Communication and Economic Growth.

Overs the past millennium, each of the three centuries of most rapid demographic growth in the West Coincided with the diffusion of a new communications technology. This paper examines the hypothesis of Harold Innis (1894-1952) that there is two-way feeback between such innovations and economic growth.

Economic integration in North America: Formal, Informal and Spatial Aspects.

An exemination of a series of indicators of economic integration in the western hemisphere (Canada-USA-Latin America) indicates that it is proceeding under the influence of formal trade agreements and informal forces including technological change, multinational firm rationalization and location strategies, etc.

The Discipline of Economics and Economic Cycles

In This Article, It Is Argued That the Long International, Financial and Economic Cycle (50-60 Years) Is More Than a Statistical Aberration, and Is the Result of Institutional Political, Financial and Economic Conditions Which Are Recurrent. It Is Proposed As an Hypothesis That the Breakdown of International Monetary Systems Is At the Origin of Hte Financial and Economic Long Cycle. Such a Breakdown Starts a Process of Unexpected Inflation, of Balance of Payments Imbalances and of International Indebtedness in a Key-Currency. the Last Stage of This Process Is Characterized by Disinflation, a Speculative Stock Market Boom and a Period of Debt-Liquidation Which Negatively Affect the Real Side of the Economy. Without an International and Automatic Mechanism to Correct the Financial and Economic International Imbalances, the World Economy Runs the Risk of Getting More and More Unstable Until the Turning Point. International Monetary Cooperation Could Contribute in Alleviating the Negative Spillovers Accompanying Hte Adjustment of These Imbalances.

Faut-il en finir avec le développement durable ? Regard sur les zones humides méditerranéennes.

A partir de projets de conservation de la biodiversité ou de gestion intégrée des zones humides méditerranéennes, cet article montre que le développement durable de ces milieux relève avant tout d’une réflexion politique sur le maldéveloppement. Les projets de conservation de la biodiversité tentent de concilier conservation et développement avec divers succès. Parmi les obstacles, la réduction de la ressource en eau douce s’ajoute aux inégalités sociales et à la pauvreté. Favoriser et gérer les changements institutionnels, accroître le capital social des parties prenantes, apprendre et décider collectivement, constituent les éléments clés du développement durable.Il existe encore de nombreuses disparités dans les processus démocratiques aux échelles locales,régionales et nationales,mais un développement participatif est proposé. En étant davantage centré sur les besoins des populations locales que sur la croissance économique,en étant plus réflexif,en plaçant la critique de la science et la co-construction de projets au coeur du processus, le développement participatif des zones humides méditerranéennes peut offrir une alternative aux approches qui ont prévalues jusqu’à présent. Le développement durable des zones humides méditerranéennes est encore possible s’il accroît la capacité d’adaptation des systèmes sociaux et écologiques afin de repousser toute irréversibilité.

Measuring Economic Insecurity

We provide a systematic treatment of the notion of economic insecurity, assuming that an individual’s sentiment of insecurity depends on the current wealth level and its variations experienced in the past. We think of wealth as a comprehensive variable encompassing anything that may help in coping with adverse occurrences. The current wealth level could also be interpreted as incorporating the individual’s evaluation of future prospects. Variations in wealth experienced in the recent past are given higher weight than experiences that occurred in the more distant past. Two classes of measures are characterized with sets of plausible and intuitive axioms.

Perfectionism, Economic (dis)Incentives, and Political Coercion

May a government attempt to improve the lives of its citizens by promoting the activities it deems valuable and discouraging those it disvalues? May it engage in such a practice even when doing so is not a requirement of justice in some strict sense, and even when the judgments of value and disvalue in question are likely to be subject to controversy among its citizens? These questions have long stood at the center of debates between political perfectionists and political neutralists. In what follows I address a prominent cluster of arguments against political perfectionism—namely, arguments that focus on the coercive dimensions of state action. My main claim is simple: whatever concerns we might have about coercion, arguments from coercion fall short of supporting a thoroughgoing rejection of perfectionism, for the reason that perfectionist policies need not be coercive. Thlist challenges to this last claim.

Economic Incentives and Liberal Equality

In order to assess to the degree to which the provision of economic incentives can result in justified inequalities, we need to distinguish between compensatory incentive payments and non-compensatory incentive payments. From a liberal egalitarian perspective, economic inequalities traceable to the provision of compensatory incentive payments are generally justifiable. However, economic inequalities created by the provision of non-compensatory incentive payments are more problematic. I argue that in non-ideal circumstances justice may permit and even require the provision of non-compensatory incentives despite the fact that those who receive non-compensatory payments are not entitled to them. In some circumstances, justice may require us to accede to unreasonable demands for incentive payments by hard bargainers. This leads to a kind of paradox: from a systemic point of view, non-compensatory incentive payments can be justified even though those who receive them have no just claim to them.