Relations intergroupes : attribution à la discrimination et perception d'hostilité chez autrui

Résumé: La thèse que nous présentons s'intéresse aux phénomènes d'attribution d'intentions hostiles. Dodge (1980) observe que les individus agressifs ont tendance, en situation ambiguë, à sur-attribuer des intentions hostiles à leurs pairs, ce qui induit des réponses agressives. Pour l'auteur, l'attribution d'intentions hostiles est un médiateur entre certaines caractéristiques personnelles (l'agressivité) des individus, et le type de réponses qu'ils apportent aux situations. Cependant, les informations concernant l'appartenance groupale des "pairs" ne sont jamais prises en compte dans leurs études. Si ce processus est perméable à l'influence des normes et croyances (Bègue et Muller, 2006), aucune étude ne met en évidence quel serait l'impact d'informations groupales sur l'élaboration des réponses aux situations, dans le cadre de ce modèle. L'objectif de cette thèse est de montrer que l'attribution d'intentions hostiles peut être envisagée comme un processus agissant également à un niveau intergroupes et donc prenant en compte des informations groupales sur les individus. En s'inspirant du modèle de Dodge, nous avons émis l'hypothèse que les logiques intergroupes intervenaient dans l'interprétation des intentions des acteurs impliqués dans les interactions, afin de produire une réponse adaptée aux logiques intergroupes. Afin de tester cette hypothèse, nous avons suivi trois axes de recherches: Dans le premier de ces axes, nous avons introduit, dans le paradigme de Dodge, des informations .sur l'appartenance groupale des protagonistes de l'interaction (endogroupe vs exogroupe). Nous avons montré que le type de situation (ambiguë vs hostile) est moins important que l'information groupale dans la production d'une réponse à la situation (Étude 1). En outre, nous avons mis en évidence des processus différents selon la position des individus dans leur groupe (Étude 2). Dans le second axe, nous avons montré que si les différences de statut entre groupes n'influençaient pas directement le modèle de Dodge, elles interagissaient avec l'appartenance groupale et la clarté de la situation au niveau de l'attribution d'intentions hostiles (étude 3) et des intentions comportementales (Ettide 4). Dans le troisième et deriúer axe, nous avons introduit l'attribution d'intentions hostiles dans un processus de dévalorisation d'une cible expliquant un échec par la discrimination (Kaiser et Miller, 2001; 2003). Nous avons alors montré que l'attribution d'intentions hostiles médiatisait le lien entre l'attribution mobilisée pour expliquer l'événement et l'évaluation de la cible (Étude 5), et que ce type d'attribution était spécifique, aux intentions comportementales agressives (Études 6). Nous avons alors conclu sur la dimension sociale de l'attribution d'intentions hostiles et sur le fait qu'il s'agissait d'un élément permettant la construction d'une représentation des interactions sociales. Abstract The present thesis focuses on the phenomena of hostile intents attribution. Dodge (1980) observes that in ambiguous situations, aggressive people tend to over attribute hostile intents to others. This attribution leads them to respond aggressively. According to the author, hostile intents attribution mediates the link between some personal characteristics (aggressiveness for example) of individuals and their responses to the situation. However information related to participants group membership is always neglected in these studies. Begue and Muller (2006) showed that some beliefs could moderate the interaction between aggressiveness and hostile intents attribution on behaviors, but no study exhibited evidence of a similar effect with social information. The aim of this thesis is to show that hostile intents attribution needs to be considered at an intergroup level by taking into account people's group ineinbership. Based on the Dodge model, we formulated the hypothesis that intergroup strategies had an impact on actors' intents interpretations which in return should lead to different but adapted reactions to the situation. To test this hypothesis, three lines of research were developed. In the first line, we introduced, in the Dodge's paradigm, some information about the participants group membership (ingroup vs outgroup). We showed that when elaborating a response to a specific situation its nature (ambiguous vs hostile) had less impact than group membership information (Study 1). In addition, we highlighted some different processes according to the position of individuals in their group (Study 2). In the second line, we showed that if the differences between groups status didn't influence the Dodge model, they interacted with group membership and situation nature to influence hostile intents attribution (Study 3) and behaviors intents (Study 4). In the last line of research, we introduced hostile intents attribution within the process of derogation of a target explaining its failure by discrimination (Kaiser and Miller, 2001; 2003). We showed that hostile intents attribution mediated the link between the attibution mobilized to explain the failure and the derogation of the target (Study 5), and that this attribution type was specifically linked to aggressive behavior intents (Study 6). We finally concluded that hostile intents attribution imply an important social dimension which needs to be taken into account because involved in the construction of a representation of social interactions.

The Good, the Bad and the Populist: A Model of Political Agency with Emotional Voters

This paper attempts to extend existing models of political agency to an environment in which voting may be divided between informed and instrumental, informed and ‘expressive’ (Brennan and Lomasky (1993)) and uninformed due to ‘rational irrationality’ (Caplan (2007)). It constructs a model where politicians may be good, bad or populist. Populists are more willing than good politicians to pander to voters who may choose inferior policies in a large-group electoral setting because their vote is insignificant compared with those that voters would choose were their vote decisive in determining the electoral outcome. Bad politicians would ideally like to extract tax revenue for their own ends. Initially we assume the existence of only good and populist politicians. The paper investigates the incentives for good politicians to pool with or separate from populists and focuses on three key issues – (1) how far the majority of voter’s preferences are from those held by the better informed incumbent politician (2) the extent to which the population exhibits rational irrationality and expressiveness (jointly labelled as emotional) and (3) the cost involved in persuading uninformed voters to change their views in terms of composing messages and spreading them. This paper goes on to consider how the inclusion of bad politicians may affect the behaviour of good politicians and suggests that a small amount of potential corruption may be socially useful. It is also argued that where bad politicians have an incentive to mimic the behaviour of good and populist politicians, the latter types of politician may have an incentive to separate from bad politicians by investing in costly public education signals. The paper also discusses the implications of the model for whether fiscal restraints should be soft or hard.

Expressive Political Behaviour: Foundations, Scope and Implications

A growing literature has focussed attention on ‘expressive’ rather than ‘instrumental’ behaviour in political settings - particularly voting A common criticism of the expressive idea is that its myriad possibilities make it rather ad hoc and lacking in both predictive and normative bite. We agree that no single clear definition of expressive behaviour has emerged to date, and no detailed foundations of specific expressive motivations have been provided, so that there are rather few specific implications drawn from the analysis of expressive behaviour. In response, we provide a foundational discussion and definition of expressive behaviour that accounts for a range of factors. We also discuss the content of expressive choice distinguishing between moral, social and emotional cases, and relate this more general account to the specific theories of expressive choice in the literature. Finally, we discuss the normative and institutional implications of expressive behaviour.

Trade in bilateral oligopoly with endogenous market formation

We study a strategic market game in which traders are endowed with both a good and money and can choose whether to buy or sell the good. We derive conditions under which a non-autarkic equilibrium exists and when the only equilibrium is autarky. Autarky is ‘nice’ (robust to small perturbations in the game) when it is the only equilibrium, and ‘very nice’ (robust to large perturbations) when no gains from trade exist. We characterize economies where autarky is nice but not very nice; that is, when gains from trade exist and yet no trade takes place.

Expertise et négociations fiscales à la Société des Nations (1923-1939)

À travers l'analyse du comité fiscal de la Société des Nations, cet article aborde la question de l'autonomie et de l'influence des organismes économiques multilatéraux instaurés après la Première Guerre mondiale. Il démontre ainsi comment ce comité abandonne progressivement son statut initial de négociations intergouvernementales pour se transformer en une réunion de praticiens fiscaux qui défendent des intérêts propres. Mais l'étude du cas suisse met également en évidence l'impact de plus en plus limité de ces discussions multilatérales sur les politiques nationales et les relations bilatérales. Dès le milieu des années 1920, les débats genevois ne font en effet plus contrepoids à la politique d'attraction fiscale de la Suisse. Expertise and fiscal negotiations at the League of Nations (1923-1939): This article considers the autonomy and the influence of multilateral economic organisations during the inter-war years through the study of the League of Nations' fiscal committee. It shows that this committee gradually discarded intergovernmental negotiations and became a tax practitioners' club that defended its own interest. But a look at the Swiss case also demonstrates that the impact of these multilateral discussions on national policies and bilateral relations quickly decreased. From the middle of the 1920s, the debates in Geneva no longer hampered the fiscal attractiveness of Switzerland as a tax haven.

Rationalising ‘Irrational’ Support for Political Violence

This paper provides a rationale for group support for political violence when violence does not provide a material benefi t. A theory of fairness is adopted to demonstrate that although group violence may not be the equilibrium of a material game it may be a fairness equilibrium in a game containing psychological payoffs. For this to happen the material stakes must be perceived as low and psychological payoffs are expressive. Although the material stakes are actually high, members of each group may choose expressively to support the use of violence because the probability of being decisive is low. The paper also considers the possibility of peace emerging as a fairness equilibrium. This can only happen if each group perceives the other as making some sacrifi ce in choosing peace.

On Cobb-Douglas Preferences in Bilateral Oligopoly

Bilateral oligopoly is a simple model of exchange in which a finite set of sellers seek to exchange the goods they are endowed with for money with a finite set of buyers, and no price-taking assumptions are imposed. If trade takes place via a strategic market game bilateral oligopoly can be thought of as two linked proportional-sharing contests: in one the sellers share the aggregate bid from the buyers in proportion to their supply and in the other the buyers share the aggregate supply in proportion to their bids. The analysis can be separated into two ‘partial games’. First, fix the aggregate bid at B; in the first partial game the sellers contest this fixed prize in proportion to their supply and the aggregate supply in the equilibrium of this game is X˜ (B). Next, fix the aggregate supply at X; in the second partial game the buyers contest this fixed prize in proportion to their bids and the aggregate bid in the equilibrium of this game is ˜B (X). The analysis of these two partial games takes into account competition within each side of the market. Equilibrium in bilateral oligopoly must take into account competition between sellers and buyers and requires, for example, ˜B (X˜ (B)) = B. When all traders have Cobb-Douglas preferences ˜ X(B) does not depend on B and ˜B (X) does not depend on X: whilst there is competition within each side of the market there is no strategic interdependence between the sides of the market. The Cobb-Douglas assumption provides a tractable framework in which to explore the features of fully strategic trade but it misses perhaps the most interesting feature of bilateral oligopoly, the implications of which are investigated.

Interconnecting race and gender relations: racism, sexism and the attribution of sexism to the racialized Other

This article analyzes the way that attitudes about gender and race relations are interconnected. Based on a survey study conducted in Switzerland with a sample of 273 Swiss nationals (125 men and 148 women), it shows that the attribution of a higher level of sexism to "racialized Others" than to Swiss individuals is a racist process resulting in the justification and naturalization of the ordinary Swiss sexism seen in the gendered division of labor. However, this study also shows that the attribution of a higher level of sexism to the Other can be countered by simultaneously adopting both feminist and non-racist attitudes.

Globalization and international relations: the Olympic Movement and European Integration

Essay elaborated by Shaelyne Johnson, undergraduate student of Global Studies at the University of California-Santa Barbara, during her internship at CEO-UAB for the academic course 2008/2009. She compares the organisational structure, goals and objectives of the institutions in the Olympic Movement and the European Integration, in order to find connections between both movements which were caused by globalization. The paper begins with an introduction of the changing world nowadays, followed by an overview on the structural similarities in the historical unfolding between these two parallel movements and, before concluding, new means for international relations are considered. This document is available in English through the digital library at the CEO-UAB Portal of Olympic Studies and the digital repository RECERCAT.

Bilateral oligopoly and quantity competition

Bilateral oligopoly is a strategic market game with two commodities, allowing strategic behavior on both sides of the market. When the number of buyers is large, such a game approximates a game of quantity competition played by sellers. We present examples which show that this is not typically a Cournot game. Rather, we introduce an alternative game of quantity competition (the market share game) and, appealing to results in the literature on contests, show that this yields the same equilibria as the many-buyer limit of bilateral oligopoly, under standard assumptions on costs and preferences. We also show that the market share and Cournot games have the same equilibria if and only if the price elasticity of the latter is one. These results lead to necessary and sufficient conditions for the Cournot game to be a good approximation to bilateral oligopoly with many buyers and to an ordering of total output when they are not satisfied.

The Political Economy of Resource Rent Distribution

I model the link between political regime and level of diversification following a windfall of natural resource revenues. The explanatory variables I make use of are the political support functions embedded within each type of regime and the disparate levels of discretion, openness, transparency, and accountability of government. I show that a democratic government seeks to maximize the long-term consumption path of the representative consumer, in order to maximize its chances of re-election, while an authoritarian government, in the absence of any electoral mechanism of accountability, seeks to buy off and entrench a group of special interests loyal to the government and potent enough to ensure its short-term survival. Essentially the contrast in the approaches towards resource rent distribution comes down to a variation in political weights on aggregate welfare and rentierist special interests endogenized by distinct political support functions.

Still in the Era of Area Studies? Political-Scientific Perspectives on European Competition Policy in the 2000s

This note reviews the political-scientific literature on European competition policy (ECP) in the 2000s. Based on a data set extracted from four well-known journals, and using an upfront methodology and explicit criteria, it analyzes the literature both quantitatively and qualitatively. On the quantitative side, it shows that, although a few sub-policy areas are still neglected, ECP is not the under-researched policy it used to be. On the qualitative side, the literature has greatly improved since the 1990s: Almost all articles now present a clear research question, and most advance specific theoretical claims/hypotheses. Yet, improvements can be made on research design, statistical testing, and, above all, state-of-the-art theorizing (e.g. in the game-theoretical treatment of delegation problems). Indeed, it is paradoxical that ECP specialists do not pay more attention to theoretical questions which are so central to the actual policy area they study.