The role of EU Special Representatives in the post-Lisbon foreign policy system: A renaissance? IES Policy Brief Issue 2012/02/June 2012

Summary. EU Special Representatives have been deployed since 1996 in order to contribute to the EU’s crisis management efforts in various crisis regions. As they are not part of the formal hierarchy of the European External Action Service and thus a rather flexible foreign policy instrument at the disposal of the Member States, new special representatives have been appointed in 2011 and 2012. This Policy Brief argues that the representatives’ autonomy must not necessarily lead to ‘clashes of competence’ with the EU’s diplomatic service.

EU Foreign Policy Between the Revolution and the Status Quo. IES Policy Brief Issue 2014/09/November 2014

Summary. When a new High Representative takes office, an opportunity presents itself to take a look at existing EU external policies and assess whether these are still sufficient to safeguard Europe’s interests in light of recent events. New strategic priorities have to be defined where necessary, not on each and every topic of foreign policy, but on those big issues that European nations can only deal with collectively, through the EU. How to pursue these strategic priorities is an equally important question. Looking for the right balance between a far-reaching reform agenda and a status quo policy, both of which can be detrimental to its interests, the EU can opt for pragmatic idealism as the new strategic concept for its foreign policy.

Law and Foreign Direct Investment. IES WORKING PAPER 4/2011

In this paper we examine the effect of law on foreign direct investment outflows with a specific interest in the relationship between international investment law and domestic private property laws. Our results indicate that FDI investor is indifferent to host country property rights, hence shareholder protection by law is not a significant determinant of FDI outflows. We argue that FDI, in contrast with other types of capital flows, can effectively mitigate the agency problem through majority ownership and control, hence reduce exposure to ex-post expropriation by the affiliate. On the other hand, FDI investor remains exposed to risk of expropriation by the host government and is strongly sensitive to the enforcement of law in the host country. In contrast with recent literature we conclude that there are no causal relationship between bilateral investment treaties and FDI.