A model of rural conflict : violence and land reform policy in Brazil

In the past ten years the struggle for land in Brazil has taken the shape of invasions of private land by welI organized groups of land less squatters. It is argued in this paper that these invasions and the resulting contlicts are a direct response to the land reform program which has been adopted by the govemment since 1985. which is based on the expropriation of farms and the creation of settlement projects. The set of formal and informal institutions which compromise the land reform program are used as the background for a game-theory model of rural contlicts. T estable implications are derived trom this model with particular emphasis on the etfect of policy variables on violence. These are then tested with panel data at state levei from 1988 to 1995. - It is shown that govemment policy which has the intent of reducing the amount of violence has the opposite etfect of leading to more incentives for contlicts.

The distribution of male wages in Brazil

This paper examines the evolution of wage inequality in Brazil in the 1980s and 1990s . It tries to investigate the role played by changing economic returns to education and to experience over this period together with the evolution of within-group inequality. It applies a quantile regression approach on grouped data to the Brazilian case. Results using repeated cross-sections of a Brazilian annual household survey indicate that : i) Male wage dispersion remained basically constant overall in the 1980's and 1990' s but has increased substantially within education and age groups. ii) Returns to experience increased significantly over this period, with the rise concentrated on the iliterate/primary school group iii) Returns to college education have risen over time, whereas return to intermediate and high-school education have fallen iv) The apparent rise in within-group inequality seems to be the result of a fall in real wages, since the difference in wage leveIs has dec1ined substantially over the period, especially within the high-educated sample. v) Returns to experience rise with education. vi) Returns to education rise over the life-cycle. vii) Wage inequality increases over the life-cycle. The next step i~ this research will try to conciliate all these stylised facts.

Conditional labour supply, quantile functions in Brazil

The estimation of labor supply elasticities has been an important issue m the economic literature. Yet all works have estimated conditional mean labor supply functions only. The objective of this paper is to obtain more information on labor supply, by estimating the conditional quantile labor supply function. vI/e use a sample of prime age urban males employees in Brazil. Two stage estimators are used as the net wage and virtual income are found to be endogenous to the model. Contrary to previous works using conditional mean estimators, it is found that labor supply elasticities vary significantly and asymmetrically across hours of work. vVhile the income and wage elasticities at the standard work week are zero, for those working longer hours the elasticities are negative.

WeIfare costs of inflation the case for interest-bearing money and empiricaI Estimates for Brazil

We provide in this paper a closed fonn for the Welfare Cost of Inflation which we prove to be closer than Bailey's expression to the correct solution of the corresponding non-separable differential equation. Next, we extend this approach to an economy with interest-bearing money, once again presenting a better appoximation than the one given by Bailey's approach. Finally, empirical estimates for Brazil are presented.

Trade liberalization and the evolution of skill earnings differentials in Brazil

From 1988 to 1995, when trade liberalization was implemented in Brazil, relative earnings of skilled workers decreased. In this paper, we investigate the role of trade liberalization in explaining these relative earnings movements, by checking all the steps predicted by the HeckscherOhlin- style trade transmission mechanism. We find that: i) employment shifted from skilled to unskilled intensive sectors, and each Sector increased its relative share of skilled labor; ii) relative prices fell in skill intensive sectors; iii) tariff changes across sectors were not related to skill intensities, but the pass-through from tariffs to prices was stronger in skill intensive sectors; iv) the decline in skilled eamings differentials mandated by the price variation predicted by trade is very elose to the observed one. The results are compatible with trade liberalization, accounting for the observed rei ative eamings changes in Brazil.

Agenda power in Brazil's Câmara dos Deputados , 1989 to 1999

This paper examines the structure of agenda power in the Brazilian Câmara dos Deputados (Chamber of Deputies). Our main question concerns when consistent agenda control by a single majority coalition, as opposed to agenda control by shifting majorities, has emerged in the post-1988 Câmara. Consistent agenda control emerges routinely in parliamentary regimes: the government commands a majority in the assembly; the legislative agenda is negotiated among the governing parties, typically with each able to “veto” the placement of bills on the agenda. However, the Câmara faces an external executive, the president, with substantial formal powers to set its agenda. Consistent agenda control thus can emerge only if the president chooses to ally with a majority coalition in the assembly. If the president always chose to form such an alliance—a presidentially-led agenda cartel—then one would expect some consistently parliamentary patterns in Brazil: the appointment of legislative party leaders to the cabinet; the use of statutes rather than decrees to achieve policy goals; the avoidance of bills that would pass and split the governing coalition. We find that only the Cardoso presidency displays consistent evidence of such a presidentiallyled agenda cartel. In this sense, our argument differs from that of Figueiredo and Limongi (1999; 2000), who argue that presidents have consistently pursued a parliamentary mode of governance in Brazil. Yet it also differs from those who argue that presidents have consistently pursued a shifting-coalitions strategy. Our results suggest that presidents make a strategic choice, with much hinging on that choice.

Labor legislation and the size of informal sector in Brazil

This paper studies the increase in the rate of informal workers in the Brazilian economy that occurred between 1985 and 1999. We develop an overlapping generations model with incomplete markets in which agents are ex-post heterogeneous. We calibrate it to match some features of the Brazilian economy for 1985. We conduct a policy experiment which reproduces the 1988 constitution reforms that increased the retirement benefits and labor costs in the formal sector. We show that these reforms can explain the increase in informal labor. Then, we conduct a policy experiment and analyze its impact on the Brazilian economy.