A review of the spatial economics of non-timber forest product extraction: implications for policy

Patterns of forest cover and forest degradation determine the size and types of ecosystem services forests provide. Particularly in low-income countries, nontimber forest product (NTFP) extraction by rural people, which provides important resources and income to the rural poor, contributes to the level and pattern of forest degradation. Although recent policy, particularly in Africa, emphasizes forest degradation, relatively little research describes the spatial aspects of NTFP collection that lead to spatial degradation patterns. This paper reviews both the spatial empirical work on NTFP extraction and related forest degradation patterns, and spatial models of behavior of rural people who extract NTFPs from forest. Despite the impact of rural people's behavior on resulting quantities and patterns of forest resources, spatial–temporal models/patterns rarely inform park siting and sizing decisions, econometric assessments of park effectiveness, development projects to support conservation, or REDD protocols. Using the literature review as a lens, we discuss the models' implications for these policies with particular emphasis on effective conservation spending and leakage.

Applications of behavioural economics to tax evasion

The paper reviews recent models that have applied the techniques of behavioural economics to the analysis of the tax compliance choice of an individual taxpayer. The construction of these models is motivated by the failure of the Yitzhaki version of the Allingham–Sandmo model to predict correctly the proportion of taxpayers who will evade and the effect of an increase in the tax rate upon the chosen level of evasion. Recent approaches have applied non-expected utility theory to the compliance decision and have addressed social interaction. The models we describe are able to match the observed extent of evasion and correctly predict the tax effect but do not have the parsimony or precision of the Yitzhaki model.

Measuring the consumer benefits of improving farm animal welfare to inform welfare labelling

Policy makers in the European Union are envisioning the introduction of a community farm animal welfare label which would allow consumers to align their consumption habits with their farm animal welfare preferences. For welfare labelling to be viable the market for livestock products produced to higher welfare standards has to be sufficiently segmented with consumers having sufficiently distinct and behaviourally consistent preferences. The present study investigates consumers’ preferences for meat produced to different welfare standards using a hypothetical welfare score. Data is obtained from a contingent valuation study carried out in Britain. The ordered probit model was estimated using Bayesian inference to obtain mean willingness to pay. We find decreasing marginal WTP as animal welfare levels increase and that people’s preferences for different levels of farm animal welfare are sufficiently differentiated making the introduction of a labelling scheme in the form of a certified rating system appear feasible.

Evaluating the alternatives

In this article, I study the impacts of a specific incentives-based approach to safety regulation, namely the control of quality through sampling and threatening penalties when quality fails to meet some minimum standard. The welfare-improving impacts of this type of scheme seem high and are cogently illustrated in a recent contribution by Segerson, which stimulated many of the ideas in this paper. For this reason, the reader is referred to Segerson for a background on some of the motivation, and throughout, I make an effort to indicate differences between the two approaches. There are three major differences. First, I dispense with the calculus as much as possible, seeking readily interpreted, closedform solutions to illustrate the main ideas. Second, (strategically optimal, symmetric) Nash equilibria are the mainstay of each of the current models. Third, in the uncertainquality- provision equilibria, each of the Nash suppliers chooses the level of the lower bound for quality as a control and offers a draw from its (private) distribution in a contribution to the (public) pool of quality.

When do export subsidies have a redistributional role? Reply

Our differences are three. The first arises from the belief that "... a nonzero value for the optimally chosen policy instrument implies that the instrument is efficient for redistribution" (Alston, Smith, and Vercammen, p. 543, paragraph 3). Consider the two equations: (1) o* = f(P3) and (2) = -f(3) ++r h* (a, P3) representing the solution to the problem of maximizing weighted, Marshallian surplus using, simultaneously, a per-unit border intervention, 9, and a per-unit domestic intervention, wr. In the solution, parameter ot denotes the weight applied to producer surplus; parameter p denotes the weight applied to government revenues; consumer surplus is implicitly weighted one; and the country in question is small in the sense that it is unable to affect world price by any of its domestic adjustments (see the Appendix). Details of the forms of the functions f((P) and h(ot, p) are easily derived, but what matters in the context of Alston, Smith, and Vercammen's Comment is: Redistributivep referencest hatf avorp roducers are consistent with higher values "alpha," and whereas the optimal domestic intervention, 7r*, has both "alpha and beta effects," the optimal border intervention, r*, has only a "beta effect,"-it does not have a redistributional role. Garth Holloway is reader in agricultural economics and statistics, Department of Agricultural and Food Economics, School of Agriculture, Policy, and Development, University of Reading. The author is very grateful to Xavier Irz, Bhavani Shankar, Chittur Srinivasan, Colin Thirtle, and Richard Tiffin for their comments and their wisdom; and to Mario Mazzochi, Marinos Tsigas, and Cal Turvey for their scholarship, including help in tracking down a fairly complete collection of the papers that cite Alston and Hurd. They are not responsible for any errors or omissions. Note, in equation (1), that the border intervention is positive whenever a distortion exists because 8 > 0 implies 3 - 1 + 8 > 1 and, thus, f((P) > 0 (see Appendix). Using Alston, Smith, and Vercammen's definition, the instrument is now "efficient," and therefore has a redistributive role. But now, suppose that the distortion is removed so that 3 - 1 + 8 = 1, 8 = 0, and consequently the border intervention is zero. According to Alston, Smith, and Vercammen, the instrument is now "inefficient" and has no redistributive role. The reader will note that this thought experiment has said nothing about supporting farm incomes, and so has nothing whatsoever to do with efficient redistribution. Of course, the definition is false. It follows that a domestic distortion arising from the "excess-burden argument" 3 = 1 + 8, 8 > 0 does not make an export subsidy "efficient." The export subsidy, having only a "beta effect," does not have a redistributional role. The second disagreement emerges from the comment that Holloway "... uses an idiosyncratic definition of the relevant objective function of the government (Alston, Smith, and Vercammen, p. 543, paragraph 2)." The objective function that generates equations (1) and (2) (see the Appendix) is the same as the objective function used by Gardner (1995) when he first questioned Alston, Carter, and Smith's claim that a "domestic distortion can make a border intervention efficient in transferring surplus from consumers and taxpayers to farmers." The objective function used by Gardner (1995) is the same objective function used in the contributions that precede it and thus defines the literature on the debate about borderversus- domestic intervention (Streeten; Yeh; Paarlberg 1984, 1985; Orden; Gardner 1985). The objective function in the latter literature is the same as the one implied in another literature that originates from Wallace and includes most notably Gardner (1983), but also Alston and Hurd. Amer. J. Agr. Econ. 86(2) (May 2004): 549-552 Copyright 2004 American Agricultural Economics Association This content downloaded on Tue, 15 Jan 2013 07:58:41 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 550 May 2004 Amer. J. Agr. Econ. The objective function in Holloway is this same objective function-it is, of course, Marshallian surplus.1 The third disagreement concerns scholarship. The Comment does not seem to be cognizant of several important papers, especially Bhagwati and Ramaswami, and Bhagwati, both of which precede Corden (1974, 1997); but also Lipsey and Lancaster, and Moschini and Sckokai; one important aspect of Alston and Hurd; and one extremely important result in Holloway. This oversight has some unfortunate repercussions. First, it misdirects to the wrong origins of intellectual property. Second, it misleads about the appropriateness of some welfare calculations. Third, it prevents Alston, Smith, and Vercammen from linking a finding in Holloway (pp. 242-43) with an old theorem (Lipsey and Lancaster) that settles the controversy (Alston, Carter, and Smith 1993, 1995; Gardner 1995; and, presently, Alston, Smith, and Vercammen) about the efficiency of border intervention in the presence of domestic distortions.

Reworking the NAFTA: departures from traditional frameworks

This paper reviews the treatment of intellectual property rights in the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and considers the welfare-theoretic bases for innovation transfer between member and nonmember states. Specifically, we consider the effects of new technology development from within the union and question whether it is efficient (in a welfare sense) to transfer that new technology to nonmember states. When the new technology contains stochastic components, the important issue of information exchange arises and we consider this question in a simple oligopoly model with Bayesian updating. In this context, it is natural to ask the optimal price at which such information should be transferred. Some simple, natural conjugate examples are used to motivate the key parameters upon which the answer is dependent

Proceedings of the inaugural construction management and economics ‘Past, Present and Future’ conference CME25, 16-18 July 2007, University of Reading, UK

This conference was an unusual and interesting event. Celebrating 25 years of Construction Management and Economics provides us with an opportunity to reflect on the research that has been reported over the years, to consider where we are now, and to think about the future of academic research in this area. Hence the sub-title of this conference: “past, present and future”. Looking through these papers, some things are clear. First, the range of topics considered interesting has expanded hugely since the journal was first published. Second, the research methods are also more diverse. Third, the involvement of wider groups of stakeholder is evident. There is a danger that this might lead to dilution of the field. But my instinct has always been to argue against the notion that Construction Management and Economics represents a discipline, as such. Granted, there are plenty of university departments around the world that would justify the idea of a discipline. But the vast majority of academic departments who contribute to the life of this journal carry different names to this. Indeed, the range and breadth of methodological approaches to the research reported in Construction Management and Economics indicates that there are several different academic disciplines being brought to bear on the construction sector. Some papers are based on economics, some on psychology and others on operational research, sociology, law, statistics, information technology, and so on. This is why I maintain that construction management is not an academic discipline, but a field of study to which a range of academic disciplines are applied. This may be why it is so interesting to be involved in this journal. The problems to which the papers are applied develop and grow. But the broad topics of the earliest papers in the journal are still relevant today. What has changed a lot is our interpretation of the problems that confront the construction sector all over the world, and the methodological approaches to resolving them. There is a constant difficulty in dealing with topics as inherently practical as these. While the demands of the academic world are driven by the need for the rigorous application of sound methods, the demands of the practical world are quite different. It can be difficult to meet the needs of both sets of stakeholders at the same time. However, increasing numbers of postgraduate courses in our area result in larger numbers of practitioners with a deeper appreciation of what research is all about, and how to interpret and apply the lessons from research. It also seems that there are contributions coming not just from construction-related university departments, but also from departments with identifiable methodological traditions of their own. I like to think that our authors can publish in journals beyond the construction-related areas, to disseminate their theoretical insights into other disciplines, and to contribute to the strength of this journal by citing our articles in more mono-disciplinary journals. This would contribute to the future of the journal in a very strong and developmental way. The greatest danger we face is in excessive self-citation, i.e. referring only to sources within the CM&E literature or, worse, referring only to other articles in the same journal. The only way to ensure a strong and influential position for journals and university departments like ours is to be sure that our work is informing other academic disciplines. This is what I would see as the future, our logical next step. If, as a community of researchers, we are not producing papers that challenge and inform the fundamentals of research methods and analytical processes, then no matter how practically relevant our output is to the industry, it will remain derivative and secondary, based on the methodological insights of others. The balancing act between methodological rigour and practical relevance is a difficult one, but not, of course, a balance that has to be struck in every single paper.

On collective intentions: collective action in economics and philosophy

Philosophers and economists write about collective action from distinct but related points of view. This paper aims to bridge these perspectives. Economists have been concerned with rationality in a strategic context. There, problems posed by “coordination games” seem to point to a form of rational action, “team thinking,” which is not individualistic. Philosophers’ analyses of collective intention, however, sometimes reduce collective action to a set of individually instrumental actions. They do not, therefore, capture the first person plural perspective characteristic of team thinking. Other analyses, problematically, depict intentions ranging over others’ actions. I offer an analysis of collective intention which avoids these problems. A collective intention aims only at causing an individual action, but its propositional content stipulates its mirroring in other minds.

Experimental economics and the artificiality of alteration

A neglected critique of social science laboratories alleges that they implement phenomena different to those supposedly under investigation. The critique purports to be conceptual and so invulnerable to a technical solution. I argue that it undermines some economics designs seeking to implement features of real societies, and counsels more modesty in experimental write‐ups. It also constitutes a plausible argument that laboratory economics experiments are necessarily less demonstrative than natural scientific ones. More radical sceptical conclusions are unwarranted.