The EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region from Germany’s perspective. OSW Commentary No. 69, 2011-01-10

Germany is one of the eight EU member states which participate in the EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region along with Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Sweden. Germany had a positive approach to the EUSBSR strategy (see Appendix 1) right from planning stage. This project contributed to the continuation of Germany’s co-operation with the countries in this region, which has been conducted since the mid 1980s mainly by German federal states. Germany is playing a major role as part of this strategy because it is the coordinator of its three priority areas.However, the German federal government sees the EUSBSR as a project to be implemented at the level of federal states. This has been proven by the great activity of three German federal states participating in the strategy (Hamburg, Mecklenburg-Vorpommern and Schleswig-Holstein) and at the same time the low level of engagement from the Bundestag, the federal government and expert circles. Furthermore, federal states more often formulate evaluations of the effects of co-operation achieved so far as part of the EUSBSR. Still, the relatively low level of Berlin’s engagement does not mean that it is not interested in co-operation in the Baltic region as such. Germany actively participates in the work of such bodies as the Council of the Baltic Sea States or the Baltic Marine Environment Protection Commission (HELCOM). All German entities engaged in the strategy make its future attractiveness and the success of individual projects as part of it dependent on including Russia in the EUSBSR. As long as Germany has the opportunity of regional co-operation with Russia at other forums (for example, the Council of the Baltic Sea States), it is unlikely to become more engaged in developing the strategy and enhancing co-operation as part of this project.

Towards a professional army. Changes to the structure of the officer cadre and the manning system of the Russian armed forces. OSW Commentary No. 73, 2012-03-28

The structure of the Russian army’s personnel has undergone a major transformation in recent years. The Armed Forces are no longer a downsized continuation of the Soviet-era mass army, but are gradually becoming a de facto professional army in which conscription, now employed on a diminishing scale, will primarily constitute a first step towards a continued professional military career. The cornerstone for the process of professionalisation has been laid by a personnel reform which cut the number of officer posts by nearly half and considerably restricted the recruitment of new officers, thus restoring traditional proportions to the structure of the officer corps. The plans to ultimately implement a manning system based predominantly on contract service are a natural consequence of these changes. The ongoing professionalisation of the Russian Armed Forces should be treated as a conscious effort which is mainly necessitated by global trends: despite the demographic changes taking place, Russia could still maintain an army with a declared strength of one million soldiers, most of them conscripts.

Macroeconomic Scenarios for the Euro-Mediterranean Area Quantification based on the GEM-E3 Model. MEDPRO Report No. 7, July 2013

Four alternative macroeconomic scenarios for southern Mediterranean countries are quantified in this study with the use of GEM-E3, a general equilibrium model. These are i) the continuation of current policies (business-as-usual scenario), ii) southern Mediterranean–EU cooperation (Euro-Mediterranean Union scenario), iii) a global opening of the southern Mediterranean countries and cooperation with the rest of the Middle East and other developing countries like China (Euro-Mediterranean alliance scenario), and iv) a deterioration in the regional political climate and a failure of cooperation (Euro-Mediterranean under threat scenario). Explicit assumptions on trade integration, infrastructure upgrade, population and governance developments are adopted in each scenario. The simulation results indicate that an infrastructure upgrade and governance improvements in the context of southern Mediterranean–EU cooperation could benefit most of the countries under consideration. The analysis remains important in light of ongoing regional developments and the need to design the best policies to pursue in the aftermath of the Arab spring.

China on Central-Eastern Europe: ‘16+1’ as seen from Beijing. OSW COMMENTARY NUMBER 166/15.04.2015

From the Introduction. In 2012, China approached the countries of Central-Eastern Europe (CEE) with a proposal concerning regional cooperation in the ‘16+1’ formula. According to Chinese analysts, the rationale behind this breakthrough decision was Beijing’s acknowledgment of the growing importance of the region’s states within the European Union as well as a partial elimination of the ideological differences which had hamstrung cooperation in previous years. It seems that the eurozone crisis may be perceived as the reason for the CEE states’ increased interest in developing their cooperation with China. These circumstances have opened a ‘window of opportunity’ which Beijing has decided to exploit to create a kind of bridgehead in the region which it could later use in its further economic expansion in Europe. Apart from opening the CEE region up for investments, the ‘16+1’ format was intended to facilitate the shaping of relations between China and the EU and to become a tool in building a positive image for China. Chinese experts agree that after three years of functioning, the ‘16+1’ regional cooperation format has helped Beijing achieve its goals only to a limited extent. The major obstacles have included: the immense diversification of the region, barriers related to EU law, insufficient expertise on the part of Chinese companies, the asymmetry of economic needs on both sides, and no willingness within the region itself to develop cooperation. Regardless of the limited effectiveness of activities carried out so far, China has continued its ‘16+1’ initiative. This continuation and the progressing institutionalisation of cooperation in the ‘16+1’ format have often seemed superficial. China has been using this multi-party formula to improve its long-term bilateral relations with selected states in the region and thereby to create a basis for Beijing’s political and economic presence in Central-Eastern Europe.

EU Facilitated Dialogue: Another exercise in constructive ambiguity. CEPS Commentary, 28 August 2015

Under the auspices of the EU, Belgrade and Pristina have signed new agreements on how to further normalise their relations. Yet these agreements, including on the creation of an Association/Community of Serb majority municipalities in Kosovo, are the continuation of an exercise in constructive ambiguity, argues Dusan Reljic in this CEPS Commentary. He makes the point that the proper implementation of these much heralded agreements will be something of a challenge.

The Greek elections and the third bailout programme: Why it could work this time round. CEPS Commentary, 21 September 2015

Following the decisive victory won by the Syriza party in Greece’s general election on September 20th, this commentary explores the key question of whether the third bailout programme can work, where the previous two programmes failed. Whereas most observers argue that the third one cannot work because it merely represents a continuation of an approach that has manifestly failed, the authors argue that a closer inspection of the conditions today give grounds for cautious optimism.

Solar radiation over and under sea ice during the POLARSTERN cruise ARK-XXVI/3 (TransArc) in summer 2011

Arctic sea ice has declined and become thinner and younger (more seasonal) during the last decade. One consequence of this is that the surface energy budget of the Arctic Ocean is changing. While the role of surface albedo has been studied intensively, it is still widely unknown how much light penetrates through sea ice into the upper ocean, affecting sea-ice mass balance, ecosystems, and geochemical processes. Here we present the first large-scale under-ice light measurements, operating spectral radiometers on a remotely operated vehicle (ROV) under Arctic sea ice in summer. This data set is used to produce an Arctic-wide map of light distribution under summer sea ice. Our results show that transmittance through first-year ice (FYI, 0.11) was almost three times larger than through multi-year ice (MYI, 0.04), and that this is mostly caused by the larger melt-pond coverage of FYI (42 vs. 23%). Also energy absorption was 50% larger in FYI than in MYI. Thus, a continuation of the observed sea-ice changes will increase the amount of light penetrating into the Arctic Ocean, enhancing sea-ice melt and affecting sea-ice and upper-ocean ecosystems.

(Table 1) Detrital modes for sand grains in sediment core CRP-3

Detrital modes determined on 68 sandstone samples from CRP-3 drillcore indicate a continuation of the dynamic history of uplift-related erosion and unroofing previously documented in CRP-1 and CRP-2/2A. The source area is identified very strongly with the Transantarctic Mountains (TAM) Dry Valleys block in southern Victoria Land. Initial unroofing of the TAM comprised removal of much of a former capping sequence of Jurassic Kirkpatrick basalts, which preceded the formation of the Victoria Land Basin. Erosion of Beacon Supergroup outcrops took place during progressive uplift of the TAM in the Oligocene. Earliest CRP-3 Oligocene samples above 788 metres below the sea floor (mbsf) were sourced overwhelmingly in Beacon Supergroup strata, including a recognisable contribution from Triassic volcanogenic Lashly Formation sandstones (uppermost Victoria Group). Moving up-section, by 500 mbsf, the CRP-3 samples are depauperate quartz arenites dominantly derived from the quartzose Devonian Taylor Group. Between c. 500 and 450 mbsf, the modal parameters show a distinctive change indicating that small outcrops of basement granitoids and metamorphic rocks were also being eroded along with the remaining Beacon (mainly Taylor Group) sequence. Apart from enigmatic fluctuations in modal indices above 450 mbsf, similar to those displayed by samples in CRP-2/2A, the CRP-3 modes are essentially constant (within a broad data scatter) to the top of CRP-3. The proportion of exposed basement outcrop remained at < 20 %, indicating negligible uplift (i.e. relative stability) throughout that period.

Conciliation act, 1896, and Industrial courts act, 1919. Report on conciliation and arbitration including particulars of proceedings under the Conciliation act, 1896, the Coal mines (minimum wage) act, 1912, the Wages (temporary regulation) acts, 1918 and 1919, the Restoration of pre-war practices act, 1919, and the Industrial courts act, 1919 ... 1919[-1920] ...

Title varies slightly.

The Canadian journal ...

Appended to 1st ser., v. 3: Reports on the improvement and preservation of Toronto harbour. 38 p., illus.

Descriptive and classified missionary centenary catalogue of current Christian literature : 1907 continuing that of 1901 (Wen-li and Mandarin) /

"A continuation of the labors of Mr. Alexander Kenmure ... and of the still earlier work of Dr. Alexander Wylie."--Pref.

Wyoming CVISN program plan.

Wyoming Highway Patrol, Commercial Carrier Section, Cheyenne

Some account of domestic architecture in England from Edward I. to Richard II. : with notices of foreign examples, and numerous illustrations of existing remains from original drawings /

Continued by the author's: Some account of domestic architecture in England from Richard II. to Henry VIII.

Resúmen de la historia de Venezuela desde el año de 1797 hasta el de 1830,

A continuation of the author's Resúmen de la historia de Venezuela desde el descubrimiento de su territorio ... hasta 1797.

Emigração Portuguesa.

Description based on: 1901.