Iowa Department for the Blind Agency Performance Plan, 2014

Agency Performance Plan

Iowa Department for the Blind Agency Annual Report, FY2010, March 2011

Annual Report. The Department is funded through a state appropriation of General Fund dollars, which is then matched by federal grant funds. For each state dollar allocated to the Department, we receive approximately four federal dollars in matching funds.

Audit report on the South Dallas County Landfill Agency for the year ended June 30, 2015

Audit report on the South Dallas County Landfill Agency for the year ended June 30, 2015

Audit report on the Shelby County Area Solid Waste Agency for the year ended June 30, 2015

Audit report on the Shelby County Area Solid Waste Agency for the year ended June 30, 2015

Audit report on the Crawford County Area Solid Waste Agency Commission for the year ended June 30, 2015

Audit report on the Crawford County Area Solid Waste Agency Commission for the year ended June 30, 2015

Audit report on the Prairie Solid Waste Agency for the year ended June 30, 2015

Audit report on the Prairie Solid Waste Agency for the year ended June 30, 2015

Audit report on the Heart of Iowa Regional Transit Agency for the year ended June 30, 2015

Audit report on the Heart of Iowa Regional Transit Agency for the year ended June 30, 2015

Audit report on the Appanoose County Service Agency in Centerville, Iowa for the year ended June 30, 2015

Audit report on the Appanoose County Service Agency in Centerville, Iowa for the year ended June 30, 2015

Audit report on the North Central Iowa Regional Solid Waste Agency for the year ended June 30, 2015

Audit report on the North Central Iowa Regional Solid Waste Agency for the year ended June 30, 2015

Senate File 2239 Section 30 AGENCY COLLABORATION AND REPORT

Section 30 of Senate File 2239 mandates “the Department on Aging, Department of Human Services, Department of Inspections and Appeals, Department of Public Health, and the Office of the Attorney General shall collaborate and provide written recommendations on strengthening Iowa’s elder abuse prevention, detection, and intervention efforts.

Agency problems with non-smooth decision profiles: the case of monopoly under product quality

A method for dealing with monotonicity constraints in optimal control problems is used to generalize some results in the context of monopoly theory, also extending the generalization to a large family of principal-agent programs. Our main conclusion is that many results on diverse economic topics, achieved under assumptions of continuity and piecewise differentiability in connection with the endogenous variables of the problem, still remain valid after replacing such assumptions by two minimal requirements.

The empirical assessment of agency accountability: A regime approach and an application to the German Bundesnetzagentur

Regulation has in many cases been delegated to independent agencies, which has led to the question of how democratic accountability of these agencies is ensured. There are few empirical approaches to agency accountability. We offer such an approach, resting upon three propositions. First, we scrutinize agency accountability both de jure (accountability is ensured by formal rights of accountability 'fora' to receive information and impose consequences) and de facto (the capability of fora to use these rights depends on resources and decision costs that affect the credibility of their sanctioning capacity). Second, accountability must be evaluated separately at political, operational and managerial levels. And third, at each level accountability is enacted by a system of several (partially) interdependent fora, forming together an accountability regime. The proposed framework is applied to the case of the German Bundesnetzagentur's accountability regime, which shows its suitability for empirical purposes. Regulatory agencies are often considered as independent, yet accountable. This article provides a realistic framework for the study of accountability 'regimes' in which they are embedded. It emphasizes the need to identify the various actors (accountability fora) to which agencies are formally accountable (parliamentary committees, auditing bodies, courts, and so on) and to consider possible relationships between them. It argues that formal accountability 'on paper', as defined in official documents, does not fully account for de facto accountability, which depends on the resources possessed by the fora (mainly information-processing and decision-making capacities) and the credibility of their sanctioning capacities. The article applies this framework to the German Bundesnetzagentur.

Transnational private authority, regulatory space and workers' collective competences: Bringing local contexts and worker agency back in

The impact of transnational private regulation on labour standards remains in dispute. While studies have provided some limited evidence of positive effects on 'outcome standards' such as wages or occupational health and safety, the literature gives little reason to believe that there has been any significant effect on 'process rights' relating primarily to collective workers' voice and social dialogue. This paper probes this assumption by bringing local contexts and worker agency more fully into the picture. It outlines an analytical framework that emphasizes workers' potential to act collectively for change in the regulatory space surrounding the employment relationship. It argues that while transnational private regulation on labour standards may marginally improve workers access to regulatory spaces and their capacity to require the inclusion of enterprises in them, it does little to increase union leverage. The findings are based on empirical research work conducted in Sub-Saharan Africa.