Bad apples in bad barrels revisited: Cognitive moral development, just world beliefs, rewards, and ethical decision-making

In this study, we test the interactive effect on ethical decision-making of (1) personal characteristics, and (2) personal expectancies based on perceptions of organizational rewards and punishments. Personal characteristics studied were cognitive moral development and belief in a just world. Using an in-basket simulation, we found that exposure to reward system information influenced managers' outcome expectancies. Further, outcome expectancies and belief in a just world interacted with managers' cognitive moral development to influence managers' ethical decision-making. In particular, low-cognitive moral development managers who expected that their organization condoned unethical behavior made less ethical decisions while high cognitive moral development managers became more ethical in this environment. Low cognitive moral development managers also behaved less ethically when their belief in a just world was high.

Ethical issues in social research

There are numerous ethical issues that one must consider when developing a research project; however, much discussion about ethics in health research has focused on experimental studies such as clinical trials. As a result, there remains some ambiguity as to the ethical issues that need to be considered in health-related social research. This paper outlines a number of important ethical issues that CAM researchers should be aware of when developing, running and writing up social research. Maintaining high ethical standards is extremely important in social research as it protects participants and researchers, improves the quality of the data retrieved and ensures that future researchers will have access to participants within the community. (C) 2005 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Cyber-rigging click-through rates: Exploring the ethical dimensions

Click-through rate is considered a very important metric and a key performance indicator of the success of online advertising and is the most frequently used measure to gauge the effectiveness of banner advertising. Marketers also use click-through rates in arriving at performance measurement activities such as the calculation of 'customer life time value' and 'customer acquisition cost'. Click-through is the second most frequently used banner ad pricing method after cost per thousand impressions. Online advertising is facing a new form of challenge – the artificial inflation of click-through rates. We call this practice 'cyber-rigging'. The objective of this paper is to explore the ethical dimensions of cyber-rigging through application of ethical principles and theories.

What does the community think about lifespan extension technologies? The need for an empirical base for ethical and policy debates

Objectives: This paper examines public understandings of possibilities for increasing life expectancy, interest in taking up lifespan-extending interventions, and motivations influencing these intentions. Methods: Structured interviews were conducted with 31 adults, aged 50 and over. Results: Participants believed that technological advances would increase life expectancy but questioned the value of quantity over quality of life. Life in itself was not considered valuable without the ability to put it to good use. Participants would not use technologies to extend their own lifespan unless the result would also enhance their health. Conclusions: These findings may not be generalisable to the general public but they provide the first empirical evidence on the plausibility of common assumptions about public interest in 'anti-ageing' interventions. Surveys of the views of representative samples of the population are needed to inform the development of a research agenda on the ethical, legal and social implications of lifespan extension.

Levinas and the defination of philosophy: An ethical approach

Emmanuel Levinas’ thought seems to be strictly neither rational, phenomenological nor ontological, and it thus intentionally exposes itself to the asking of the question ‘why call it philosophy at all’? While we may have trouble containing Levinas’ thought within our traditional philosophical boundaries, I argue that this gives us no reason to exclude him from philosophy proper as a mere poser, but rather provides the occasion for reflection on just what it means, in an ethical manner, to call something ‘philosophical’. Instead of asking whether or not philosophy can ‘contain’ Levinas’ thought, I contend that it would be more ethical to instead re-phrase the question in terms of ‘sociality’. When we do this, I argue, we can indeed justifiably call Levinas’ thought philosophy.