Viral dynamics in vivo: limitations on estimates of intracellular delay and virus decay.

Anti-viral drug treatment of human immunodeficiency virus type I (HIV-1) and hepatitis B virus (HBV) infections causes rapid reduction in plasma virus load. Viral decline occurs in several phases and provides information on important kinetic constants of virus replication in vivo and pharmacodynamical properties. We develop a mathematical model that takes into account the intracellular phase of the viral life-cycle, defined as the time between infection of a cell and production of new virus particles. We derive analytic solutions for the dynamics following treatment with reverse transcriptase inhibitors, protease inhibitors, or a combination of both. For HIV-1, our results show that the phase of rapid decay in plasma virus (days 2-7) allows precise estimates for the turnover rate of productively infected cells. The initial quasi-stationary phase (days 0-1) and the transition phase (days 1-2) are explained by the combined effects of pharmacological and intracellular delays, the clearance of free virus particles, and the decay of infected cells. Reliable estimates of the first three quantities are not possible from data on virus load only; such estimates require additional measurements. In contrast with HIV-1, for HBV our model predicts that frequent early sampling of plasma virus will lead to reliable estimates of the free virus half-life and the pharmacological properties of the administered drug. On the other hand, for HBV the half-life of infected cells cannot be estimated from plasma virus decay.

The college, the market, and the court, or, Woman's relation to education, labor, and law

by Caroline H. Dall.

Petition of Sever and Welsteed to the General Court (manuscript copy), [1723 June-August]

Two folio-sized leaves containing a two-page handwritten copy of the June 21, 1723 petition of Sever and Welsteed requesting the question of non-resident Fellows in the Corporation be readdressed by the General Court, and a one-page handwritten copy of the answer to the petition passed by the General Court on August 7, 1723. The text of the petition begins "Sheweth that we have formerly represented to the Overseers of the College the Difficulty we were under in the business of it by reason of our not being vested with the power of its Charter..." The petition is incorrectly dated as "June 24th 1722" instead of 1723.

[Grants of the General Court for 1737 and 1750 to President Holyoke], undated

One folio-sized leaf containing a handwritten list of grants received by President Holyoke from the Massachusetts General Court between 1737 and 1750, presumably copied from a record book cited as "M.S. No. II," pages 26-56.

Memorial of the President and Fellows of Harvard College to the General Court for the enlargement of their power to hold real estate. Copy, [1797 July 15]

Four folio-sized leaves containing a handwritten copy of a petition to the Massachusetts General Court from the Harvard Corporation requesting the College's amount of tax exempt real estate be enlarged.

Notes of proceedings and cases determined in the high court of errors and appeals, the court of chancery, and the orphans court of the state of Delaware, 1792-1832

Contains summaries of cases heard by the Delaware Supreme Court and the Delaware Appeals Court in the counties of Sussex, Kent, and Newcastle covering a variety of legal topics. Supposedly based on Wilson's Red Book.

Notebook of cases in the New York Supreme Court and Circuit Court, 1797-ca. 1802

Contains "court minutes" of the New York Supreme Court and Circuit Court, in short entries by an unknown judge, identifying cases, attorneys, plaintiffs and defendants, and the actions taken.

Battlefield of Spotsylvania Court House, Virginia and vicinity, 1864 (Raster Image)

This layer is a georeferenced raster image of the historic paper map: Map of the battle field of Spottsylvania C.H. : showing the field of operations of the Army of the Potomac commanded by Maj. Gen. George G. Meade U.S.A., from May 8th to 21st, 1865 [i.e. 1864], surveyed under the orders of Bvt. Col. J.C. Duane, Major of Engineers, Chief Engineer, Army of the Potomac, by Bvt. Maj. C.W. Howell, 1st Lieut. of Engineers ; assisted by Messrs. L.C. Oswell, L. Bell, and R.B. Talfor ; J. Bien, lithographer, New York. It was published ca. 1865. Scale [1:15,840]. Covers area surrounding Spotsylvania and Spotsylvania Battlefield, Virginia. The image inside the map neatline is georeferenced to the surface of the earth and fit to the Virginia State Plane North Coordinate System (in Meters) (Fipszone 4501). All map collar and inset information is also available as part of the raster image, including any inset maps, profiles, statistical tables, directories, text, illustrations, or other information associated with the principal map. This map shows features such as roads, drainage, dwellings with names of inhabitants, vegetation, Union and Confederate troop lines and defenses, and more. Relief shown by hachures. Includes note. This layer is part of a selection of digitally scanned and georeferenced historic maps of the Civil War from the Harvard Map Collection. Many items from this selection are from a collection of maps deposited by the Military Order of the Loyal Legion of the United States Commandery of the State of Massachusetts (MOLLUS) in the Harvard Map Collection in 1938. These maps typically portray both natural and manmade features, in particular showing places of military importance. The selection represents a range of regions, originators, ground condition dates, scales, and purposes.

The European Court of Justice and process-oriented review. Research Paper in Law, 01/2012

Structuralism is a theory of U.S. constitutional adjudication according to which courts should seek to improve the decision-making process of the political branches of government so as to render it more democratic.1 In words of John Hart Ely, courts should exercise their judicial-review powers as a ‘representation-reinforcing’ mechanism.2 Structuralism advocates that courts must eliminate the elements of the political decision-making process that are at odds with the structure set out by the authors of the U.S. Constitution. The advantage of this approach, U.S. scholars posit, lies in the fact that it does not require courts to second-guess the policy decisions adopted by the political branches of government. Instead, they limit themselves to enforcing the constitutional structure within which those decisions must be adopted. Of course, this theory of constitutional adjudication, like all theories, has its shortcomings. For example, detractors of structuralism argue that it is difficult, if not impossible, to draw the dividing line between ‘substantive’ and ‘structural’ matters.3 In particular, they claim that, when identifying the ‘structure’ set out by the authors of the U.S. Constitution, courts necessarily base their determinations not on purely structural principles, but on a set of substantive values, evaluating concepts such as democracy, liberty and equality. 4 Without claiming that structuralism should be embraced by the ECJ as the leading theory of judicial review, the purpose of my contribution is to explore how recent case-law reveals that the ECJ has also striven to develop guiding principles which aim to improve the way in which the political institutions of the EU adopt their decisions. In those cases, the ECJ decided not to second-guess the appropriateness of the policy choices made by the EU legislator. Instead, it preferred to examine whether, in reaching an outcome, the EU political institutions had followed the procedural steps mandated by the authors of the Treaties. Stated simply, I argue that judicial deference in relation to ‘substantive outcomes’ has been counterbalanced by a strict ‘process review’. To that effect, I would like to discuss three recent rulings of the ECJ, delivered after the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, where an EU policy measure was challenged indirectly, i.e. via the preliminary reference procedure, namely Vodafone, Volker und Markus Schecke and Test-Achats.5 Whilst in the former case the ECJ ruled that the questions raised by the referring court disclosed no factor of such a kind as to affect the validity of the challenged act, in the latter cases the challenged provisions of an EU act were declared invalid.

The future of the Eurozone and the role of the German Constitutional Court. Research Papers in Law, 05/2012

[Introduction.] Necessary reforms towards a deepened and increased European shaped economic, financial and budgetary policy, paraphrased with the term “fiscal union”, could possibly reach constitutional limits. In its EFSF judgment1, the German Constitutional Court, following the Lisbon judgment in which certain government tasks were determined as being part of the “constitutional identity”2, connected the budget right of the parliament via the principle of democracy to the eternity clause of Art. 79 para 3 Basic Law. A transfer of essential parts of the budget right of the German Bundestag, which would be in conflict with the German constitution, is said to exist when the determination of the nature and amount of the tax affecting the citizens is largely regulated on the supranational level and thereby deprived of the Bundestag’s right to disposition. A reform of the Economic and Monetary Union that touches the core of the budget right can, according to the German Federal Court, with regard to Art. 79 (3) of the Basic Law only be realized by way of Art. 146 of the Basic Law, thus with a new constitution given by the people that replaces the Basic Law.3

The European Court of Justice and the Draft Constitution: A Supreme Court for the Union? Research Paper in Law 8/2003

[Introduction]. The purpose of this paper is twofold. First, it examines selectively the provisions of the draft Constitution pertaining to the Court of Justice and assesses the ways in which the draft Constitution is likely to affect the jurisdiction and the function of the Court. Secondly, it discusses the challenges faced by the Court in relation to the protection of human rights by reference to the recent judgment in Schmidberger.1 Both aspects of the discussion serve to underlie that the Court is assuming the function of the Supreme Court of the Union whose jurisdiction is fundamentally constitutional in character. It has a central role to play not only in relation to matters of economic integration but also in deciding issues of political governance, defining democracy at European and national level, and contributing through the process of judicial harmonisation to the emergence of a European demos. This constitutional jurisdiction of the ECJ is not new but has acquired more importance in recent years and is set to be enhanced under the provisions of the new Constitution. The paper is divided as follows: The first section provides an overview of the way the new Constitution affects the ECJ. The subsequent sections examine respectively Article 28(1) of the draft Constitution, the appointment and tenure of the judiciary, locus standi for private individuals, sanctions against Member States, jurisdiction under the CFSP and the Chapter on freedom, security and justice, preliminary references, other provisions o f the Constitution pertaining to the Court, the principle of subsidiarity, and the judgment in Schmidberger. The final section contains some concluding remarks.