Similarities and dissimilarities between the Movement ABC-2 and the Zurich Neuromotor Assessment in children with suspected developmental coordination disorder.

An established tool for the assessment of motor performance in children with developmental coordination disorder (DCD) is the Movement-ABC-2 (M-ABC-2). The Zurich Neuromotor Assessment (ZNA) is also widely used for the evaluation of children's motor performance, but has not been compared with the M-ABC-2. Fifty-one children (39 males) between 5 and 7 years of age with suspected DCD were assessed using the M-ABC-2 and the ZNA. Rank correlations between scores of different test components were calculated. The structure of the tests was explored using canonical-correlation analysis. The correlation between total scores of the two motor tests was reasonable (0.66; p<0.001). However, ZNA scores were generally lower than those of M-ABC-2, due to poor performance in the fine motor adaptive component and increased contralateral associated movements (CAM). The canonical-correlation analysis revealed that ZNA measures components like pure motor skills and CAM that are not represented in the M-ABC-2. Furthermore, there was also no equivalent for the aiming and catching items of the M-ABC-2 in ZNA. The two tests measure different motor characteristics in children with suspected DCD and, thus, can be used complementary for the diagnosis of the disorder.

Heterogeneity as a coordination device

A model of directed search with a finite number of buyers and sellers is considered, where sellers compete in direct mechanisms. Buyer heterogeneity and Nash equilibrium results in perfect sorting. The restriction to complementary inputs, that the match value function Q is supermodular, in addition coordinates the sellers strategies. In that case, equilibrium implements positive assortative matching, which is efficient and consistent with the stable (cooperative equilibrium) outcome. This provides a non-cooperative and decentralizedsolution for the Assignment Game. Conversely, if buyers are identical, no such coordination is possible, and there is a continuum of equilibria, one of which exhibits price posting, another yields competition in auctions.

Measuring strategic uncertainty in coordination games

This paper explores three aspects of strategic uncertainty: its relation to risk, predictability of behavior and subjective beliefs of players. In a laboratory experiment we measure subjects certainty equivalents for three coordination games and one lottery. Behavior in coordination games is related to risk aversion, experience seeking, and age.From the distribution of certainty equivalents we estimate probabilities for successful coordination in a wide range of games. For many games, success of coordination is predictable with a reasonable error rate. The best response to observed behavior is close to the global-game solution. Comparing choices in coordination games with revealed risk aversion, we estimate subjective probabilities for successful coordination. In games with a low coordination requirement, most subjects underestimate the probability of success. In games with a high coordination requirement, most subjects overestimate this probability. Estimating probabilistic decision models, we show that the quality of predictions can be improved when individual characteristics are taken into account. Subjects behavior is consistent with probabilistic beliefs about the aggregate outcome, but inconsistent with probabilistic beliefs about individual behavior.

On the impact of fundamentals, liquidity and coordination on market stability

We develop a coordination game to model interactions betweenfundamentals and liquidity during unstable periods in financial markets.We then propose a flexible econometric framework for estimationof the model and analysis of its quantitative implications. The specificempirical application is carry trades in the yen dollar market, includingthe turmoil of 1998. We find a generally very deep market, withlow information disparities amongst agents. We observe occasionallyepisodes of market fragility, or turmoil with up by the escalator, downby the elevator patterns in prices. The key role of strategic behaviorin the econometric model is also confirmed.

The effect of intergroup competition on group coordination: An experimental study

We report an experiment on the effect of intergroup competition on group coordination in the minimal-effort game (Van Huyck et al., 1990). The competition was between two 7-person groups. Each player in each group independently chose an integer from 1 to 7. The group with the higher minimum won the competition and each of its members was paid according to the game s original payoff matrix. Members of the losing group were paid nothing. In case of a tie, each player was paid half the payoff in the original matrix. This treatment was contrasted with two control treatments where each of the two groups played an independent coordination game, either with or without information about the minimum chosen by the outgroup. Although the intergroup competition does not change the set of strict equilibria, we found that it improved collective rationality by moving group members in the direction of higher-payoff equilibria. Merely providing group members with information about the minimal-effort level in the other group was not sufficient to generate this effect.

Ex post bargaining, labor coordination and wage formation at the firm level

We lay out a model of wage bargaining with two leading features:bargaining is ex post to relevant investments and there isindividual bargaining in firms without a Union. We compareindividual ex post bargaining to coordinated ex post bargainingand we analyze the effects on wage formation. As opposed to exante bargaining models, the costs of destroying the employmentrelationship play a crucial role in determining wages. Highfiring costs in particular yield a rent for employees. Ourtheory points to a employer size-wage effect that is independentof the production function and market power. We derive a simpleleast squares specification from the theoretical model thatallow us to estimate components of the wage premium fromcoordination. We reject the hypothesis that labor coordinationdoes not alter the extensive form of the bargaining game. Laborcoordination substantially increases bargaining power butdecreases labor's ability to pose costly threats to the firm.

Communication, coordination and efficiency in evolutionary one-population models

We analyze the role of commitment in pre-play communication for ensuringefficient evolutionarily stable outcomes in coordination games. All players are a priori identical as they are drawn from the same population. In games where efficient outcomes can be reached by players coordinating on the same action we find commitment to be necessary to enforce efficiency. In games where efficienct outcomes only result from play of different actions, communication without commitment is most effective although efficiency can no longer be guaranteed. Only when there are many messages then inefficient outcomes are negligible as their basins of attraction become very small.

Equilibrium selection through incomplete information in coordination games: An experimental study

We perform an experiment on a pure coordination game with uncertaintyabout the payoffs. Our game is closely related to models that have beenused in many macroeconomic and financial applications to solve problemsof equilibrium indeterminacy. In our experiment each subject receives anoisy signal about the true payoffs. This game has a unique strategyprofile that survives the iterative deletion of strictly dominatedstrategies (thus a unique Nash equilibrium). The equilibrium outcomecoincides, on average, with the risk-dominant equilibrium outcome ofthe underlying coordination game. The behavior of the subjects convergesto the theoretical prediction after enough experience has been gained. The data (and the comments) suggest that subjects do not apply through"a priori" reasoning the iterated deletion of dominated strategies.Instead, they adapt to the responses of other players. Thus, the lengthof the learning phase clearly varies for the different signals. We alsotest behavior in a game without uncertainty as a benchmark case. The gamewith uncertainty is inspired by the "global" games of Carlsson and VanDamme (1993).

On the role of non-equilibrium focal points as coordination devices

Considering a pure coordination game with a large number of equivalentequilibria, we argue, first, that a focal point that is itself not a Nash equilibriumand is Pareto dominated by all Nash equilibria, may attract the players'choices. Second, we argue that such a non-equilibrium focal point may act asan equilibrium selection device that the players use to coordinate on a closelyrelated small subset of Nash equilibria. We present theoretical as well asexperimental support for these two new roles of focal points as coordinationdevices.

La coordination des dirigeants économiques face à la financiarisation : gouvernance d'entreprise, relations industrielles et élites dirigeantes dans l'industrie suisse des machines, de l'électrotechnique et de la métallurgie (1970-2008)

Résumé Cette recherche analyse les transformations de la gouvernance d'entreprise et des relations industrielles entre 1970 et 2008 dans le contexte suisse, en mettant l'accent sur les changements survenus depuis les années 1990. Elle se centre sur le secteur de l'industrie des machines, de l'électrotechnique et de la métallurgie -noyau historique du capitalisme helvétique et principal employeur et exportateur industriel du pays - et discute l'hypothèse de la convergence des économies coordonnées vers le modèle libéral. Elle examine d'abord les formes de coordination hors-marché qui se sont consolidées entre les élites économiques suisses au cours de la période d'après-guerre. Les stratégies d'innovation incrémentale des grandes sociétés étaient soutenues par une gouvernance marquée par la faible pression des marchés des capitaux, en raison notamment de la forte concentration de l'actionnariat, de mécanismes protectionnistes en matière d'accès au contrôle des sociétés, ainsi que d'une grande interdépendance entre banques et entreprises. Cette interdépendance apparaît dans la forte densité du réseau d'interconnexions des Conseils d'administration, où les principales banques tiennent une place centrale. Le réseau met également en relation les sociétés du secteur entre elles, ainsi qu'avec des firmes actives sur d'autres marchés, ce qui témoigne de l'irréductibilité des stratégies industrielles à une pure logique de compétition centrée sur les marchés. Les stratégies à long terme du management peuvent également s'appuyer sur un système pacifié de relations industrielles, caractérisé par l'autorégulation des acteurs privés dans le cadre d'un partenariat social de branche entre des associations aux stratégies modérées, « néocorporatistes ». Nous analysons alors l'impact de la libéralisation et de la financiarisation de l'économie suisse sur la coordination des élites économiques durant les années 1990. Nous montrons que l'affirmation des fonds d'investissement a déstabilisé le système traditionnel de gouvernance d'entreprise. Ce dernier a ainsi été marqué par l'émergence d'un marché pour le contrôle de l'entreprise -fin du «capital patient » -, la dissolution de l'interdépendance entre banques et industries et plus globalement des formes de coordination hors-marché reposant sur le réseau d'interconnexions des Conseils d'administration, ainsi que par de profondes restructurations des grandes sociétés orientées vers la création de richesse pour les actionnaires. La recherche explore alors les logiques d'interactions entre la sphère de la gouvernance d'entreprise et celle des relations industrielles, l'affirmation du capital financier faisant pression sur le partenariat social dans le sens d'une flexibilisation et déréglementation du marché du travail. Par ailleurs, nous mettons en perspective le rôle central des élites dans le changement institutionnel. Loin de subir la pression des actionnaires, les préférences d'une nouvelle élite managériale au profil financier ont convergé avec les intérêts des investisseurs dans le processus de financiarisation. Ces préférences ont également participé à l'érosion du partenariat social de branche. Du côté syndical, l'émergence -ici aussi - d'une nouvelle élite, académique et issue de la gauche politique, au cours des années 1990, a remis en cause les recettes de l'ancienne génération de syndicalistes ouvriers. La principale association du secteur a ainsi diversifié ses registres d'action en investissant la sphère politique et en relativisant la paix absolue du travail, deux stratégies activement rejetées par le syndicat au cours du régime de croissance d'après-guerre. Tout en mettant la sociologie des élites au service d'une meilleure compréhension des processus de changement institutionnel dans les capitalismes contemporains, cette recherche souligne des logiques de changement différentes dans les sphères sous revue :changement disruptif dans la gouvernance d'entreprise, incrémentai dans les relations industrielles. L'analyse s'est appuyée sur le croisement de différentes méthodes : analyse documentaire, entretiens semi-directifs, analyse du parcours et profil des élites, analyse de réseau, études de cas.