Sin opción. Comentario a la STS, 1ª, 17.2.2006, por la que se niega el derecho de opción de las víctimas de exigir responsabilidad civil a los funcionarios públicos ante los órganos de la jurisdicción ordinaria

Actualmente, tras la reforma del art. 146.1 de la Ley 30/1992, de 26 de noviembre, de régimen jurídico de las Administraciones públicas y del procedimiento administrativo común (LRJPAC) llevada a cabo por la Ley 4/1999, de 13 de enero, nadie duda ya que las víctimas de daños causados por los funcionarios y demás agentes públicos en el ejercicio de sus funciones están obligadas a dirigir su reclamación indemnizatoria a la Administración a la que aquellos pertenezcan, sin poder demandarles ante los órganos de la jurisdicción civil en exigencia de su responsabilidad extracontractual. Según el art. 145 LRJPAC, la víctima deberá reclamar directamente a la Administración ­iniciando la tramitación del procedimiento administrativo específico previsto en los arts. 142 y 143 LRJPAC e interponiendo, eventualmente, recurso contencioso-administrativo contra la resolución desestimatoria que le ponga fin­, y ésta, una vez haya satisfecho la indemnización, ejercerá acción de repetición contra el funcionario o agente responsable cuando el mismo haya ocasionado el daño con dolo o culpa grave. Ya no existe, por tanto, el genérico derecho de opción anteriormente reconocido por el art. 43 de la Ley de régimen jurídico de la administración del Estado de 1957.

Resistance to extreme strategies, rather than prosocial preferences, can explain human cooperation in public goods games.

The results of numerous economic games suggest that humans behave more cooperatively than would be expected if they were maximizing selfish interests. It has been argued that this is because individuals gain satisfaction from the success of others, and that such prosocial preferences require a novel evolutionary explanation. However, in previous games, imperfect behavior would automatically lead to an increase in cooperation, making it impossible to decouple any form of mistake or error from prosocial cooperative decisions. Here we empirically test between these alternatives by decoupling imperfect behavior from prosocial preferences in modified versions of the public goods game, in which individuals would maximize their selfish gain by completely (100%) cooperating. We found that, although this led to higher levels of cooperation, it did not lead to full cooperation, and individuals still perceived their group mates as competitors. This is inconsistent with either selfish or prosocial preferences, suggesting that the most parsimonious explanation is imperfect behavior triggered by psychological drives that can prevent both complete defection and complete cooperation. More generally, our results illustrate the caution that must be exercised when interpreting the evolutionary implications of economic experiments, especially the absolute level of cooperation in a particular treatment.

Mutual trust and cooperation in the evolutionary hawks-doves game

Using a new dynamical network model of society in which pairwise interactions are weighted according to mutual satisfaction, we show that cooperation is the norm in the hawks-doves game when individuals are allowed to break ties with undesirable neighbors and to make new acquaintances in their extended neighborhood. Moreover, cooperation is robust with respect to rather strong strategy perturbations. We also discuss the empirical structure of the emerging networks, and the reasons that allow cooperators to thrive in the population. Given the metaphorical importance of this game for social interaction, this is an encouraging positive result as standard theory for large mixing populations prescribes that a certain fraction of defectors must always exist at equilibrium.

A role for the alpha-chain connecting peptide motif in mediating TCR-CD8 cooperation.

To generate peripheral T cells that are both self-MHC restricted and self-MHC tolerant, thymocytes are subjected to positive and negative selection. How the TCR discriminates between positive and negative selection ligands is not well understood, although there is substantial evidence that the CD4 and CD8 coreceptors play an important role in this cell fate decision. We have previously identified an evolutionarily conserved motif in the TCR, the alpha-chain connecting peptide motif (alpha-CPM), which allows the TCR to deliver positive selection signals. Thymocytes expressing alpha-CPM-deficient receptors do not undergo positive selection, whereas their negative selection is not impaired. In this work we studied the ligand binding and receptor function of alpha-CPM-deficient TCRs by generating T cell hybridomas expressing wild-type or alpha-CPM-deficient forms of the T1 TCR. This K(d)-restricted TCR is specific for a photoreactive derivative of the Plasmodium berghei circumsporozoite peptide(252-260) IASA-YIPSAEK(ABA)I and is therefore amenable to TCR photoaffinity labeling. The experiments presented in this work show that alpha-CPM-deficient TCRs fail to cooperate with CD8 to enhance ligand binding and functional responses.

Planning for disaster : local government's role in civil preparedness,1975

This handbook deals with the duties and responsibilities of a mayor of a city, a member of a county board of supervisor or a sheriff of a county from the standpoint of their relationship with a county/municipal civil defense and emergency planing administration.

The co-evolution of social institutions, demography, and large-scale human cooperation.

Human cooperation is typically coordinated by institutions, which determine the outcome structure of the social interactions individuals engage in. Explaining the Neolithic transition from small- to large-scale societies involves understanding how these institutions co-evolve with demography. We study this using a demographically explicit model of institution formation in a patch-structured population. Each patch supports both social and asocial niches. Social individuals create an institution, at a cost to themselves, by negotiating how much of the costly public good provided by cooperators is invested into sanctioning defectors. The remainder of their public good is invested in technology that increases carrying capacity, such as irrigation systems. We show that social individuals can invade a population of asocials, and form institutions that support high levels of cooperation. We then demonstrate conditions where the co-evolution of cooperation, institutions, and demographic carrying capacity creates a transition from small- to large-scale social groups.

Una reflexión sobre la impronta romana del 'beneficio de separación de patrimonios' en el Código Civil catalán

The roman institution of the separatio bonorum is a pretorian remedy that relies on the principle of equity, created as to protect the deceased creditors and/or legatees. It provides them a"benefit" in the case of selling the goods of the heir-deubtor, enabling them to separate and reserve for themselves that whole patrimonium, as to avoid that by the act of selling, the heirs creditors could go to it; and like this they maintain intact their guarantee, which relies on the whole goods and assets left by the deceased. The separation of patrimonies implied the existence of 2 different groups of goods: that of the heirs" and that one of the deceased, which are not the same in legal terms, in spite of having a common owner at this point, the heir. This institution was regulated in the 6th title of the 42nd book of the Digesto, and in the 72th title, 7th book of the Justinean Code, and its interest is really high due to its material complexity and its procedure. The aim of this work is to analyze the institution of the separatio bonorum in Roman Law, and its importance in the same figure, actually regulated in the 4th book of the Catalan civil code.

Staff officers manual, 1958

This manual is a compilation of principles, procedures and information to be used as a guide by Iowa Civil Defense Directors, Commanders, Chairmen and their staffs.

Un espacio europeo de libertad, seguridad y justicia: la cooperación en el ámbito civil

La creación de un espacio europeo de libertad, seguridad y justicia en el ámbito civil ha recibido un impulso decisivo con el Tratado de Amsterdam, pero no se trata de una materia absolutamente nueva. En efecto, el art. 220 TCE en su versión original de 1958 dispone que los Estados miembros «entablarán en tanto sea necesario, negociaciones entre sí a fin de asegurar a favor de sus nacionales», entre otras cosas, para «la simplificación de las formalidades a que están sometidos el reconocimiento y la ejecución recíprocos de las decisiones judiciales y de los laudos arbitrales

Audit report on the Iowa State Civil Rights Commission for the year ended June 30, 2013

Audit report on the Iowa State Civil Rights Commission for the year ended June 30, 2013

The Impact of Cooperation on R&D, Innovation andProductivity: an Analysis of Spanish Manufacturing and Services Firms

This paper investigates relationships between cooperation, R&D, innovation and productivity in Spanish firms. It uses a large sample of firm-level micro-data and applies an extended structural model that aims to explain the effects of cooperation on R&D investment, of R&D investment on output innovation, and of innovation on firms’ productivity levels. It also analyses the determinants of R&D cooperation. Firms’ technology level is taken into account in order to analyse the differences between high-tech and low-tech firms, both in the industrial and service sectors. The database used was the Technological Innovation Panel (PITEC) for the period 2004-2010. Empirical results show that firms which cooperate in innovative activities are more likely to invest in R&D in subsequent years. As expected, R&D investment has a positive impact on the probability of generating an innovation, in terms of both product and process, for manufacturing firms. Finally, innovation output has a positive impact on firms’ productivity, being greater in process innovations.

The Impact of Cooperation on R&D, Innovation and Productivity: an Analysis of Spanish Manufacturing and Services Firms

This paper investigates relationships between cooperation, R&D, innovation and productivity in Spanish firms. It uses a large sample of firm-level micro-data and applies an extended structural model that aims to explain the effects of cooperation on R&D investment, of R&D investment on output innovation, and of innovation on firms’ productivity levels. It also analyses the determinants of R&D cooperation. Firms’ technology level is taken into account in order to analyse the differences between high-tech and low-tech firms, both in the industrial and service sectors. The database used was the Technological Innovation Panel (PITEC) for the period 2004-2010. Empirical results show that firms which cooperate in innovative activities are more likely to invest in R&D in subsequent years. As expected, R&D investment has a positive impact on the probability of generating an innovation, in terms of both product and process, for manufacturing firms. Finally, innovation output has a positive impact on firms’ productivity, being greater in process innovations. Keywords: innovation sources; productivity; R&D Cooperation

The role of reputation, punishment and their interplay in human cooperation

The problem of how cooperation can evolve between individuals or entities with conflicting interests is central to biology as many of the major evolutionary transitions, from the first replicating molecules to human societies, have required solving this problem. There are many routes to cooperation but humans seem to be distinct from other species as they have more complex and diverse mechanisms, often due to their higher cognitive skills, allowing them to reap the benefits from living in groups. Among those mechanisms, the use of reputation or past experience with others as well as sanctioning mechanisms both seem to be of major importance. They have often been considered separately but the interaction between the two might provide new insights as to how punishment could have appeared as a means to enforce cooperation in early humans. In this thesis, I firstly use theoretical approaches from evolutionary game theory to investigate the evolution of punishment and cooperation through a reputation system based on punitive actions, and compare the efficacy of this system, in terms of cooperation achieved, with one based on cooperative actions. On the other hand, I use empirical approaches from economics to test, in real life, predictions from theoretical models but also to explore further conditions such as environmental variation, constrained memory, or even the scale of competition between individuals. Both approaches have allowed contributing to the understanding of how these factors affect reputation and punishment use, and ultimately how cooperation is achieved.