Statutory protections from forfeiture of a leasehold estate following Apriaden Pty Ltd v Seacrest Pty Ltd

In Apriaden Pty Ltd v Seacrest Pty Ltd the Victorian Court of Appeal decided that termination of a lease under common law contractual principles following repudiation is an alternative to reliance upon an express forfeiture provision in the lease and that it is outside the sphere of statutory protections given against the enforcing of a forfeiture. The balance of authority supports the first aspect of the decision. This article focuses on the second aspect of it, which is a significant development in the law of leases. The article considers the implications of this decision for essential terms of clauses in leases, argues that common law termination for breach of essential terms should be subject to compliance with these statutory requirements and, as an alternative, suggests a way forward through appropriate law reform, considering whether the recent Victorian reform goes far enough.

Decolonising the concept of knowledge

Controlling the definition of what was essentially a subjugated culture, the colonisers reserve the power to distinguish authentic aspects of the living traditions of the colonised. If the colonised argue political demands by reference to their culture, the colonisers are quick to adjudicate what is genuine in such claims. (Fannon, 1967) Since colonial invasions, Australia’s Indigenous people have weathered rapid change. While the origins of Australia’s Indigenous peoples continues to be an archaeological interest for many, how Indigenous cultures have survived, transformed and retained a sense of ‘difference’ is fundamental to understanding the diversity of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander cultures within this continent as both contemporaneous and historical. It is important that teachers, students and researchers within Indigenous studies remind themselves that much of the literature on Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders can be ideologically traced back to the emergence of ‘knowledge’ about native peoples in the context of European imperialism and expansion from the fifteenth century. Care must therefore be taken in not conveying ‘scientific’ rational knowledge as perhaps the hidden agenda or notion of assumptions of European ‘superiority’ and non-European inferiority. The recognition by the High Court of Australia (1992) abandoned the legal myth of terra nullius which based the dispossession of Indigenous land on the basis of it being considered an empty land. It could also be argued that this decision recognised that distinct customs and traditions continue to exist within the social and cultural ‘knowledge’ of Indigenous peoples of Australia. General issues and concerns relating to research design, methodology and articulation within QUT are not just confined to this university and the research project presented as a case study but are important in dealing with how Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander students and academics participate or are employed within the university. We feel that the design and methodology of research that either covertly or overtly focuses on Indigenous Australians can no longer presume that all research will naturally follow protocols that are culturally appropriate as this appropriateness is usually defined by the institution. By no means do we feel that research should be debilitated as a result of raising these issues, but that collaborative approaches within the ‘process’ of research will address Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people and communities as much as the intended outcomes of research itself.

Duty of police and ambulance services : what happens when the plaintiff refuses treatment?

In a recent case the New South Wales Court of Appeal considered the duty of care owed by ambulance and police officers, issues concerning breach and causation and the practical effect of the exclusion of the plaintiff's evidence.

Foreseeability of pure economic loss and causation

In Bonny Glen Pty Ltd v Country Energy [2009] NSWCA 26 (24 February 2009) the New South Wales Court of Appeal held that the pure economic loss suffered by the appellant was recoverable. However, rather than arguments as to whether the appellant was vulnerable and a member of an ascertainable class, whether the respondent had knowledge of the risk to the appellant and was in a position of control and considerations as to indeterminate liability as in Perre v Apand Pty Ltd (1999) 198 CLR 180, the arguments raised related to the foreseeability of the loss and causation.

High Court decision on duty owed by licensee to patron

In a previous column of Queensland Lawyer,1 the case of Scott v CAL No 14 Pty Ltd (No 2) (2009) 256 ALR 512 was discussed. Special leave to appeal against the decision of the Full Court of the Supreme Court of Tasmania was granted and on 10 November 2009 the High Court handed down its decision.

Everyday life and the edges of existence : wrongs with no name or the wrong name?

Actions for wrongful life, as they have come unfortunately to be styled, encompass various types of claim. These include claims for alleged negligence after conception, those based on negligent advice or diagnosis prior to conception concerning possible effects of treatment given to the child's mother, contraception or sterilisation, or genetic disability. This distinguishes such claims from those for so called wrongful birth, which are claims by parents for the cost of raising either a healthy or a disabled child where the unplanned birth imposes costs on the parents as a result of clinical negligence. Two of the more controversial cases to have reached the High Court of Australia which are if interest to us here in the past decade are Cattanach v Melchior where the court, by a narrow majority (McHugh, Gummow, Kirby and Callinan JJ; Gleeson CJ, Hayne and Heydon dissenting) acknowledged recovery for wrongful birth. In the second joined appeals of Harriton v Stephens and Waller v James; Waller v Hoolahan the court overwhelmingly precluded a ‘wrongful life’ claim (Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Callinan, Heydon and Crennan JJ; Kirby J dissenting). Both cases raised issues around the sanctity and value of life and the nature of harm and the assessment of damages, and this brief note affords us the opportunity to consider the way in which the ‘life as legal loss’ arguments were treated by the various judges in both cases.

Queensland requirements (old and new) for the appointment of a real estate agent

In Moneywood Pty Ltd v Salamon Nominees Pty Ltd 1 the High Court of Australia considered an appeal from the Queensland Court of Appeal in relation to the correct interpretation of s76 (1)(c) Auctioneers and Agents Act 1971 (Qld). In paraphrase, s76(1)(c) provides that a real estate agent shall not be entitled to sue for or recover any commission unless “the engagement or appointment to act as …..real estate agent ….. in respect of such transaction is in writing signed by the person to be charged with such…..commission…..or the person’s agent or representative” (“the statutory requirement”).

Beware the doctrine of election!

The operation of the doctrine of election, as it applies in a conveyancing context, was recently considered by the Queensland Court of Appeal (McMurdo P and White and Fryberg JJ) in Barooga Projects (Investments) Pty Ltd v Duncan [2004] QCA 149.

Compensation for compulsory acquisition of a licensed car parking space

The Acquisition of Land Act 1967 (Qld) (‘the Act’) deals with the acquisition of land by the State for public purposes and provides for compensation. The issue that arose for determination in Sorrento Medical Service Pty Ltd v Chief Executive, Dept of Main Roads [2007] QCA 73 was whether the appellant was entitled to claim compensation under the Act in respect of land resumed by the Main Roads Department over which the appellant had an exclusive contractual licence for car parking spaces for use in association with a medical centre leased by the appellant. At first instance, it was held by the Land Court that the appellant was not entitled to compensation for the resumption of the car parking spaces. The basis for this decision by the Land Court was that a right to compensation only exists where resumption has taken some proprietary interest of the claimant in the land. Following an appeal to the Land Appeal Court being dismissed, the appellant instituted the present appeal to the Queensland Court of Appeal (McMurdo P, Holmes JA and Chesterman J).

The impact of location on contribution schedule lot entitlements

Should the owner of a penthouse unit pay more in body corporate levies than the ground floor unit owner? A decision of the Queensland Court of Appeal (McPherson JA, Chesterman and Atkinson JJ) will be of great interest to those seeking to challenge contribution schedule lot entitlements imposed under the Body Corporate and Community Management Act 1997 (Qld) (‘the Act’). The decision is Fischer v Body Corporate for Centrepoint Community Title Scheme 7779 [2004] QCA 214.

The requirement to 'Start a Proceeding' to prevent the lapse of a caveat

Section 126 of the Land Title Act 1994 (Qld) regulates whether, and if so, when a caveat will lapse. While certain caveats will not lapse due to the operation of s 126(1), if a caveator does not wish a caveat to which the section applies to lapse, the caveator must start a proceeding in a court of competent jurisdiction to establish the interest claimed under the caveat within the time limits specified in, and otherwise comply with the obligations imposed by, s 126(4). The requirement, in s 126(4), to “start a proceeding” was the subject of judicial examination by the Court of Appeal (McMurdo P, Holmes JA and MacKenzie J) in Cousins Securities Pty Ltd v CEC Group Ltd [2007] QCA 192.

The source of the good faith obligation in the performance and enforcement of commercial contracts

There are many issues associated with good faith that will ultimately confront the Australian High Court and a number of these have been well canvassed. However, one significant issue has attracted relatively little comment. To date, a number of Australian courts (lower in the judicial hierarchy) have been prepared to hold directly, tacitly accept or assume (without making a final determination) that good faith is implied (as a matter of law) in the performance and enforcement of a very broad class of contract, namely commercial contracts per se. This broad approach is demonstrated in decisions from the Federal Court, the New South Wales Court of Appeal, the Supreme Courts of Victoria and Western Australia and has crept into pleadings in commercial matters in Queensland

The application of the statutory derivative action in Pt 2F.1A of the Corporations Act to companies in liquidation under Ch 5 : Well oiled machine or is Pt 2F.1A in need of a tune up?

The statutory derivative action was introduced in Australia in 2000. This right of action has been debated in the literature and introduced in a number of other jurisdictions as well. However, it is by no means clear that all issues have been resolved despite its operation in Australia for over 10 years. This article considers the application of Pt 2F.1A of the Corporations Act to companies in liquidation under Ch 5. It demonstrates that the application involves consideration of not only proper statutory interpretation but also policy matters around the role and the supervision by the court of a liquidator once a company has entered liquidation.

Is there a physicality requirement at Common Law? : a survey of the Pre-NRDC cases discussing ‘Manufacture’

One of the fundamental issues that remains unresolved in patent law today, both in Australia and in other jurisdictions, is whether an invention must produce a physical effect or cause a physical transformation of matter to be patentable, or whether it is sufficient that an invention involves a specific practical application of an idea or principle to achieve a useful result. In short, the question is whether Australian patent law contains a physicality requirement. Despite being recently considered by the Federal Court, this is arguably an issue that has yet to be satisfactorily resolved in Australia. In its 2006 decision in Grant v Commissioner of Patents, the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia found that the patentable subject matter standard is rooted in the physical, when it held that an invention must involve a physical effect or transformation to be patent eligible. That decision, however, has been the subject of scrutiny in the academic literature. This article seeks to add to the existing literature written in response to the Grant decision by examining in detail the key common law cases decided prior to the High Court’s watershed decision in National Research Development Corporation v Commissioner of Patents, which is the undisputed authoritative statement of principle in regards to the patentable subject matter standard in Australia. This article, in conjunction with others written by the author, questions the Federal Court’s assertion in Grant that the physicality requirement it established is consistent with existing law.