Political representation in Switzerland : democratic or plutocratic ?

Les inégalités économiques se traduisent-elles dans des inégalités politiques à travers le processus de représentation électorale? Telle est la question centrale de cette thèse qui s'attache, par ailleurs, à investiguer les mécanismes qui tendent à produire une représentation biaisée des préférences politiques des citoyens en fonction de leur statut économique. Focalisé sur le cas de la Suisse et faisant usage des données de l'enquête postélectorale Selects de 2007, ce travail démontre que sur les rares sujets qui divisent les citoyens selon des clivages économiques - la redistribution des richesses et la sécurité sociale en particulier - les élus à l'Assemblée fédérale ont des préférences qui reflètent mieux les opinions des citoyens les plus riches. Cette sous-représentation des opinions des citoyens modestes et de ceux faisant partie du centre de la distribution des revenus peut en partie être attribuée à des différences dans les taux de participation et de connaissance politiques entre ces groupes de citoyens. La thèse met également en évidence le rôle joué par la représentation descriptive - autrement dit, la similitude en termes de statut économique entre les représentants et les représentés - dans la représentation des opinions et intérêts des citoyens. Par ailleurs, la structure du système partisan en Suisse ne reflétant pas la multidimensionnalité des préférences politiques des citoyens, les électeurs ne parviennent pas à traduire la complexité de leurs préférences politiques dans un choix de vote, ce qui, dans la configuration actuelle des forces politiques, tend à favoriser l'élection de représentants aux opinions proches de la droite sur les questions économiques. Enfin, une analyse de la représentation politique au niveau cantonal tend à soutenir la thèse selon laquelle le manque de régulation en matière de financement des partis en Suisse pourrait partiellement expliquer les inégalités dans la représentation des opinions politiques des citoyens aux revenus distincts. - Do economic inequalities translate into political inequalities through electoral representation? This is the central research question of this thesis, which also investigates the mechanisms that lead to potential economically based inequalities in the representation of citizens' policy preferences. Focusing on the case of Switzerland and making use of data provided by the post- electoral survey Selects 2007, this research demonstrates that regarding the rare policy domains in which the preferences of citizens are clearly linked to economic cleavages - redistribution and social security in particular - members of the Federal Assembly have policy preferences that best reflect the policy preferences of richer citizens. The under-representation of the opinions of relatively poor citizens and of those being the in the middle of the income distribution can be to some extent be explained by differences in political participation and political information across income groups. The thesis also puts forward the role played by descriptive representation - the similarity between representatives and represented in terms of their socioeconomic status - for the representation of citizens' preferences and interests. In addition, the structure of the party system in Switzerland does not reflect the multidimensionality of policy preferences among citizens who, as a result, have a hard time translating their complex preferences into a vote choice. Given the configuration of political actors, this tends to favour the election of representatives from the right who do not represent the preferences of their voters on economic issues. Finally, an analysis of representation at the cantonal level tends to confirm that the lack of party finance regulations in Switzerland may partially explain inequalities in the representation of citizens with different levels of income.

On the origins of electoral systems and political parties. The role of elections in multi-member districts

The old, understudied electoral system composed of multi-member districts, open ballot and plurality rule is presented as the most remote scene of the origin of both political parties and new electoral systems. A survey of the uses of this set of electoral rules in different parts of the world during remote and recent periods shows its wide spread. A model of voting by this electoral system demonstrates that, while it can produce varied and pluralistic representation, it also provides incentives to form factional or partisan candidacies. Famous negative reactions to the emergence of factions and political parties during the 18th and 19th centuries are reinterpreted in this context. Many electoral rules and procedures invented since the second half of the 19th century, including the Australian ballot, single-member districts, limited and cumulative ballots, and proportional representation rules, derived from the search to reduce the effects of the originating multi-member district system in favor of a single party sweep. The general relations between political parties and electoral systems are restated to account for the foundational stage here discussed.

Assesing the political viability of labour market reform: The case of employment protection

We analyze the political support for employment protection legislation.Unlike my previous work on the same topic, this paper pays a lot ofattention to the role of obsolescence in the growth process.In voting in favour of employment protection, incumbent employeestrade off lower living standards (because employment protectionmaintains workers in less productive activities) against longer jobduration. The support for employment protection will then depend onthe value of the latter relative to the cost of the former. Wehighlight two key deeterminants of this trade-off: first, the workers'bargaining power, second, the economy's growth rate-more preciselyits rate of creative destruction.

Amílcar Cabral: estratégias políticas e culturais para independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde

Nascido na Guiné portuguesa, educado em Cabo Verde e na universidade de portuguesa, profissional no campo da agronomia em Portugal e nos territórios colonizados, Cabral apelido que hoje dispensa muitas apresentações na historiografia africana, foi actor de um percurso único sedimentado nos tempos duros da dominação colonial portuguesa, quando fora de Portugal e do seu império, movimentos intelectuais, ideias políticas e acções culturais procuravam libertar o homem colonizado africano das malhas do colonialismo e da opressão. É com base nesta breve descrição que ressaltamos a necessidade de analisar as estratégias políticas e culturais de Cabral para a conquista da independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde, procurando o que foi produto da colonização portuguesa, mas sobretudo apurar como integrou contribuições teóricas internacionais e africanas, que em meados do século XX marcaram as escolhas e práticas dos intelectuais e políticos africanos integrados no processo de luta de libertação e independência. Procuramos estudar neste trabalho, a forma como este notável político africano estruturou as suas aprendizagens, e reflexões articulando a realidades guineenses e caboverdeanas do século XX, e as correntes marcantes do pensamento libertador africano. Tentaremos também perceber as diversas dinâmicas que possam ter contribuído de alguma maneira especial para construção da sua identidade que resultou na sua entrega à luta de libertação nacional. Cabral, as suas estratégias políticas e culturais, o seu impacto nos territórios africanos constituiu o eixo central desta investigação a que titulamos «Amílcar Cabral: Estratégias políticas e culturais para a independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde».

Deciding analytically or trusting your intuition? The advantadges and disadvantadges of analytic and intuitive thought

Recent research has highlighted the notion that people can make judgmentsand choices by means of two systems that are labeled here tacit(or intuitive) and deliberate (or analytic). Whereas most decisionstypically involve both systems, this chapter examines the conditions underwhich each system is liable to be more effective. This aims to illuminatethe age-old issue of whether and when people should trust intuition or analysis. To do this, a framework is presented to understand how thetacit and deliberate systems work in tandem. Distinctions are also madebetween the types of information typically used by both systems as wellas the characteristics of environments that facilitate or hinder accuratelearning by the tacit system. Next, several experiments that havecontrasted intuitive and analytic modes on the same tasks are reviewed.Together, the theoretical framework and experimental evidence leads tospecifying the trade-off that characterizes their relative effectiveness.Tacit system responses can be subject to biases. In making deliberate systemresponses, however, people might not be aware of the correct rule to dealwith the task they are facing and/or make errors in executing it. Whethertacit or deliberate responses are more valid in particular circumstancesrequires assessing this trade-off. In this, the probability of making errorsin deliberate thought is postulated to be a function of the analytical complexityof the task as perceived by the person. Thus the trade-off is one of bias (inimplicit responses) versus analytical complexity (when tasks are handled indeliberate mode). Finally, it is noted that whereas much attention has beenpaid in the past to helping people make decisions in deliberate mode, effortsshould also be directed toward improving ability to make decisions intacit mode since the effectiveness of decisions clearly depends on both. Thistherefore represents an important frontier for research.

Betting on Hitler: The value of political connections in Nazi Germany

This paper examines the value of connections between German industry andthe Nazi movement in early 1933. Drawing on previously unused contemporarysources about management and supervisory board composition and stock returns,we find that one out of seven firms, and a large proportion of the biggest companies,had substantive links with the National Socialist German Workers Party. Firmssupporting the Nazi movement experienced unusually high returns, outperformingunconnected ones by 5% to 8% between January and March 1933. These resultsare not driven by sectoral composition and are robust to alternative estimatorsand definitions of affiliation.

The political economy of employment protection

This paper develops a model of job creation and job destruction in agrowing economy with embodied technical progress, that we use toanalyze the political support for employment protection legislationssuch as the ones that are observed in most European countries.We analyze the possibility of Condorcet cycles due to the fact thatworkers about to become unemployed prefer both an increase and areduction in firing costs over the status quo. Despite this problem, we show the existence of local, and sometimes global majority winners.In voting in favour of employment protection, incumbent employeestrade off lower living standards (because employment protectionmaintains workers in less productive activities) against longer job duration. We show that the gains from, and consequently the politicalsupport for employment protection (as defined by maximunjob tenure) are larger, the lower the rate of creative destruction and the largerthe worker's bargaining power. Numerical simulations suggest a hump-shaped response of firing costs to these variables, as well as negative impact of exogeneous turnover on employment protection.

Increasing political returns and rural-urban migrations

This paper analyzes the different equilibria in rural-urban migrationsand political redistribution that result from the interaction betweenincreasing political returns, the distribution of land, and creditmarket imperfections. Governments that put a special weight on thewelfare of urban workers when setting agricultural prices generate apolitical externality in the urban sector, giving peasants anincentive to migrate in anticipation of policy determination. Ifcredit markets are imperfect, land ownership confers higherproductivity to peasants, who require large price changes to migrate.In this context, land inequality would lead to large migrations and tolarge policy change, while an egalitarian land distribution would leadto no migration and to a small policy change. This interaction shedslight on the contrasting experience of Latin America and East Asia atthe outset of World War II.

Going Public in the European Union: Action Repertoires of Western European Collective Political Actors

As a result of the Europeanization of politics and the increasing role of the public sphere, political actors in Western Europe are currently facing a double strategic challenge. Based on data from seven West European countries and the European Union, the authors analyze how state actors, political parties, interest groups, and social movement organizations cope with this double challenge at both the national and the supranational level. Results indicate that the classic repertoire of inside strategies at the national level is still the most typical for all actors, but media-related strategies are also prominent at the national level. The Europeanization of repertoires is mainly determined by institutional factors and by the actors' power, whereas the public arena plays an equally important role for all types of actors, in all countries and at both the national and the EU level.

Social security in theory and practice (I): Facts and political theories

166 countries have some kind of public old age pension. What economic forcescreate and sustain old age Social Security as a public program? We document some of the internationally and historically common features of Social Security programs including explicit and implicit taxes on labor supply, pay-as-you-go features, intergenerational redistribution, benefits which areincreasing functions of lifetime earnings and not means-tested. We partition theories of Social Security into three groups: "political", "efficiency" and "narrative" theories. We explore three political theories in this paper: the majority rational voting model (with its two versions: "the elderly as the leaders of a winning coalition with the poor" and the "once and for all election" model), the "time-intensive model of political competition" and the "taxpayer protection model". Each of the explanations is compared with the international and historical facts. A companion paper explores the "efficiency" and "narrative" theories, and derives implicationsof all the theories for replacing the typical pay-as-you-go system with a forced savings plan.

The political consequences of unemployment

We analyze the channels by which an ill-functioning labor market changes the preferences of the people for public policy and therefore the decisions that are made. We not only discuss labour market reform but other important aspects of policy making such as the size and structure of government spending. Theclass of mechanisms that we highlight can be summarized as the very existence of unemployment generating political support for "sclerosis". This may help to explain the timid pace of reform, in particular the fact that any recovery sends them at the backfront of the political agenda, and the sometimes violent opposition generated by some measures, as we have seen mostly in France.