Modeling the role of investigator bias, interrogation techniques, and suspect decision -making on the likelihood of confession

The purpose of the current study was to attempt to model various cognitive and social processes that are believed to lead to false confessions. More specifically, this study manipulated the variables of experimenter expectancy, guilt-innocence of the suspect, and interrogation techniques using the Russano et al. (2005) paradigm. The primary measure of interest was the likelihood of the participant signing the confession statement. By manipulating experimenter expectancy, the current study sought to further explore the social interactions that may occur in the interrogation room. In addition, in past experiments, the interrogator has typically been restricted to the use of one or two interrogation techniques. In the present study, interrogators were permitted to select from 15 different interrogation techniques when attempting to solicit a confession from participants. ^ Consistent with Rusanno et al. (2005), guilty participants (94%) were more likely to confess to the act of cheating than innocent participants (31%). The variable of experimenter expectancy did not effect confessions rates, length of interrogation, or the type of interrogation techniques used. Path analysis revealed feelings of pressure and the weighing of consequences on the part of the participant were associated with the signing of the confession statement. The findings suggest the guilt/innocence of the participant, the participant's perceptions of the interrogation situation, and length of interrogation play a pivotal role in the signing of the confession statement. Further examination of these variables may provide researchers with a better understanding of the relationship between interrogations and confessions. ^

Examining moderators of the hindsight bias in the context of civil legal decision -making: Counterfactuals, causal proximity, and self -referencing

The current research sought to clarify the diverging relationships between counterfactual thinking and hindsight bias observed in the literature thus far. In a non-legal context, Roese and Olson (1996) found a positive relationship between counterfactuals and hindsight bias, such that counterfactual mutations that undid the outcome also increased participants’ ratings of the outcome’s a priori likelihood. Further, they determined that this relationship is mediated by causal attributions about the counterfactually mutated antecedent event. Conversely, in the context of a civil lawsuit, Robbennolt and Sobus (1997) found that the relationship between counterfactual thinking and hindsight bias is negative. The current research sought to resolve the conflicting findings in the literature within a legal context. ^ In Experiment One, the manipulation of the normality of the defendant’s target behavior, designed to manipulate participants’ counterfactual thoughts about said behavior, did moderate the hindsight effect of outcome knowledge on mock jurors’ judgments of the foreseeability of that outcome as well as their negligence verdicts. Although I predicted that counterfactual thinking would increase, or exacerbate, the hindsight bias, as found by Roese and Olson (1996), my results provided some support for Robbenolt and Sobus’s (1997) finding that counterfactual thinking decreases the hindsight bias. Behavior normality did not moderate the hindsight effect of outcome knowledge in Experiment Two, nor did causal proximity in Experiment Three. ^ Additionally, my hypothesis that self-referencing may be an effective hindsight debiasing technique received little support across the three experiments. Although both the self-referencing instructions and self-report measure consistently decreased mock jurors’ likelihood of finding the defendant negligent, and self-referencing instructions decreased their foreseeability ratings in studies two and three, the self-referencing manipulation did not interact with outcome knowledge to moderate a hindsight bias effect on either foreseeability or negligence judgments. The consistent pattern of results across the three experiments, however, suggests that self-referencing may be an effective technique in reducing the likelihood of negligence verdicts.^

Confirmation bias in witness interviewing: Can interviewers ignore their preconceptions?

Basic research on expectancy effects suggests that investigative interviewers with pre-conceived notions about a crime may negatively influence the interview process in meaningful ways, yet many interviewing protocols recommend that interviewers review all available information prior to conducting their interviews. Previous research suggests that interviewers with no pre-interview knowledge elicit more detailed and accurate accounts than their informed counterparts (Cantlon, et al., 1996; Rivard et al., under review). The current study investigated whether (a) the benefit of blind versus informed interviewing is moderated by cautionary interviewer instructions to avoid suggestive questions and (b) whether any possible effects of pre-interview information extend beyond the immediate context of the forensic interview. ^ Paired participants (N = 584) were assigned randomly either to the role of interviewer or witness. Witnesses viewed a mock crime video and were interviewed one week later by an interviewer who received either correct, incorrect, or no information about the crime event. Half of the interviewers were assigned randomly to receive additional instructions to avoid suggestive questions. All participants returned 1 week after the interview to recall the crime video (for the witness) or the information recalled by the witness during the interview (for the interviewer). All interviews and delayed recall measures were scored for the quantity and accuracy of information reported. ^ Results replicate earlier findings that blind interviewers elicit more information from witnesses, without a decrease in accuracy rate. However instructions to avoid suggestive questions did not moderate the effect of blind versus informed interviewing on witness recall during the interview. Results further demonstrate that the effects of blind versus non-blind interviewing may extend beyond the immediate context of the interview to a later recall attempt. With instructions to avoid suggestive questions, witnesses of blind interviewers were more accurate than witnesses of incorrectly informed interviewers when recalling the event 1 week later. In addition, blind interviewers had more accurate memories for the witnesses' account of the event during the interview compared to non-blind interviewers.^

Examining Moderators of the Hindsight Bias in the Context of Civil Legal Decision-Making: Counterfactuals, Causal Proximity, and Self-Referencing

The current research sought to clarify the diverging relationships between counterfactual thinking and hindsight bias observed in the literature thus far. In a non-legal context, Roese and Olson (1996) found a positive relationship between counterfactuals and hindsight bias, such that counterfactual mutations that undid the outcome also increased participants’ ratings of the outcome’s a priori likelihood. Further, they determined that this relationship is mediated by causal attributions about the counterfactually mutated antecedent event. Conversely, in the context of a civil lawsuit, Robbennolt and Sobus (1997) found that the relationship between counterfactual thinking and hindsight bias is negative. The current research sought to resolve the conflicting findings in the literature within a legal context. In Experiment One, the manipulation of the normality of the defendant’s target behavior, designed to manipulate participants’ counterfactual thoughts about said behavior, did moderate the hindsight effect of outcome knowledge on mock jurors’ judgments of the foreseeability of that outcome as well as their negligence verdicts. Although I predicted that counterfactual thinking would increase, or exacerbate, the hindsight bias, as found by Roese and Olson (1996), my results provided some support for Robbenolt and Sobus’s (1997) finding that counterfactual thinking decreases the hindsight bias. Behavior normality did not moderate the hindsight effect of outcome knowledge in Experiment Two, nor did causal proximity in Experiment Three. Additionally, my hypothesis that self-referencing may be an effective hindsight debiasing technique received little support across the three experiments. Although both the self-referencing instructions and self-report measure consistently decreased mock jurors’ likelihood of finding the defendant negligent, and self-referencing instructions decreased their foreseeability ratings in studies two and three, the self-referencing manipulation did not interact with outcome knowledge to moderate a hindsight bias effect on either foreseeability or negligence judgments. The consistent pattern of results across the three experiments, however, suggests that self-referencing may be an effective technique in reducing the likelihood of negligence verdicts.

Stereotype Threat and the Standardized Testing Experiences of African American Children at an Urban Elementary School

Stereotype threat (Steele & Aronson, 1995) refers to the risk of confirming a negative stereotype about one’s group in a particular performance domain. The theory assumes that performance in the stereotyped domain is most negatively affected when individuals are more highly identified with the domain in question. As federal law has increased the importance of standardized testing at the elementary level, it can be reasonably hypothesized that the standardized test performance of African American children will be depressed when they are aware of negative societal stereotypes about the academic competence of African Americans. This sequential mixed-methods study investigated whether the standardized testing experiences of African American children in an urban elementary school are related to their level of stereotype awareness. The quantitative phase utilized data from 198 African American children at an urban elementary school. Both ex-post facto and experimental designs were employed. Experimental conditions were diagnostic and non-diagnostic testing experiences. The qualitative phase utilized data from a series of six focus group interviews conducted with a purposefully selected group of 4 African American children. The interview data were supplemented with data from 30 hours of classroom observations. Quantitative findings indicated that the stereotype threat condition evoked by diagnostic testing depresses the reading test performance of stereotype-aware African American children (F[1, 194] = 2.21, p < .01). This was particularly true of students who are most highly domain-identified with reading (F[1, 91] = 19.18, p < .01). Moreover, findings indicated that only stereotype-aware African American children who were highly domain-identified were more likely to experience anxiety in the diagnostic condition (F[1, 91] = 5.97, p < .025). Qualitative findings revealed 4 themes regarding how African American children perceive and experience the factors related to stereotype threat: (1) a narrow perception of education as strictly test preparation, (2) feelings of stress and anxiety related to the state test, (3) concern with what “others” think (racial salience), and (4) stereotypes. A new conceptual model for stereotype threat is presented, and future directions including implications for practice and policy are discussed.

The Effects of Attention Bias Modification Training on Cognitive Biases Perceived Threats in Children with Anxiety

It has been found in research that children and adults with anxiety have a bias toward interpreting ambiguous situations as threatening. This bias is thought to consequently maintain many symptoms of anxiety. An emergent computer treatment system called Attention Bias Modification Training (ABMT) has been used to try to reduce this bias. It is essential to understand whether this bias can be reduced with ABMT because of its feasibility and cost effective nature of treatment. In the current study, interpretation bias is measured using the Children's Opinions of Everyday Life Events (COELE). The ABMT treatment is given to children once a week for an hour and their answers to the COELE are recorded before and after treatment. The recorded procedures are transcribed by undergraduate students working at the Child Anxiety and Phobia lab, and then scored. Each of the situations of the COELE are rated 0 being neutral or 1 threatening interpretation of the situation. The hypothesis is that ABMT will reduce the negative interpretation bias in children over the course of 4 weeks of treatment. The study is still in the collection and transcription of data phase, and will expect to have analytical conclusions in the start of spring 2015.

Evaluation of the threat of marine CO2 leakage-associated acidification on the toxicity of sediment metals to juvenile bivalves

The effects of the acidification associated with CO2 leakage from sub-seabed geological storage was studied by the evaluation of the short-term effects of CO2-induced acidification on juveniles of the bivalve Ruditapes philippinarum. Laboratory scale experiments were performed using a CO2-bubbling system designed to conduct ecotoxicological assays. The organisms were exposed for 10 days to elutriates of sediments collected in different littoral areas that were subjected to various pH treatments (pH 7.1; pH 6.6; pH 6.1). The acute pH-associated effects on the bivalves were observed, and the dissolved metals in the elutriates were measured. The median toxic effect pH was calculated, which ranged from 6.33 and 6.45. The amount of dissolved Zn in the sediment elutriates increased in parallel with the pH reductions and was correlated with the proton concentrations. The pH, the pCO2 and the dissolved metal concentrations (Zn and Fe) were linked with the mortality of the exposed bivalves.

Single Events in a COTS Soft-Error Free SRAM at Low Bias Voltage Induced by 15-MeV Neutrons

This paper presents an experimental study of the sensitivity to 15-MeV neutrons of Advanced Low Power SRAMs (A-LPSRAM) at low bias voltage little above the threshold value that allows the retention of data. This family of memories is characterized by a 3D structure to minimize the area penalty and to cope with latchups, as well as by the presence of integrated capacitors to hinder the occurrence of single event upsets. In low voltage static tests, classical single event upsets were a minor source of errors, but other unexpected phenomena such as clusters of bitflips and hard errors turned out to be the origin of hundreds of bitflips. Besides, errors were not observed in dynamic tests at nominal voltage. This behavior is clearly different than that of standard bulk CMOS SRAMs, where thousands of errors have been reported.

From Mare Nostrum to Insula Nostra : British Colonial Cyprus and the Italian Imperial Threat

Peer reviewed

Role of the plasma-electrode bias and the transverse magnetic field upon H- ion extraction in the negative ion source

Non peer reviewed

The difference model with guessing explains interval bias in two-alternative forced- chocice detection procedures

The standard difference model of two-alternative forced-choice (2AFC) tasks implies that performance should be the same when the target is presented in the first or the second interval. Empirical data often show “interval bias” in that percentage correct differs significantly when the signal is presented in the first or the second interval. We present an extension of the standard difference model that accounts for interval bias by incorporating an indifference zone around the null value of the decision variable. Analytical predictions are derived which reveal how interval bias may occur when data generated by the guessing model are analyzed as prescribed by the standard difference model. Parameter estimation methods and goodness-of-fit testing approaches for the guessing model are also developed and presented. A simulation study is included whose results show that the parameters of the guessing model can be estimated accurately. Finally, the guessing model is tested empirically in a 2AFC detection procedure in which guesses were explicitly recorded. The results support the guessing model and indicate that interval bias is not observed when guesses are separated out.

"Sexism in the Schools" conference at P.S. 41 about sex bias in high schools

General note: Title and date provided by Bettye Lane.

Bias on the Bench: How Judges’ Legal Backgrounds Influence Their Decisions

The ideal conception of a judge is that of a neutral arbitrator. However, there exist good reasons to believe that personal characteristics, including professional experiences, bias judges. Such suspicions inspired two hypotheses: (1) judges that are former prosecutors are biased in favor of the government in criminal appeals; (2) judges that are former criminal defense attorneys are biased in favor of the criminal appellant. These hypotheses were tested by gathering professional information about state supreme court judges in the south during the years from 1995 until 1998. That was then matched to an existing database that recorded those judges’ demographics and decisions in criminal appeals during that time. Logistic regressions of that data revealed that despite when other characteristics, including gender, race, and legal experience, were accounted for, criminal defense remained a statistically significant predictor. Judges with a background in criminal defense were more likely to reverse criminal court decisions. In contrast, prosecutorial experience was not a good predictor of how a judge ruled. Judges that had backgrounds in prosecution did not rule much differently than those that did not have such a background.

Liberal bias and the five-factor model.

Duarte et al. draw attention to the "embedding of liberal values and methods" in social psychological research. They note how these biases are often invisible to the researchers themselves. The authors themselves fall prey to these "invisible biases" by utilizing the five-factor model of personality and the trait of openness to experience as one possible explanation for the under-representation of political conservatives in social psychology. I show that the manner in which the trait of openness to experience is conceptualized and measured is a particularly blatant example of the very liberal bias the authors decry.