Observability and overcoming coordination failure in organizations

Many organizations suffer poor performance because its members fail to coordinate on efficient patterns of behavior. In previous research, we have shown that financial incentives can be used to find a way out of such performance traps. Here we examine the sensitivity of this result to the ability of people to observe others' choices. Our experiments are set in a corporate environment where subjects' payoffs depend on coordinating at high effort levels; the underlying game being played repeatedly by the employees of an experimental firm is a weak-link game. Treatments vary along two dimensions. First, subjects either start with low financial incentives for coordination, which typically leads to coordination failure, and then are switched to higher incentives or start with high incentives, which typically yield effective coordination, and are switched to low incentives. Second, as the key treatment variable, subjects either observe the effort levels chosen by all employees in their experimenta

A change would do you good . . . An experimental study on how to overcome coordination failure in organizations

Many organizations suffer poor performance because individuals within the organization fail to coordinate on efficient patterns of behavior. Using controlled laboratory experiments, we study how financial incentives can be used to find a way out of such performance traps. Our experiments are set in a corporate environment where subjects' payoffs depend on coordinating at high effort levels; the underlying game being played repeatedly by employees is a weak-link game. In an initial phase, the benefits of coordination are low relative to the cost of increased effort. Play in this initial phase typically converges to an inefficient outcome with employees failing to coordinate at high effort levels. The experimental design then explores the effects of varying the financial incentives to coordinate at a higher effort level. We find that an increase in the benefits of coordination leads to improved coordination, but, surprisingly, large increases have no more impact than small increases. Once subj

A note on the separability principle in economies with single-peaked

We consider the problem of allocating an infinitely divisible commodity among a group of agents with single-peaked preferences. A rule that has played a central role in the analysis of the problem is the so-called uniform rule. Chun (2001) proves that the uniform rule is the only rule satisfying Pareto optimality, no-envy, separability, and continuity (with respect to the social endowment). We obtain an alternative characterization by using a weak replication-invariance condition, called duplication-invariance, instead of continuity. Furthermore, we prove that Pareto optimality, equal division lower bound, and separability imply no-envy. Using this result, we strengthen one of Chun's (2001) characterizations of the uniform rule by showing that the uniform rule is the only rule satisfying Pareto optimality, equal división lower bound, separability, and either continuity or duplication-invariance.

Isolamento e estudo experimental de duas novas culturas de bacilos ácido-alcool resistentes de muco nasal de leprosos

The A. described on December 14, 1951, his first culture of acid-fast bacillus isolated from nasal mucus of a leprous girl. in this paper the A. describes two new strains of acid-fast bacilli gotten also from nasal mucus of other two leprous girls, L3 cases. The first patient (layse S) had her mucus treated by petroff's method on December 16, 1952 and sown onto three tubes of loewenstein medium and in glycerin broth. After two weeks incubation at 37°C all three tubes of Loewenstein showed many punctiforme and pin-head yellowish colonies, whose microscopic examination proved to be of a pure acid-fast bacillus culture. This sample inoculated in rats and mice produced, after 55 days incubation, small tumors from which the culture was easily recovered. On April, 9, 1953 a new sample of nasal mucus of the same patient was sown in three tubes of Loewenstein. After two weeks incubation at 37°C all 3 tubes showed germination of small yellowish colonies of acid-fast bacilli. Within four months being gotten two samples of identical cultures in all smeared tubes of Loewenstein medium sown, proved that such cultures were not an ordinary ambient contamination. Second patient: - Maria N. After various sowing of different kinds of material from her, february 26, 1953 her nasal mucus treated by soda and sown onto Loewenstein medium, after 25 days incubation showed in only one tube, one small round colony, at first white, becoming creamy after three months. Transplants in various media grew at first slowly and after 2 or 3 generations grew faster. The "Layse" strain produced pellicle in glycerin broth and Dubos medium; the "Maria N." strain did not produce as yet. Both strains (Layse I and II, and Maria N.) gave weak positive Dubos test in half-an-hour and negative after 24 hours reading. Both were strongly positive when stained by Gram, Ziehl-Neelsen and Fontes methods. Both strains gave also positive fluoroscopy. These cultures are being studied. The A. concludes that, according to his experience, the slower growing cultures of acid-fast bacilli isolated from leprosy material, are the more suitable for experimental work. Aknowledgement. The A. thanks to Miss MARIA DE LOURDES SANTANA for her valuable collaboration in the studies of the described cultures.

Bribe-proof rules in the division problem

The division problem consists of allocating an amount of a perfectly divisible good among a group of n agents with single-peaked preferences. A rule maps preference profiles into n shares of the amount to be allocated. A rule is bribe-proof if no group of agents can compensate another agent to misrepresent his preference and, after an appropriate redistribution of their shares, each obtain a strictly preferred share. We characterize all bribe-proof rules as the class of efficient, strategy-proof, and weak replacement monotonic rules. In addition, we identify the functional form of all bribe-proof and tops-only rules.

Personal redistribution and the regional allocation of public investment

How should an equity-motivated policy-marker allocate public capital (infrastructure) across regions. Should it aim at reducing interregional differences in per capita output, or at maximizing total output? Such a normative question is examined in a model where the policy-marker is exclusively concerned about personal inequality and has access to two policy instruments. (i) a personal tax-transfer system (taxation is distortionary), and (ii) the regional allocation of public investment. I show that the case for public investment as a significant instrument for interpersonal redistribution is rather weak. In the most favorable case, when the tax code is constrained to be uniform across regions, it is optimal to distort the allocation of public investment in favor of the poor regions, but only to a limited extent. The reason is that poor individuals are relatively more sensitive to public trans fers, which are maximized by allocating public investment efficiently. If! the tax code can vary across regions then the optimal policy may involve an allocation of public investment distorted in favor of the rich regions.

Mitsuda's reactions: induced by BCG in the normal Rhesus ("Macacca mulatta")

The reversals of Mitsuda's reactions induced by BCG have been objected to based on the possiblem interference of other determination causes of the phenomenon: tuberculous primo-infections, communicants of unsuspected leprosy, revearsals due to other causes, such as anti-diphteric and anti-tetanic vaccination, etc. In order to study the problem, we have used Rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta), which were reared in isolation, in an attempt to avoid the referred to interferences. Prior to the experiments, all animals were tested and found negative to radiograph, tuberculin and lepromin tests and were then submitted to the application of BCG vaccine (from 1 to 3 days old), in different doses and by different via. At different times, after the application of BCG, they were again submitted to the radiographic, tuberculin and lepromin tests. In the tables I to IV the experiences were summarised. From the experiments, the following conclusions were reached: 1 - From 12 Rhesus that received BCG 11 showed reversals of the Mitsuda reaction (91.7%). 2 - These reverseals took place both in tests effected shortly after BCG (from 6 days to 2 months), and tests effected much later (from 7 to 12 months after BCG). 3 - Some differences were found in the results, according to the dosis and the application via of the BCG. a) - The testicular and peritonela via (0,02g) were the only that determined strong positive Mitsuda's reactions (+++). b) - By oral via, animals that received high dosis (0.6g and 1.2 g), there resulted uniform and regular reversals, even though of low intensity (+); but from those who got small doses (0.2 g.) one showed no reversals in all tests, and the other presented reversals in the 2nd and 3rd tests only, also with low positivity (+). 4) In the 2nd and 3rd Mitsuda's reactions in the same animals, positivity was always precocious (generally within 48 hours), one getting the impression that there occurs a sensibilization of the animal body by the antigen with the repetition of the tests, even though the intensity of the reaction always remains the same. This precocious reaction (Fernandez type) occurs both shortly and long time after the application of the BCG. Its precocity depends not of the antigen only because the first Mitsuda's reaction after the BCG application occurs after some time and seems not influenced by the control lepromin test effected on the Rhesus before the BCG. 5) On the control group, the animals which received a.a.f. bacilli suspensions (Mycobacterium sp.; M. avium, and M. smegmatis), did not show reverseals of the Mitsuda's reaction. Two Rhesus, however, which received dead BCG (120ºC autoclave 1 hour), one intradermically (0.006 g) and the other orally (1.2 g), did both present reversals of the Mitsuda's reaction, with weak positivity (+). In all animals of the control-group, the allergic reactions were found negative. 6) Strong local inflammatory reactions were observed in the Rhesus that had received living BCG by intradermal via, and in the one submitted to multipunctures, there occurred the formation of a large caseous abcess. 7) The allergic tuberculinic and infratuberculinic reactions appeared dissociated from the Mitsuda's reactions: sometimes they are more precocious, occurring before of the lepromin test; on other occasions they disappear, when the Mitsuda's reactions still persist; and finally, they may be absent, when the latter occur, especially after the oral application of the BCG. 8) In Rhesus which received BCG by testicular and peritonela via, in the infratuberculinic test (0.1 ml of total BCG extract), besides the classic answer, which occurs between 48 and 96 hours, one could observe a delayed answer (15 to 20 days), represented by a non-erythematous nodule, which persists for 11-14 days.

The Rise of democracy in Europe and the fight against mass poverty in Latin America: the implications for marxist thought of some recent mainstream papers

Recently a number of mainstream papers have treated the rise of democracy in 19th century Europe and its instability in Latin America in an eminently Marxist fashion. This paper sets out their implications for Marxist thought. With respect to Europe, Marx's emphasis on political action backed by the threat of violence is vindicated but his justification for socialism is not. With respect to Latin America, the unequal distribution of wealth is the cause of political instability that is, in turn, the root cause of mass poverty. In addition it is possible to explain some of the paradoxical characteristics of neo-liberalism and to make a weak argument for socialism in spite of its rejection in Europe.

Leadership and overcoming coordination failure with asymmetric costs

We study how the heterogeneity of agents affects the extent to which changes in financial incentives can pull a group out of a situation of coordination failure. We focus on the connections between cost asymmetries and leadership. Experimental subjects interact in groups of four in a series of weak-link games. The treatment variable is the distribution of high and low effort cost across subjects. We present data for one, two and three low-cost subjects as well as control sessions with symmetric costs. The overall pattern of coordination improvement is common across treatments. Early coordination improvements depend on the distribution of high and low effort costs across subjects, but these differences disappear with time. We find that initial leadership in overcoming coordination failure is not driven by low-cost subjects but by subjects with the most frequent cost. This conformity effect can be due to a kind of group identity or to the cognitive simplicity of acting with identical others.