954 resultados para financial crisis
Resumo:
Three years ago, in May 2010, Greece became the first euro-area country to receive financial assistance from the European Union and the International Monetary Fund in exchange for implementing an economic programme designed by the Troika of the European Commission, the European Central Bank and the IMF. Within a year, Ireland and Portugal went down the same path. This study provides an early evaluation of these assistance programmes implemented by the Troika in these three countries. The study assesses the economic impact of the programmes and the consequences of their particular institutional set-up.
Resumo:
During the Great Recession, central banks went well beyond their normal operations and provided liquidity in unlimited amounts, in foreign currency and to foreign banks. Central bank cooperation took the form of a swap network, and amounted to an episode of global monetary policy. However, though bank cooperation will continue to contribute to global governance, the swap network should not be made permanent and given an institutional basis to provide international lending of last resort. Swaps are a monetary policy tool and should continue to be decided on by central banks like all other monetary policy tools,to avoid impinging on their independence, which a difficult historical process has shown to be the best basis for price stability.
Resumo:
In her examination of the capital controls that have been in place in Cyprus since March 27th, Leonor Coutinho asks how soon can they be lifted and whether the recapitalisation plans will be sufficiently convincing to allow the Cypriot banking sector to regain the trust of the public.
Resumo:
The more severe a financial crisis, the greater has been the likelihood of its management under an IMF-supported programme and the shorter the time from crisis onset to programme initiation. Political links to the United States have increased programme likelihood but have prompted faster response mainly for ‘major’crises. Over time, the IMF’s response has not been robustly faster, but the time sensitivity to the more severe crises and those related to fixed exchange rate regimes did increase from the mid-1980s. Similarly, democracies had tended to stall programme initiation but have become more supportive of financial markets’ demands for quicker action.
Resumo:
To compensate for the inflexibility of fixed exchange rates, the euro area needs flexibility through a system of orderly debt restructuring. With virtually no room for macroeconomic manoeuvring since the crisis onset, fiscal austerity has been the main instrument for achieving reductions in public debt levels; but because austerity also weakens growth, public debt ratios have barely budged. Austerity has also implied continued high private debt ratios. And these debt burdens have perpetuated economic stasis. Economic theory,history, and the recent experience all call for a principled debt restructuring mechanism as an integral element of the euro area’s design. Sovereign debt should be recognised as equity (a residual claim on the sovereign), operationalised by the automatic lowering of the debt burden upon the breach of contractually-specified thresholds. Making debt more equity-like is also the way forward for speedy private deleveraging. This debt-equity swap principle is a needed shock absorber for the future but will also serve as the principle to deal with the overhang of ‘legacy’ debt.
Resumo:
From the Executive Summary. Europe’s financial and sovereign debt crises have become increasingly interconnected. In order to break the negative feedback loop between the two, the EU has decided to create a common supervisory framework for the banking sector: the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM). The SSM will involve a supervisory system including both the national supervisors and the European Central Bank (ECB). By endowing the ECB with supervisory authority over a major part of the European banking sector, the SSM’s creation will result in a shake-up of the way in which the European financial sector is being supervised. Under the right circumstances, this could be a major step forward in addressing Europe’s interconnected crises.
Resumo:
In order to celebrate the 20th anniversary of the establishment of European Union citizenship under the Maastricht Treaty in 1993, the year 2013 has been designated by the European Commission as the ‘European Year of Citizens’. The European Citizen’s Initiative (ECI) – labelled by the Commission as a ‘direct gateway through which citizens can make their voices heard in Brussels’ - may emerge in the European awareness as a new appealing platform for policy-shaping and communication. The ECI, through its transnational vox civilis character, figures among the most important novelties in the Lisbon Treaty and in the long run may facilitate and accelerate the bottom-up building of a European demos. The question is, however, whether the mechanism of pan-European signature collection is strong enough to face the democratic challenges present in the EU, especially during the ongoing financial crisis.
Resumo:
Competitiveness adjustment in struggling southern euro-area members requires persistently lower inflation than in major trading partners, but low inflation worsens public debt sustainability. When average euro-area inflation undershoots the two percent target, the conflict between intra-euro relative price adjustment and debt sustainability is more severe. In our baseline scenario, the projected public debt ratio reduction in Italy and Spain is too slow and does not meet the European fiscal rule. Debt projections are very sensitive to underlying assumptions and even small negative deviations from GDP growth, inflation and budget surplus assumptions can easily result in a runaway debt trajectory. The case for a greater than five percent of GDP primary budget surplus is very weak. Beyond vitally important structural reforms, the top priority is to ensure that euro area inflation does not undershoot the two percent target, which requires national policy actions and more accommodative monetary policy. The latter would weaken the euro exchange rate, thereby facilitating further intra-euro adjustment. More effective policies are needed to foster growth. But if all else fails, the European Central Bank’s Outright Monetary Transactions could reduce borrowing costs.
Resumo:
From the Introduction. As financial and economic turmoil continues to rock the Eurozone nations and even threatens to undermine the political stability in the region, it may be helpful to recall the circumstances that helped bring about the formation of the European Union and the common currency of the Eurozone. While issues of trade, finance, and economics were at the heart of many of the agreements upon which the European Union was founded, there were larger issues about a shared future for Europeans that went beyond fiscal concerns. As the economic conditions in Europe and the rest of the world appear to have brought the Eurozone to the brink of collapse, the question at hand is whether the strength of the euro and the economies of the Eurozone nations will be able to withstand the forces that threaten not just the economic ties among the nations of the Eurozone and the EU, but that also strain the historical, cultural, and political foundations on which those economic ties were forged.
Resumo:
The European Commission has put forward a new proposal for a directive on insurance mediation which should provide for significant changes in practices of selling insurance products and guarantee enhanced level of consumer protection. This proposal accompanies other regulatory initiatives in the insurance sector, all of them pursuing three main objectives: firstly, a strengthened insurance supervision with convergent supervisory standards at EU level; secondly, a better risk management of insurance companies; and thirdly a greater protection of policyholders. All these initiatives contribute to the EU programme on consumer protection and herald a new approach to EU insurance regulation and supervision. However, while the new supervisory rules are a direct response to the financial crisis and shortcomings of crossborder cooperation between national supervisors, the plans for the revision of insurance mediation rules were conceived much earlier due to scandals with mis-selling of insurance products in the United States and some EU Member States. This article will focus entirely on the Commission’s initiative in the consumer mediation area and the aspects of insurance supervision and risk management will be dealt with in separate articles.
Resumo:
The July 2013 European Council recommendations to the euro area recognise a number of fiscal and macrostructural challenges, but do not fully exploit the options made possible by the European economic governance framework. There are particular problems with the Council's suggestions for the euro area as whole, which are not (or not adequately) reflected by the country-specific recommendations. A major drawback is that the Council recommendations do not give sufficient importance to symmetric intra-euro area adjustments. Reference to the euro area's ‘aggregate fiscal stance’ is empty rhetoric. Insufficient attention is paid to demand management. The most comprehensive recommendations are made on structural reforms. The July/August 2013 Article IV IMF recommendations on macroeconomic policies could also have been more ambitious, but they correspond better to the economic situation of the euro area than the Council’s recommendations. The President of the Eurogroup should continue discussions on the completion of the economic governance framework, including completion of the banking union and the setting-up of a euro-area institution responsible for managing the euro area’s aggregate fiscal stance.
Resumo:
On the fifth anniversary of the start of the financial crisis, Karel Lannoo looks at the regulatory steps that have been taken to date, and argues that the EU should apply the same logic of reinforced integration at the federal level that informed the Single Supervisory Mechanism to the bank resolution systems and deposit guarantee schemes.
Resumo:
From the Introduction. In the aftermath of the EU’s enlargement towards Central and Eastern Europe, many scholars and observers of European integration were proclaiming that the French-German “engine” of Europe had come to an end. The political legitimacy of French-German initiatives was contested by coalitions of smaller member states and the ‘new Europe’ was calling for new leadership dynamics. However, the experience of the Eurozone debt crisis provided dramatic evidence that no alternative to the Franco-German partnership has yet to emerge in the enlarged EU. In a time of existential crisis, Franco-German initiatives appear to have remained the basic dynamic of integration. However, unlike in the past, agreements on steps forward have proven to be particularly difficult. This is largely due to these countries’ contrasting political economic policy ideas, cultures, and practices....the paper analyses the ideational ‘frames’ of the two leaders while tracing their discursive interactions against changing background conditions since the European debt crisis was triggered by Greece in October 2009 until the last measures taken in 2012 before the French Presidential elections. The empirical analysis is based on a systematic corpus of press conferences and media interviews by Nicolas Sarkozy and Angela Merkel after European summits. It is complemented by a number of press interviews including some given by their respective Finance Ministers) and important speeches in that same period of time.
Resumo:
Suite à la crise financière de 2008 les pays du G20 se sont interrogés sur la transparence des marchés, la stabilité du système et une façon de réguler les risques posés par le nouvel environnement économique. Les produits dérivés de gré à gré ont été identifiés et des engagements ont été pris en faveur de nouvelles régulations des dérivés de gré à gré et la gestion des risques sous-jacents. Les régulateurs ont donc adopté chacun à leur tour un cadre législatif régulant les dérivés de gré à gré tout en déployant un effort international d'harmonisation et de reconnaissance des contreparties assujetties à des régimes équivalents. Les autorités canadiennes en valeurs mobilières ont publié des projets de règlements. Nous nous interrogerons sur ce nouveau cadre réglementaire des dérivés de gré à gré élaboré par les autorités canadiennes en valeurs mobilières, prenant en considération les spécificités canadiennes et les acteurs actifs sur leur territoire. Notre étude traite de ces projets de règlements et de la difficulté d'encadrer les marchés des dérivés de gré à gré qui par définition ne comportent pas de plateformes de négociation ou de lieu géographique et de frontières mais se caractérisent surtout par le lien contractuel entre les parties et l'identification de ces parties. L'élaboration d'un nouveau cadre pour les dérivés de gré à gré qui régule les transactions transfrontières semble très délicat à traiter et les possibles conflits et chevauchements de lois seront inévitables. Confrontés à des définitions divergentes de contreparties locales, les parties à une opération seront condamnées à un risque de qualification en vertu des règlements nationaux sur les dérivés de gré à gré. Une concertation pourrait être renforcée et la détermination de l'autorité compétente ainsi que les concepts de contreparties locales, succursales ou filiales pourraient être harmonisés.
Resumo:
As the basis for a European regime for resolving failing and failed banks, the European Commission has proposed the Bank Resolution and Recovery Directive (BRRD) and a regulation establishing a European Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM) and a Single Bank Resolution Fund (SBRF). There is a debate about which parts of the proposed SRM-SBRF to add to the BRRD. The BRRD sets out a resolution toolkit that can be used by national resolution authorities. The SRM would involve European institutions more at the expense of national resolution authorities. This change could affect resolution outcomes. Domestic resolution authorities might be more generous than supranational authorities in providing assistance to banks. A supranational approach might be more effective in minimising costs for taxpayers. But regardless of the final design, more attention is needed to ensure that resolution authorities are politically independent from governments. When public support is provided to failed institutions it should come from a bankfunded resolution fund. This would reduce taxpayers’ direct costs, and would make banks less likely to take risks and advocate for bailouts.