Les débats publics suscités par la création des Expos de Montréal

Les années 1960 au Québec sont marquées par un vigoureux courant nationaliste prônant l’affirmation politique et culturelle des francophones dans la province. Également, le phénomène de l’américanisation du territoire québécois s’accélère. C’est dans ce cadre historique particulier que naissent en 1968 les Expos de Montréal, équipe du circuit de baseball le plus important au monde, soit la Ligue du baseball majeur. La MLB s’installe alors dans un territoire où le baseball est centenaire. L’objectif de ce mémoire est d’étudier les débats et réactions suscités par l’avènement de Montréal dans le baseball majeur, en déterminant l’influence qu’y ont joué le nationalisme québécois des années 1960, l’américanisation du Québec et la longue histoire du baseball dans la province. Si les deux communautés linguistiques de celle-ci sont ici à l’étude, il n’en demeure pas moins que l’attention est davantage portée sur les francophones que les anglophones. En effet, ceux-ci ont semblé davantage interpelés par la création des Expos. D’ailleurs, parmi les deux groupes, les positions les plus documentées sont celles des chroniqueurs sportifs, qui se retrouvent donc au cœur de notre étude. Les opinions d’amateurs de baseball, de politiciens, d’hommes d’affaires ou de simples citoyens québécois sont également rapportées et analysées, mais dans une plus faible mesure.

Mise à l’essai d’une séquence d’apprentissage intégrant des chansons comme source primaire pour développer la compétence 2 : interpréter la réalité sociale à l’aide de la méthode historique

Ce mémoire a pour objet la mise à l’essai d’une séquence d’apprentissage intégrant des chansons comme sources primaires pour développer la compétence 2– interpréter la réalité sociale à l’aide de la méthode historique. Le ministère de l’Éducation du Québec et les écrits scientifiques (Côté, 2008; LENOIR et SAUVÉ, 2010; Turner-Bisset, 2001) s’attendent à ce que l’élève terminant ses études secondaires raisonne à partir de faits tirés des sources qui lui sont accessibles, notamment des sources primaires. Or, on constate trois lacunes dans la pratique enseignante : le petit nombre de sources travaillées, l’inégalité de leurs interprétations et la faiblesse de leurs critiques (Byrom, 2005; Pickles, 2010; Watson, 1998). Aussi, peu de cas utilisent la chanson comme source primaire. La séquence d’apprentissages sur la Deuxième Guerre mondiale que l’enseignante française Sylvaine Moreau (2012) a rendue disponible sur Internet a donc servi de point de départ à cette mise à l’essai afin de comprendre ce qu’il en est. Comme il y a un aller-retour régulier prévu entre l’adaptation du matériel pédagogique au contexte scolaire québécois et les observations en classe c’est la recherche-développement qui semble l’approche la plus efficace (Artigue, 1989; Harvey et Loiselle, 2009). Quatre enseignants montréalais ont accepté une entrevue avec l’auteure de cette recherche. Ils ont adapté le matériel au contexte scolaire, ils ont été observés en classe et les réponses écrites des élèves ont été analysées grâce, notamment, au programme N’Vivo. En explorant les données qualitatives recueillies, on constate le petit nombre de sources travaillées puisque les réponses ne reprennent que ce qui a été vu en classe, priorisant même certains types de sources. La faiblesse des critiques est criante puisque des étapes jugées « inutiles » par certains élèves sont laissées incomplètes. Finalement, l’auteure remarque l’inégalité des interprétations liée à une barrière de niveau de langue. Les métaphores et le vocabulaire de certaines chansons semblent un défi.

Le processus de construction de l'identité collective du mouvement queer montréalais : perspectives militantes francophones

Ce mémoire vise à analyser le processus de construction de l'identité collective du mouvement queer à Montréal dans un contexte francophone. Bien que plusieurs travaux portent en partie sur les groupes militants queers québécois, aucune recherche ne s'est employée à comprendre comment les militant.es queers à Montréal se constituent comme un collectif qui développe une identité. Pour analyser le processus de construction de l'identité collective du mouvement queer montréalais, je m'appuie sur la théorie de Melucci (1985; 1996), qui définit l'identité collective d'un mouvement selon plusieurs axes : les champs d'action, les moyens employés et les fins visées, ainsi que le mode d'organisation. Afin de répondre à cette question de recherche, j'ai effectué une recherche documentaire ainsi que sept entrevues avec des militant.es queers montréalais.es francophones. L'analyse des données a été faite grâce à divers travaux qui portent sur les champs d'action, les valeurs, les fins et moyens, le mode d'organisation de mouvements contemporains anti-autoritaires et anti-oppressifs, ainsi qu'en fonction de trois dimensions élaborées par Melucci (1985) : le conflit, la solidarité et les limites du système. Je conclus que l'identité collective comme processus s'articule autour de plusieurs enjeux : premièrement, la diversité des champs d'action, les valeurs anti-oppressives, les relations d'affinités, le mode de vie alternatif et le mode d'organisation anti-oppressif des militant.es queers permettent au mouvement de créer une solidarité interne, d'affirmer une position anti-autoritaire qui brise les limites du système dominant et de se différencier du mouvement LGBT mainstream. Par ailleurs, les actions militantes concrètes qui réalisent le changement dans l'ici et maintenant participent à créer une solidarité et une reconnaissance entre militant.es, ainsi qu'à mettre en lumière un conflit avec le système dominant oppressif. Enfin, les perspectives francophones sur le mouvement queer ne semblent pas donner au bilinguisme du mouvement un rôle fondamental dans la construction de son identité collective. Cependant, l'intérêt marqué des militant.es francophones comparativement aux militant.es anglophones pour la politique institutionnelle fait émerger de nouvelles interrogations sur l'impact que pourrait avoir le mélange des cultures francophone et anglophone à Montréal sur la culture politique et l'identité du mouvement.

La québécité dans le théâtre contemporain Mythanalyse de Scotstown, Yukonstyle et Félicité

Ce mémoire aborde trois oeuvres du théâtre québécois contemporain, Scotstown de Fabien Cloutier, Yukonstyle de Sarah Berthiaume et Félicité d’Olivier Choinière dans le but de les comparer. Cette comparaison doit alimenter une réflexion sur le concept de québécité, que le présent mémoire définit comme la mise en place d’un traitement de l’identité qui encourage le développement d’une certaine ambivalence identitaire. En stipulant que les discours identitaires sont empreints de ce que Gérard Bouchard appelle les mythes sociaux, ce mémoire analyse le corpus proposé pour en extraire les parts rationnelles de ces mythes, mais aussi les parts émotionnelles, qui agissent comme fondation de l’identité au même titre que la raison. Ce faisant, ce mémoire a pour ambition de déplacer une perception de la québécité ancrée dans une tradition historique et politique influencée par le nationalisme pour ramener ce concept vers une définition plus large, mais aussi plus polysémique pour interpréter l’histoire de la dramaturgie québécoise, qui entretient depuis la Révolution tranquille un rapport ironiquement ambivalent à l’égard des discours identitaires.

Pour éviter de nuire, 10 ans plus tard

Éditorial portant sur les pratiques controversées de certains psychoéducateurs québécois.

Bénéfices de la diversité culturelle en entreprises : Études de cas dans les entreprises québécoises

Mémoire numérisé par la Direction des bibliothèques de l'Université de Montréal

Trade policy issues in the Wider Europe – that led to war and not yet to peace. CEPS Working Document No. 398, July 2014

This paper looks at the trade policy landscape of the EU and the wider Europe, with a focus on issues arising from the signature on 27 June 2014 of Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreements (DCFTAs) between the EU and three East European countries (Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine), and actual or prospective issues relating to the customs union of Belarus, Russia and Kazakhstan (BRK), and the Eurasian Economic Union whose founding treaty was signed on 29 May 2014. The huge expansion of intercontinental free trade area negotiations currently underway, in which the EU is an active participant alongside much of the Americas and Asia, stands in contrast with Russia’s choice to restrict itself to the Eurasian Economic Union, which is only a marginal extension of its own economy. Alone among the major economies in the world, Russia does not seek to integrate economically with any major economic bloc, which should be a matter of serious concern for Moscow. Within the wider Europe, the EU’s DCFTAs with Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia are a major new development, but Russia now threatens trade sanctions against Ukraine in particular, the economic case for which seems unfounded and whose unilateral application would also impair the customs union. The Belarus-Russia-Kazakhstan customs union itself poses several issues of compatibility with the rules of the WTO, which in turn are viewed by the EU as an impediment to discussing possible free trade scenarios with the customs union, although currently there are far more fundamental political impediments to any consideration of such ideas. Nonetheless, this paper looks at various long-term scenarios, if only as a reminder that there could be much better alternatives to the present context of conflict around Ukraine.

The Putin doctrine: The formation of a conceptual framework for Russian dominance in the post-Soviet area. OSW Commentary No. 131, 28.03.2014

The statements made in recent weeks by Russian officials, and especially President Vladimir Putin, in connection with Moscow’s policy towards Ukraine, may suggest that the emergence of a certain doctrine of Russian foreign and security policy is at hand, especially in relation to the post-Soviet area. Most of the arguments at the core of this doctrine are not new, but recently they have been formulated more openly and in more radical terms. Those arguments concern the role of Russia as the defender of Russian-speaking communities abroad and the guarantor of their rights, as well as specifically understood good neighbourly relations (meaning in fact limited sovereignty) as a precondition that must be met in order for Moscow to recognise the independence and territorial integrity of post-Soviet states. However, the new doctrine also includes arguments which have not been raised before, or have hitherto only been formulated on rare occasions, and which may indicate the future evolution of Russia’s policy. Specifically, this refers to Russia’s use of extralegal categories, such as national interest, truth and justice, to justify its policy, and its recognition of military force as a legitimate instrument to defend its compatriots abroad. This doctrine is effectively an outline of the conceptual foundation for Russian dominance in the post-Soviet area. It offers a justification for the efforts to restore the unity of the ‘Russian nation’ (or more broadly, the Russian-speaking community), within a bloc pursuing close integration (the Eurasian Economic Union), or even within a single state encompassing at least parts of that area. As such, it poses a challenge for the West, which Moscow sees as the main opponent of Russia’s plans to build a new order in Europe (Eurasia) that would undermine the post-Cold War order.

Before the parliamentary elections in Ukraine. OSW Commentary No. 149, 15.10.2014

The parliamentary elections to be held in Ukraine on 26 October will bring about deep changes in the political composition of the Verkhovna Rada, Ukraine’s parliament. It is very probable that after the elections only one or two of the five parties which are represented in the parliament today will remain, and the leading positions will be taken by groupings who were still considered marginal a year ago. The Petro Poroshenko Bloc, a party which according to polls can count on victory, did not exist a year ago and today still remains in the construction phase. It is likely that around two-thirds of the newly elected deputies will be people with no parliamentary or even no political experience. On the one hand, this may be a strong impetus to revival; but on the other the lack of experience of most of the parliamentarians may be a problem. Another source of potential problems may be the process of consolidating the internally unstable political parties which have emerged during the electoral campaign. All of the parties which will count in the upcoming elections have a pro-European programme. It is probable that the numerous supporters of an anti-Western orientation (although not necessarily a pro-Russian orientation, as recent events have shown) will be represented by very few deputies elected in single-mandate constituencies. On the one hand, this homogeneity within the Rada will facilitate the country’s reforms, including work on the new constitution, while on the other it might be a subject of permanent criticism by Moscow and its Ukrainian representatives. The elections will take place in the conditions of a growing wave of social disappointment and ongoing military actions in the eastern part of the country. Nevertheless, it can be expected that the vote will be held without any major disturbances, and its course will be transparent and fair.

Greater Europe. Putin's vision of European (dis)integration. OSW Study 46/2013

On several occasions since 2001 Vladimir Putin has raised the concept of ‘Greater Europe’, a partly-integrated common space comprising mainly Russia and the European Union. This concept has never been recast into a detailed political programme. While it has been championed as‘a Europe without dividing lines’, the concept would in practice permanently split Europe into two geopolitical blocs – the Western bloc of the European Union, with Germany in the dominant role, and the Eastern bloc, consisting of the emerging Eurasian Union, with Russia in a hegemonic position. In recent years Russia has undertaken a number of initiatives aimed at implementing some elements of the concept. However, most of these have failed to become reality. In this context, we should expect Russia’s policy to focus on implementing its priority project of Eurasian integration, based on the structures of the Customs Union/the Eurasian Union. The Greater Europe project, on the other hand, will be postponed until the time when, as Moscow believes, a weakened EU will be ready to accept Russian proposals.

Rebalancing the EU-Russia-Ukraine gas relationship. Bruegel Policy Contribution ISSUE 2014/15, DECEMBER 2014

The October 2014 agreement on gas supplies between Russia, Ukraine and the European Union did not resolve the Ukraine-Russia conflict over gas. The differences between parties in terms of objectives, growing mistrust and legacy issues make it unlikely that a long-term stable arrangement will be achieved without further escalation. Without EU pressure and support, Ukraine is likely to enter a new unfavourable gas arrangement with Russia, which could have repercussions beyond the energy sector. Key highlights: To reduce prices and increase the security of imports, the EU as a bloc should redefine its gas relationship with Russia and Ukraine and overcome the diverging interests of EU member states on second-order issues. Implementation of a joint strategy rests on enforcement of EU competition and gas market rules, a strengthened role for the Energy Community and the establishment of a market-based instrument for supply security. For Ukraine, the EU should serve as an anchor for comprehensive gas sector reform. Contingent on Ukraine’s reform efforts, EU financial and technical assistance, the enabling of reverse flows from the EU to Ukraine and pressure on Gazprom, should eventually enable Ukraine to obtain a sustainable gas-supply contract with Russia. This should make a sustainable and mutually beneficial Russia-Ukraine-EU gas relationship possible. However, during the transition, the EU should be prepared for possible frictions.

The Ukrainian government's strategy towards the opposition. OSW Commentary No. 47, 2011-09-02

In recent months in Ukraine, there has been a toughening of measures targeted at opposition leaders, in particular the former Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko and the former interior minister Yuri Lutsenko. These two have been charged with abuses of office when in power. The way in which the criminal investigations are being conducted shows that these measures are actually meant to prevent the two politicians from conducting regular political activities, or at least to make this practically impossible for them. These actions are an element of the Party of Regions’ long-term strategy, as it tries during the pre-election period to eliminate Yulia Tymoshenko from political life and weaken or even destroy her powerbase. Similar measures, although to a more limited extent, are being taken against other opposition groups. These actions are leading to the lowering of democratic standards in Ukraine, although these are still much higher than in Belarus or Russia; this has been proved, among other things, by the militia’s more restrained behaviour towards the protesters, and the fact that abuses of the law during the current investigations have not yet slipped into actual violations. The Ukrainian opposition is fragmented and disorganised; even the Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc is unable to stage a major campaign in defence of its leader. This allows the authorities to feel free to tighten their policy towards the opposition.

Svodboda party - the new phenomenon on the Ukrainian right-wing scene. OSW Commentary No. 56, 2011-07-04

Even though the national-level political scene in Ukraine is dominated by the Party of Regions, the west of the country has seen a progressing increase in the activity of the Svoboda (Freedom) party, a group that combines participation in the democratically elected local government of Eastern Galicia with street actions, characteristic of anti-system groups. This party has brought a new quality to the Ukrainian nationalist movement, as it refers to the rhetoric of European anti-liberal and neo-nationalist movements, and its emergence is a clear response to public demand for a group of this sort. The increase in its popularity plays into the hands of the Party of Regions, which is seeking to weaken the more moderate opposition parties (mainly the Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc). However, Svoboda retains its independence from the ruling camp. This party, in all likelihood, will become a permanent and important player in Ukrainian political life, although its influence may be restricted to Eastern Galicia. Svoboda is determined to fight the tendencies in Ukrainian politics and the social sphere which it considers pro-Russian. Its attitude towards Russia and Russians, furthermore, is unambiguously hostile. In the case of Poland, it reduces mutual relations almost exclusively to the historical aspects, strongly criticising the commemoration of the victims of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army’s (UPA) crimes. This may cause tension in Polish-Ukrainian relations, where they are affected by decisions made by local governments controlled by the Svoboda Party.

What can Arab countries learn from the post-communist transition? MEDPRO Commentary, 31 May 2012

More than a year has passed since the start of the political uprising against the authoritarian regimes in the Arab world. But, as demonstrated by the ongoing unrest in Syria, the process is far from over. Meanwhile, nations that have already rid themselves of their authoritarian rulers (Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Yemen), must decide where to go now and how to manage their political and economic transitions. To a lesser extent, a similar challenge is being faced by those constitutional monarchies (such as Morocco or Jordan) that accelerated reforms in order to avoid political destabilisation.   Many politicians and experts, especially those from Central and Eastern Europe, suggest that their Arab colleagues should learn from the post‐communist transition of the early 1990s. However, while learning from others’ experience is always a useful exercise, the geopolitical and socio‐economic context of the Arab revolution appears to be different, in many respects, from that of former Soviet bloc countries more than twenty years ago.

European Union Leadership and Enlargement in 2014. Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series Vol. 14 No. 14, July 2014

On July 15, 2014 the European Parliament confirmed the new European Commission President. An absolute majority was needed for this purpose, and the 422 votes “For” cleared the 376-vote threshold in the legislative body of 751 members. A Grand Coalition has been formed among the three largest political parties: the European People’s Party (EPP), the Progressive Alliances of Socialists Democrats (S&D), and the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE). Considering policy decisions going forward, the European Union (EU) faces the pressing question: Will there be more, less, or similar power from the EU? There are a greater number voices from across the political spectrum contributing to the democratic plurality. European leaders may regain trust by acknowledging that future governance will not be “business as usual” as the reform agenda gets underway. 2014 has been an exciting and important year in European politics. “This time is different” was the motto for the European Parliament’s election campaign. This essay analyzes recent EU political trends with the new Commission leadership and the Parliamentary elections results. The Parliamentary elections, held in late May, and the new European Commission, planned to be in place in the autumn, influence the leadership direction of the 28-member bloc. Additionally, this year on July 1 Croatia celebrated the first anniversary of joining the EU in 2013. Leading the way for candidate countries, Croatia embraces the democratic politics and capitalist market economics embodied by the EU. The greater number of seats held by newer political parties in the European Parliament demonstrates increasing plurality in the EU democracy. The Parliamentary elections have taken place every 5 years since 1979. In this eighth legislative session, the EPP and the S&D remain the largest parties represented, with 221 and 191 seats respectively. As the EU has evolved, a greater number of voices influence politics. The ongoing point of contention on a host of policies is national sovereignty in relation to pooled sovereignty in the EU. The European Parliament is important for democracy in EU governance since it is the direct link from the national citizens to their elected leaders at the supranational level. The representatives of the European Commission are appointed by the national governments of Member States, and their heads of government are the representatives to the European Council. These three political institutions – the European Parliament, the European Commission, and the European Council – together with other important institutions, including the European Court of Justice Luxembourg, form the EU. The new European Commission President is Jean-Claude Juncker, former Prime Minister and Minister of Finance of Luxembourg (1995-2013). After being nominated by the European Council on June 27, his candidacy was voted on by the European Parliament on July 15, according to the guidelines of the Lisbon Treaty. The leadership for the President of the European Commission has been an important issue, considering Britain’s deliberations on whether or not to stay in the EU in the face of a future national referendum. Voting on June 27, among the European Council on the nomination of Commission President-Designate Juncker, was 26 in favor and 2 opposed. Only Viktor Orbán, the prime minister of Hungary, joined David Cameron, the prime minister of the United Kingdom (UK), with a negative vote (Spiegel and Parker 2014). The UK had not been supportive, being concerned that Juncker embraces the policies of a federalist, prioritizing an ever-closer union above the interests of individual Member States. Historically, since joining the predecessor institution of the European Economic Community in 1973, the UK has had a relatively independent attitude about participation in the EU.