Registered letter and envelope addressed to S.D. Woodruff from John I. Mackenzie

Registered letter and envelope addressed to S.D. Woodruff from John I. Mackenzie regarding the 5 shares that have been held in trust for Mr. Woodruff (1 ½ pages, handwritten), Dec. 15, 1881.

Note regarding Shooting Arrears

Note (unsigned) stating that any shareholders not having paid the assessment shall be suspended from shooting and any shareholders being 3 months in arrears for non-payment of any assessment will have their shares sold, n.d.

Letter to S.D. Woodruff from G. H. Richards of Boston regarding Louis Cabot

Letter to S.D. Woodruff from G. H. Richards of Boston regarding Louis Cabot who sent a letter regarding Mr. Woodruff’s shares in Long Point and asked Mr. Richards to send $1000 on account of them, Mar. 26, 1883.

Letter to S.D. Woodruff from Louis Cabot of Brookline, Massachusetts

Letter to S.D. Woodruff from Louis Cabot of Brookline, Massachusetts asking if shares are transferable by lease, Jan. 3, 1884.

Letter to Louis Cabot from S.D. Woodruff regarding Long Point shooting share

Letter to Louis Cabot from S.D. Woodruff regarding Long Point shooting shares. Jan. 14, 1886.

Telegram from Great North Western Telegraph Company of Canada to S.D. Woodruff from L. Cabot

Telegram from Great North Western Telegraph Company of Canada to S.D. Woodruff from L. Cabot stating that he will take the shares, Jan. 16, 1886.

Letter to S.D. Woodruff from Louis Cabot saying that he owes Mr. Woodruff an apology

Letter (1 ½ pages, handwritten) to S.D. Woodruff from Louis Cabot saying that he owes Mr. Woodruff an apology. He thought he had done 20, but he thinks it would be wise to take 9 of the sheriff’s shares. This letter is accompanied by an envelope, Feb. 8, 1886.

Letter to Louis Cabot from S.D. Woodruff

Letter to Louis Cabot from S.D. Woodruff asking if he knows anyone who would like to buy his Point McMillen [McMillan] shares, Feb. 15, 1886.

Letter to S.D. Woodruff from Louis Cabot

Letter to S.D. Woodruff from Louis Cabot thanking Mr. Woodruff for the circular about the Warsaw Bank, which he hid. Mr. Cabot feels that he will not sell any more shares. This letter is accompanied by an envelope, Nov. 30, 1886

Letter to S.D. Woodruff from E. Harris, president of the Long Point Company

Letter to S.D. Woodruff from E. Harris, president of the Long Point Company in which he suggests that the principal provisions of the bill regarding shares in the Long Point Company be brought before the Ontario House (2 pages, handwritten), Jan. 15, 1887

Letter to E. Harris which is unsigned [from S.D. Woodruff]

Letter to E. Harris which is unsigned [from S.D. Woodruff] in which he suggests raising the cost of the shooting shares, Feb. 7, 1887.

Letter to S.D. Woodruff from Louis Hayne

Letter to S.D. Woodruff from Louis Hayne, secretary in which he states that the directors have made an assessment of $60 upon each 5 shares ($30 to life members). He asks that S.D. Woodruff make a remittance, Feb. 22, 1887.

The Ligand and Membrane-binding Behaviour of the Phosphatidylinositol Transfer Proteins (PITPa & PITPb)

Human Class I phosphatidylinositol transfer proteins (PITPs) exists in two forms: PITPα and PITPβ. PITPs are believed to be lipid transfer proteins based on their capacity to transfer either phosphatidylinositol (PI) or phosphatidylcholine (PC) between membrane compartments in vitro. In Drosophila, the PITP domain is found to be part of a multi-domain protein named retinal degeneration B (RdgBα). The PITP domain of RdgBα shares 40 % sequence identity with PITPα and has been shown to possess PI and PC binding and transfer activity. The detailed molecular mechanism of ligand transfer by the human PITPs and the Drosophila PITP domain remains to be fully established. Here, we investigated the membrane interactions of these proteins using dual polarization interferometry (DPI). DPI is a technique that measures protein binding affinity to a flat immobilized lipid bilayer. In addition, we also measured how quickly these proteins transfer their ligands to lipid vesicles using a fluorescence resonance energy transfer (FRET)-based assay. DPI investigations suggest that PITPβ had a two-fold higher affinity for membranes compared to PITPα. This was reflected by a four-fold faster ligand transfer rate for PITPβ in comparison to PITPα as determined by the FRET assay. Interestingly, DPI analysis also demonstrated that PI-bound human PITPs have lower membrane affinity compared to PC-bound PITPs. In addition, the FRET studies demonstrated the significance of membrane curvature in the ligand transfer rate of PITPs. The ligand transfer rate was higher when the accepting vesicles were highly curved. Furthermore, when the accepting vesicles contained phosphatidic acid (PA) which have smaller head groups, the transfer rate increased. In contrast, when the accepting vesicles contained phosphoinositides which have larger head groups, the transfer rate was diminished. However, PI, the favorite ligand of PITPs, or the presence of anionic lipids did not appear to influence the ligand transfer rate of PITPs. Both DPI and FRET examinations revealed that the PITP domain of RdgBα was able to bind to membranes. However, the RdgBα PITP domain appears to be a poor binder and transporter of PC.

Letter to William Dickson of Galt from the cashier of the Bank of Upper Canada

Letter to William Dickson of Galt from the cashier of the Bank of Upper Canada, Toronto, Ontario. This letter informs Mr. Dickson that he has received a bonus on his shares of the Old Stock on the Bank of Upper Canada due to an act that was passed by legislature (3 pages, printed), Jan. 6, 1855.

Fair Allocation of Production Externalities: Recent Results

We survey recent axiomatic results in the theory of cost-sharing. In this litterature, a method computes the individual cost shares assigned to the users of a facility for any profile of demands and any monotonic cost function. We discuss two theories taking radically different views of the asymmetries of the cost function. In the full responsibility theory, each agent is accountable for the part of the costs that can be unambiguously separated and attributed to her own demand. In the partial responsibility theory, the asymmetries of the cost function have no bearing on individual cost shares, only the differences in demand levels matter. We describe several invariance and monotonicity properties that reflect both normative and strategic concerns. We uncover a number of logical trade-offs between our axioms, and derive axiomatic characterizations of a handful of intuitive methods: in the full responsibility approach, the Shapley-Shubik, Aumann-Shapley, and subsidyfree serial methods, and in the partial responsibility approach, the cross-subsidizing serial method and the family of quasi-proportional methods.