeting the loan conditions. Even assuming all goes well, the three countries will be subject to enhanced post-pro-gramme surveillance for decades. Managing such long-term relationships will be a key challenge.

Ukrainian economy overshadowed by war. OSW Commentary No. 148, 08.10.2014

Ukraine’s financial results over the past few months prove that the economic crisis which has been ongoing since mid 2012 has exacerbated. According to data from the Ukrainian Ministry of Economy, Gross Domestic Product for the first six months of 2014 shrank by 3%. In the second quarter, it fell by 4.6%1 and may further be reduced by as much as 8–10% over the year as a whole. After the first six months of this year, the balance of payments deficit reached US$4.3 billion. After deflation last year, prices grew by 12%, and the hryvnia dropped to a historic low. Although a surplus was seen in Ukrainian foreign trade in goods and services, reaching over US$3 billion at the end of June, its trade volume is shrinking. The main reason behind this deteriorating situation is the actions taken by Russia. Moscow has been fomenting the conflict in Donbas since April, has consistently imposed embargoes on imports of more and more Ukrainian goods and cut gas supplies to Ukraine in June. This has forced the government to focus on the current management of state finances and to carry out budget sequestration twice this year. The government has also used this as an excuse not to implement necessary systemic reforms. The increasing share of military expenditure, the shrinking exports (-5% in the first six months), including in particular to Russia, which until recently was Ukraine’s key trade partner, and the rapid fall in industrial production and investments have all made the situation even worse. All that saves Ukraine from an economic collapse is the loan from the International Monetary Fund and higher taxes, which allows the government to maintain budget liquidity. However, if the conflict in Donbas lasts longer and if Russia continues its economic blackmail, including withholding gas supplies, the economic crisis may prove to be long-lasting.

An economy with unrealistic indicators: an evaluation of the economic situation in Belarus and a forecast for 2013. OSW Commentary No. 103, 2013-02-20

The macroeconomic results achieved by Belarus in 2012 laid bare the weakness and the inefficiency of its economy. Belarus’s GDP and positive trade balance were growing in the first half of last year. However, this trend was reversed when Russia blocked the scheme of extremely lucrative manipulations in the re-export of Russian petroleum products by Belarus and when the demand for potassium fertilisers fell on the global market. It became clear once again that the outdated Belarusian model of a centrally planned economy is unable to generate sustainable growth, and the Belarusian economy needs thorough structural reforms. Nevertheless, President Alyaksandr Lukashenka consistently continues to block any changes in the system and at the same time expects that the economic indicators this year will reach levels far beyond the possibilities of the Belarusian economy. Therefore, there is a risk that the Belarusian government may employ – as they used to do – instruments aimed at artificially stimulating domestic demand, including money creation. This may upset the relative stability of state finances, which the regime managed to achieve last year. The worst case scenario would see a repeat of what happened in 2011, when a serious financial crisis occurred, forcing Minsk to make concessions (including selling the national network of gas pipelines) to Moscow, its only real source of loans. It thus cannot be ruled out that also this time the only way to recover from the slump will be to receive additional loan support and energy subsidies from Russia at the expense of selling further strategic companies to Russian investors.

Tug-of-war over EU's policy towards its neighbours. OSW Commentary No. 49, 2011-03-09

The revolutions in North Africa, the approaching end of the ‘strategic review’ of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) initiated by the European Commission, and the beginning of negotiations on the European Union’s new financial perspective, have intensified the debate among the member states and EU institutions on what policy the EU will adopt towards its neighbourhood in the future. The discussion concerns not only the shape of the ENP but also non-ENPI foreign policy instruments which Brussels applies towards neighbouring countries, such as the thematic instruments and loan support. Serious differences of opinion have emerged among the member states. The countries located in the southern part of the EU want Brussels to boost its policy towards North Africa, even at the expense of engagement in Eastern Europe and the Southern Caucasus. Meanwhile Central European countries, including Germany, favour a more balanced approach towards both directions. The future shape of the ENP, as well as the EU’s other foreign policy instruments, will have a strong impact on the approach the EU adopts towards its Eastern neighbourhood. If some of the proposals are realised, especially the southern member states’ request to transfer some of the funds from the Eastern to the Southern neighbourhood, the chances of meeting the Eastern Partnership goals, such as the association of the partner countries with the EU and the creation of deep and comprehensive free trade areas, could be reduced.

On the verge of crisis? Mounting economic problems in Belarus. OSW Commentary No. 51, 2011-04-06

Belarus’s financial condition has visibly worsened since the beginning of this year. The severe falls in the country’s foreign currency reserves and its shortage of foreign currency on the international market pose an increasing threat to the stability of the Belarusian economy. Fearing an outbreak of public dissatisfaction, The government has so far been trying to avoid devaluing the rouble or structural economic reforms. Maintaining full control inside the country and the stability of the authoritarian regime are still the main concerns for President Alyaksandr Lukashenka. For this reason, the actions taken by the Belarusian government have been limited to imposing short-term administrative restrictions on the foreign currency market and obtaining external support in the form of loans. Given Belarus’s falling creditworthiness, Minsk is only able to ask Russia for financial support, thus offering the Kremlin more opportunities to realise its desire to take over strategic industrial plants in Belarus. However, the present economic problems of Belarus are so serious that no loan will be able to safeguard its government from the need of carrying out serious economic reforms.