A study of the interaction between national and corporate culture in a selection of Irish based companies

This research studies the phenomenon of national and corporate culture. National culture is the culture the members of a country share and corporate culture is a subculture which members of an organisation share (Schein, 1992). The objective of this research is to reveal if the employees within equivalent Irish and American companies share the same corporate and national culture and to ascertain if, within each company, there is a link between national culture and corporate culture. The object of this study is achieved by replicating research which was conducted by Shing (1997) in Taiwan. Hypotheses and analytical tools developed by Shing are employed in the current study to allow comparison of results between Shing’s study and the current study. The methodology used, called for the measurement and comparison of national and corporate culture in two equivalent companies within the same industry. The two companies involved in this study are both located in Ireland and are of American and Irish origin. A sample of three hundred was selected and the response rate was 54%. The findings from this research are: (1) The two companies involved had different corporate cultures, (2) They had the same national culture, (3) There was no link between national culture and corporate culture within either company, (4) The findings were not similar to those of Shing (1997). The implication of these findings is that national and corporate culture are separate phenomena therefore corporate culture is not a response to national culture. The results of this research are not reflected in the finding’s of Shing (1997), therefore they are context specific. The core recommendation for management is that, corporate culture should take account of national culture. This is because although employees recognise the espoused values of corporate culture (Schein, 1992), they are at the same time influenced by a much stronger force, their national culture.

Motivating techniques within Irish and American manufacturing and service companies in the Northwest of Ireland

In today’s world, many companies are concentrating on both their technology and human resources to provide them with their competitive advantage. Hence, understanding what motivates people is particularly important for managers in order to develop and sustain a competitive edge. As a result, numerous theories have been advanced to help our understanding of the subject matter and from these theories many motivational methods have evolved to enhance motivation within the workplace. In addition, research has been conducted on the various types of motivational techniques utilised by companies within Ireland. However, very little research has been completed within specific geographical regions in Ireland concerning the types of motivational techniques implemented at different job levels and their impact on employees work performance. Thus the objective of this research was to identify the motivational techniques utilised at different job levels within large manufacturing and service companies in the Northwest of Ireland and examine how these techniques influence the performance levels of employees. Furthermore, the study examined if these companies have changed from traditional ways of motivating employees to newer techniques. The research methodologies used to undertake the research included interviews with the HR managers and questionnaires completed by different employees at various job levels within the participating companies. Overall the conclusions were varied. Many different types of motivation techniques were found within the study’s participating companies. Irish companies are improving their motivational techniques, however most of these techniques are only used within higher job levels. In contrast to their American counterparts, a variety of motivational techniques are utilised and implemented at all job levels. On a more positive note, the majority of these motivational techniques do increase performance levels at all job levels. From the extensive primary and secondary research conducted, the thesis concludes by offering a number of recommendations to assist companies in further development of their motivational techniques for all job levels. These recommendations hope to augment the success of companies through an enhanced motivated workforce.

The Barcelonnettes: an example of network-entrepreneurs in XIX century Mexico. An explanation based on a theory of bounded rational choice with social embeddedness

A theory of network-entrepreneurs or "spin-off system" is presented in this paper for the creation of firms based on the community’s social governance. It is argued that firm’s capacity for accumulation depends on the presence of employees belonging to the same social/ethnic group with expectations of "inheriting" the firm and becoming entrepreneurs once they have been selected for their merits and loyalty towards their patrons. Such accumulation is possible because of the credibility of the patrons’ promises of supporting newcomers due to high social cohesion and specific social norms prevailing in the community. This theory is exemplified through the case of the Barcelonnettes, a group of immigrants from the Alps in the South of France (Provence) who came to Mexico in the XIX Century.

Internal promotion versus external recruitment: evidence in industrial plants

An analysis is carried out in a sample of 738 industrial plants of the determining factors in the use of internal promotion of blue-collar workers to middle managers and skilled technicians as against their external recruitment. The use of internal promotion is positively correlated with variables indicative of the efforts made by plants to measure employees' skills, and to a lesser extent, with the level of specificity of investments in human capital made by blue-collar workers. Contrary to what was expected, variables related with the use and efficiency of other incentive systems have no significant influence on the increased or decreased use of internal promotion. These results are initial evidence that internal promotions are used to protect and favour specific investments, especially those made by firms in order to discover their workers' skills.

Access as a motivational device: implications for human resource management

This paper analyzes the employment relationship on the basis of the notion of access. We argue that the degree of access provided by a job is an incentive to activate the employee’s self-actualization needs. We investigate the effect of access on the workers’ performance through an agency model and provide a number of propositions with practical implications for personnel policies. Our results are consistent with the intuition emerged from the real business practice as well as with many of the arguments on the substitutive role between monetary and non-monetary incentives frequently reported in the literature.

It's what you say not what you pay

We study manager-employee interactions in experiments set in a corporate environment where payoffs depend on employees coordinating at high effort levels; the underlying game being played repeatedly by employees is a weak-link game. In the absence of managerial intervention subjects invariably slip into coordination failure. To overcome a history of coordination failure, managers have two instruments at their disposal, increasing employees' financial incentives to coordinate and communication with employees. We find that communication is a more effective tool than incentive changes for leading organizations out of performance traps. Examining the content of managers' communication, the most effective messages specifically request a high effort, point out the mutual benefits of high effort, and imply that employees are being paid well.

Observability and overcoming coordination failure in organizations

Many organizations suffer poor performance because its members fail to coordinate on efficient patterns of behavior. In previous research, we have shown that financial incentives can be used to find a way out of such performance traps. Here we examine the sensitivity of this result to the ability of people to observe others' choices. Our experiments are set in a corporate environment where subjects' payoffs depend on coordinating at high effort levels; the underlying game being played repeatedly by the employees of an experimental firm is a weak-link game. Treatments vary along two dimensions. First, subjects either start with low financial incentives for coordination, which typically leads to coordination failure, and then are switched to higher incentives or start with high incentives, which typically yield effective coordination, and are switched to low incentives. Second, as the key treatment variable, subjects either observe the effort levels chosen by all employees in their experimenta

A change would do you good . . . An experimental study on how to overcome coordination failure in organizations

Many organizations suffer poor performance because individuals within the organization fail to coordinate on efficient patterns of behavior. Using controlled laboratory experiments, we study how financial incentives can be used to find a way out of such performance traps. Our experiments are set in a corporate environment where subjects' payoffs depend on coordinating at high effort levels; the underlying game being played repeatedly by employees is a weak-link game. In an initial phase, the benefits of coordination are low relative to the cost of increased effort. Play in this initial phase typically converges to an inefficient outcome with employees failing to coordinate at high effort levels. The experimental design then explores the effects of varying the financial incentives to coordinate at a higher effort level. We find that an increase in the benefits of coordination leads to improved coordination, but, surprisingly, large increases have no more impact than small increases. Once subj

Inequity version and team incentives

We study optimal contracts in a simple model where employees are averse to inequity as modelled by Fehr and Schmidt (1999). A "selfish" employer can profitably exploit such preferences among its employees by offering contracts which create inequity off-equilibrium and thus, they would leave employees feeling envy or guilt when they do not meet the employer's demands. Such contracts resemble team and relative performance contracts, and thus we derive conditions under which it may be beneficial to form work teams of employees with distributional concerns who were previously working individually. Similar results are obtained for status-seeking and efficiency concerns preferences.

Market Competition and Lower Tier Incentives

The relationship between competition and performance-related pay has been analysed in single-principal-single-agent models. While this approach yields good predictions for managerial pay schemes, the predictions fail to apply for employees at lower tiers of a firm's hierarchy. In this paper, a principal-multi-agent model of incentive pay is developed which makes it possible to analyze the effect of changes in the competitiveness of markets on lower tier incentive payment schemes. The results explain why the payment schemes of agents located at low and mid tiers are less sensitive to changes in competition when aggregated firm data is used. JEL classification numbers: D82, J21, L13, L22. Keywords: Cournot competition, Contract delegation, Moral hazard, Entry, Market size, Wage cost.

Personal relations and their effect on behavior in an organizational setting: an experimental study

We study how personal relations affect performance in organizations. In the experimental game we use a manager has to assign different degrees of decision power to two employees. These two employees then have to make distributive decisions which affect themselves and the manager. Our focus is on the effects on managers' assignment of decision power and on employees' distributive decisions of one of the employees and the manager knowing each other personally. Our evidence shows that managers tend to favor employees that they personally know and that these employees tend, more than other employees, to favor the manager in their distributive decisions. However, this behavior does not affect the performance of the employees that do not know the manager. All these effects are independent of whether the employees that know the manager are more or less productive than those who do not know the manager. The results shed light on discrimination and nepotism and its consequences for the performance of family firms and other organizations.

Information networks and worker recruitment

This paper studies experimentally how the existence of social information networks affects the ways in which firms recruit new personnel. Through such networks firms learn about prospective employees' performance in previous jobs. Assuming individualistic preferences social networks are predicted not to affect overall labor market behavior, while with social preferences the prediction is that when bilaterally negotiated: (i) wages will be higher and (ii) that workers in jobs with incomplete contracts will respond with higher effort. Our experimental results are consistent with the social preferences view, both for the case of excess demand and excess supply of labor. In particular, the presence of information networks leads to more efficient allocations.

A water-borne hepatitis A outbreak in Rio de Janeiro

An excess of hepatitis cases, in the research center of Petrobrás located in the Fundaão Island, within the city of Rio de Janeiro, was notified during the second half of March 1980. In recent years this center has had an average of four cases per year, but between March 5th and April 25th, sixteen cases were reported. The cause and possible source of infection were investigated. A serologic diagnosis of hepatitis A was made by showing IgG serum antibodies against this virus in patients. No subclinical cases among a group of 60 healthy employees could be identified. A questionnaire was circulated to investigate a possible commom source of infection. Evaluation of the water supply system indicated that it had recently been contaminated. Information obtained from other medical services in the island failed to reveal that the episode was part of a larger outbreak.

Pupal cocoons affect sanitary brood care and limit fungal infections in ant colonies.

BACKGROUND: The brood of ants and other social insects is highly susceptible to pathogens, particularly those that penetrate the soft larval and pupal cuticle. We here test whether the presence of a pupal cocoon, which occurs in some ant species but not in others, affects the sanitary brood care and fungal infection patterns after exposure to the entomopathogenic fungus Metarhizium brunneum. We use a) a comparative approach analysing four species with either naked or cocooned pupae and b) a within-species analysis of a single ant species, in which both pupal types co-exist in the same colony. RESULTS: We found that the presence of a cocoon did not compromise fungal pathogen detection by the ants and that species with cocooned pupae increased brood grooming after pathogen exposure. All tested ant species further removed brood from their nests, which was predominantly expressed towards larvae and naked pupae treated with the live fungal pathogen. In contrast, cocooned pupae exposed to live fungus were not removed at higher rates than cocooned pupae exposed to dead fungus or a sham control. Consistent with this, exposure to the live fungus caused high numbers of infections and fungal outgrowth in larvae and naked pupae, but not in cocooned pupae. Moreover, the ants consistently removed the brood prior to fungal outgrowth, ensuring a clean brood chamber. CONCLUSION: Our study suggests that the pupal cocoon has a protective effect against fungal infection, causing an adaptive change in sanitary behaviours by the ants. It further demonstrates that brood removal-originally described for honeybees as "hygienic behaviour"-is a widespread sanitary behaviour in ants, which likely has important implications on disease dynamics in social insect colonies.

Firms in Scottish High Technology Clusters: software, life sciences, microelectronics, optoelectronics and digital media – preliminary evidence and analysis on firm size, growth and optimality

This paper reports on: (a) new primary source evidence on; and (b) statistical and econometric analysis of high technology clusters in Scotland. It focuses on the following sectors: software, life sciences, microelectronics, optoelectronics, and digital media. Evidence on a postal and e-mailed questionnaire is presented and discussed under the headings of: performance, resources, collaboration & cooperation, embeddedness, and innovation. The sampled firms are characterised as being small (viz. micro-firms and SMEs), knowledge intensive (largely graduate staff), research intensive (mean spend on R&D GBP 842k), and internationalised (mainly selling to markets beyond Europe). Preliminary statistical evidence is presented on Gibrat’s Law (independence of growth and size) and the Schumpeterian Hypothesis (scale economies in R&D). Estimates suggest a short-run equilibrium size of just 100 employees, but a long-run equilibrium size of 1000 employees. Further, to achieve the Schumpeterian effect (of marked scale economies in R&D), estimates suggest that firms have to grow to very much larger sizes of beyond 3,000 employees. We argue that the principal way of achieving the latter scale may need to be by takeovers and mergers, rather than by internally driven growth.