Understanding Corporate Governance Reform in South Africa: Anglo-American Divergence, the King Reports and Hybridization

This article investigates corporate governance reform in South Africa in the context of the country’s international links with Anglo-American corporate governance and domestic pursuit of socioeconomic development. Two key questions are evaluated. (a) How has divergence within the Anglo-American model influenced corporate governance reform in South Africa? (b) Can South Africa’s historical closeness to the Anglo-American model be combined with increasing attention to stakeholder issues to produce a hybrid “African model” of corporate governance? Evaluating these questions, the following issues are explored in turn: the contrast between shareholder and stakeholder models, divergence between U.S. and U.K. approaches to corporate governance as exemplified by Sarbanes-Oxley, locating a South African approach in context of the Anglo-American model, the King reports and an emerging “African” model of corporate governance, and the role of international and domestic factors in shaping South Africa’s ongoing reform process.

A bargaining set for monotonic simple games based on external and internal stability

A new bargaining set based on notions of both internal and external stability is developed in the context of endogenous coalition formation. It allows to make an explicit distinction between within-group and outside-group deviation options. This type of distinction is not present in current bargaining sets. For the class of monotonic proper simple games, the outcomes in the bargaining set are characterized. Furthermore, it is shown that the bargaining set of any homogeneous weighted majority game contains an outcome for which the underlying coalition structure consists of a minimal winning coalition and its complement.

Opportunity cost based analysis of corporate eco-efficiency: A methodology and its application to the CO2-efficiency of German companies

In this paper, we propose the return-to-cost-ratio (RCR) as an alternative approach to the analysis of operational eco-efficiency of companies based on the notion of opportunity costs. RCR helps to overcome two fundamental deficits of existing approaches to eco-efficiency. (1) It translates eco-efficiency into managerial terms by applying the well-established notion of opportunity costs to eco-efficiency analysis. (2) RCR allows to identify and quantify the drivers behind changes in corporate eco-efficiency. RCR is applied to the analysis of the CO2-efficiency of German companies in order to illustrate its usefulness for a detailed analysis of changes in corporate eco-efficiency as well as for the development of effective environmental strategies. (C) 2010 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

The ‘Public Interest’ Agency of International Organizations? The case of the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance

This article seeks to outline and explore some of the conditions necessary for International Organizations (IOs) to perform in a public interest fashion through a case study of the Principles of corporate governance formulated by the OECD. Rather than the more commonly documented pathological and dysfunctional behavioural forms of IOs, the case of the Principles, both in their formulation by the OECD, and in their assessment by the World Bank through the ROSC process, represent an episode of IO agency protecting and promoting a wider public interest. In exercising their agency, IO staff, have made the Principles more agreeable to a wider range of interested parties, giving them a general interest orientation, in accordance with a proceduralist definition of public interest. This case should therefore encourage IPE scholars to consider carefully and systematically the sets of circumstances and conditions, which might be required for IO agency to take more socially useful forms. In the final section, three indicators are identified which might be evaluated in future research into the positive public interest agency of IOs across a range of cases.

Critical Success Factors for Transfer-Operate-Transfer Urban Water Supply Projects in China

Over the years, build-operate-transfer (BOT) has continuously attracted research interests. Many studies on BOT have been carried out. Variations of BOT such as build-own-operate-transfer and build-own-operate have also been reported in some relevant publications. However, few investigations thus far have been conducted for transfer-operate-transfer (TOT). Therefore, there is a knowledge gap in this particular field. TOT is a new model that is suitable for existing infrastructure and public utility projects formerly funded by the governments and currently operated by state-owned enterprises. It refers to the transfer of a running public project to a foreign business or domestic private entity. Based on four case studies carried out in the Chinese water supply industry, this paper examines why there is an increasing need for TOT projects and identifies the distinctive features of TOT practice in China. This is followed by an introduction of a framework of critical success factors (CSFs) for TOT projects. The most important factors include project profitability, asset quality, fair risk allocation, competitive tendering, internal coordination within government, employment of professional advisors, corporate governance, and government supervision. The identification of CSFs provides a useful guidance to project parties planning to participate in TOT practice.