Uncovering hidden duplicated content in public transcriptomics data.

As part of the development of the database Bgee (a dataBase for Gene Expression Evolution), we annotate and analyse expression data from different types and different sources, notably Affymetrix data from GEO and ArrayExpress, and RNA-Seq data from SRA. During our quality control procedure, we have identified duplicated content in GEO and ArrayExpress, affecting ∼14% of our data: fully or partially duplicated experiments from independent data submissions, Affymetrix chips reused in several experiments, or reused within an experiment. We present here the procedure that we have established to filter such duplicates from Affymetrix data, and our procedure to identify future potential duplicates in RNA-Seq data. Database URL: http://bgee.unil.ch/

HSS (F) 40-08 Managing Public Money Northern Ireland (PDF 221KB)

Managing Public Money Northern Ireland

Public Attitudes to Health and Social Services (PDF 1.15 Mb)

Survey of the attitudes of the general public to health and social services

Public Health Function Review

Public Health Function Review

Improving Patient Safety - Building Public Confidence (PDF 440 KB)

A response by the Department of Health, Social Services & Public Safety to the recommendations contained in the Shipman Inquiry Reports 3, 4 & 5.

Public Appointments

Public appointments home page

Public Monitoring with Uncertainty in the Time Repetitions

This paper study repeated games where the time repetitions of the stage game are not known or controlled by the players. We call this feature random monitoring. Kawamori's (2004) shows that perfect random monitoring is always better than the canonical case. Surprisingly, when the monitoring is public, the result is less clear-cut and does not generalize in a straightforward way. Unless the public signals are sufficiently informative about player's actions and/or players are patient enough. In addition to a discount effect, that tends to consistently favor the provision of incentives, we found an information effect, associated with the time uncertainty on the distribution of public signals. Whether payoff improvements are or not possible, depends crucially on the direction and strength of these effects. JEL: C73, D82, D86. KEYWORDS: Repeated Games, Frequent Monitoring, Random Public Monitoring, Moral Hazard, Stochastic Processes.

Causeway HSS Trust - Public Health Practice Development Pilot Report (PDF 257 KB)

Final Causeway HSS Trust Report on its Public Health Practice Development Pilot, part of the Department's redesign of community nursing project

Development of Public Health Nursing within Public Health Nursing in the Poleglass Twinbrook and Lagmore Areas of Down Lisburn Trust (PDF 424 KB)

Project evaluation report on the development of public health nursing within children's services in areas of Down Lisburn Trust. Part of the Department's redesign of community nursing project

Public Attitudes Survey 2005 (PDF 558 KB)

Public Attitudes to Health and Social Services in Northern Ireland

Public Health Functions Project Team Minutes (PDF 21 KB)

Minutes of the Meeting of the Public Health Functions Project Team 21 February 2006

Review Of Public Administration: Consultation On Draft Legislation To Establish Five New Integrated Health And Social Services Trusts

Reform of HPSS

Public sector rationing and private sector selection [paper accepted and forthcoming in Journal of Public Economic Theory]

We study the interaction between nonprice public rationing and prices in the private market. Under a limited budget, the public supplier uses a rationing policy. A private firm may supply the good to those consumers who are rationed by the public system. Consumers have different amounts of wealth, and costs of providing the good to them vary. We consider two regimes. First, the public supplier observes consumers' wealth information; second, the public supplier observes both wealth and cost information. The public supplier chooses a rationing policy, and, simultaneously, the private firm, observing only cost but not wealth information, chooses a pricing policy. In the first regime, there is a continuum of equilibria. The Pareto dominant equilibrium is a means-test equilibrium: poor consumers are supplied while rich consumers are rationed. Prices in the private market increase with the budget. In the second regime, there is a unique equilibrium. This exhibits a cost-effectiveness rationing rule; consumers are supplied if and only if their costbenefit ratios are low. Prices in the private market do not change with the budget. Equilibrium consumer utility is higher in the cost-effectiveness equilibrium than the means-test equilibrium [Authors]