Un estudi sobre l'emmagatzematge col·laboratiu dels recursos bibliotecaris

L'emmagatzematge cooperatiu consisteix bàsicament en compartir l'espai dins d'un servei, mentre que l'emmagatzematge col·laboratiu ("collaborative storage") implica una aproximació compartida a la col·lecció en termes de creixement, forma, gestió i accés. L'emmagatzematge col·laboratiu proporciona un ús més eficient dels recursos. Aquest estudi és una investigació sobre les opcions físiques, més que sobre l'emmagatzematge digital. Tanmateix, l'estudi reflexiona sobre la relació prospectiva que s'estableix entre aquests dos factors. La tensió entre ells és una qüestió emergent, la qual encara no ha trobat un lloc en el context de la política bibliotecària des d’una perspectiva local, regional o nacional.

Foundations for contest success functions

In the literature the outcome of contests is either interpreted as win probabilities or as shares of the prize. With this in mind, we examine two approaches to contest success functions. In the first we analyze the implications of contestants' incomplete information concerning the "type" of the contest administrator. While in the case of two contestants this approach can rationalize prominent contest success functions, we show that it runs into difficulties when there are more agents. Our second approach interprets contest success functions as sharing rules and establishes a connection to bargaining and claims problems which is independent of the number of contestants. Both approaches provide foundations for popular contest success functions and guidelines for the definition of new ones. Keywords: Endogenous Contests, Contest Success Function. JEL Classification: C72 (Noncooperative Games), D72 (Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections), D74 (Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances).

Dividends and weighted values in games with externalities

We consider cooperative environments with externalities (games in partition function form) and provide a recursive definition of dividends for each coalition and any partition of the players it belongs to. We show that with this definition and equal sharing of these dividends the averaged sum of dividends for each player, over all the coalitions that contain the player, coincides with the corresponding average value of the player. We then construct weighted Shapley values by departing from equal division of dividends and finally, for each such value, provide a bidding mechanism implementing it.

Productivity, Preferences and UIP deviations in an Open Economy Business Cycle Model

We show that a flex-price two-sector open economy DSGE model can explain the poor degree of international risk sharing and exchange rate disconnect. We use a suite of model evaluation measures and examine the role of (i) traded and non-traded sectors; (ii) financial market incompleteness; (iii) preference shocks; (iv) deviations from UIP condition for the exchange rates; and (v) creditor status in net foreign assets. We find that there is a good case for both traded and non-traded productivity shocks as well as UIP deviations in explaining the puzzles.

Non-cooperative incentives to share knowledge in competitive environments

In this paper we study a model where non-cooperative agents may exchange knowledge in a competitive environment. As a potential factor that could induce the knowledge disclosure between humans we consider the timing of the moves of players. We develop a simple model of a multistage game in which there are only three players and competition takes place only within two stages. Players can share their private knowledge with their opponents and the knowledge is modelled as in uencing their marginal cost of e¤ort. We identify two main mechanisms that work towards knowledge disclosure. One of them is that before the actual competition starts, the stronger player of the rst stage of a game may have desire to share his knowledge with the "observer", be- cause this reduces the valuation of the prize of the weaker player of that stage and as a result his e¤ort level and probability of winning in a ght. Another mechanism is that the "observer" may have sometimes desire to share knowledge with the weaker player of the rst stage, because in this way, by increasing his probability of winning in that stage, he decreases the probability of winning of the stronger player. As a result, in the second stage the "observer" may have greater chances to meet the weaker player rather than the stronger one. Keywords: knowledge sharing, strategic knowledge disclosure, multistage contest game, non-cooperative games

Regiones salientes complejas para aplicaciones de seguimiento facial

Este trabajo presenta una metodología para detectar y realizar el seguimiento de características faciales. En el primer paso del procedimiento se detectan caras mediante Adaboost con cascadas de clasificadores débiles. El segundo paso busca las características internas de la cara mediante el CSR, detectando zonas de interés. Una vez que estas características se capturan, un proceso de tracking basado en el descriptor SIFT, que hemos llamado pseudo-SIFT, es capaz de guardar información sobre la evolución de movimiento en las regiones detectadas. Además, un conjunto de datos públicos ha sido desarrollado con el propósito de compartirlo con otras investigaciones sobre detección, clasificación y tracking. Experimentos reales muestran la robustez de este trabajo y su adaptabilidad para trabajos futuros.

Horizontal Agreements and R&D Complementarities: Merger versus RJV

We study the decision of two rms within an oligopoly concerning whether to enter into a horizontal agreement to exploit complementarities between their R&D activities and, if so, whether to merge or form a research joint venture (RJV). In contrast to horizontal merger, there is a probability that an RJV contract will fail to enforce R&D sharing. We nd that a horizontal agreement always arises. The insiders' merger/RJV choice involves a trade-o : While merger o ers certainty that R&D complementarities will be exploited, it leads to a pro t-reducing reaction by outsiders on the product market, where competition is Cournot. Greater brand similarity and contract enforceability (\quality") both favour RJV, while greater R&D complementarity favours merger. Interestingly, the insiders may choose to merge even when RJV contracts are always enforceable, and they may opt to form an RJV even when the likelihood of enforceability is negligible.

EMU, EU, Market Integration and Consumption Smoothing

We take a new approach to the study of the impact of EMU on consumption smoothing. Rather than relying on inferences based on the behavior of consumption levels or growth, we focus on consumption volatility and therefore on smoothing more directly. Consequently, we find that even though EMU tends to smooth consumption, it is not through cross-country property and claims. Rather it comes through the promotion of the tradability of goods, capital in particular: specifically, the encouragement of price competition, contestable home markets, ability to borrow and buy insurance at home, and the harmonization of regulations. Some of the consumption smoothing may also depend on EU membership rather than EMU as such but EMU adds to it. As a fundamental part of the analysis, the paper uses a new index of currency union which focuses on the ratio of trade with other countries sharing the same currency relative to total foreign trade.

On Cobb-Douglas Preferences in Bilateral Oligopoly

Bilateral oligopoly is a simple model of exchange in which a finite set of sellers seek to exchange the goods they are endowed with for money with a finite set of buyers, and no price-taking assumptions are imposed. If trade takes place via a strategic market game bilateral oligopoly can be thought of as two linked proportional-sharing contests: in one the sellers share the aggregate bid from the buyers in proportion to their supply and in the other the buyers share the aggregate supply in proportion to their bids. The analysis can be separated into two ‘partial games’. First, fix the aggregate bid at B; in the first partial game the sellers contest this fixed prize in proportion to their supply and the aggregate supply in the equilibrium of this game is X˜ (B). Next, fix the aggregate supply at X; in the second partial game the buyers contest this fixed prize in proportion to their bids and the aggregate bid in the equilibrium of this game is ˜B (X). The analysis of these two partial games takes into account competition within each side of the market. Equilibrium in bilateral oligopoly must take into account competition between sellers and buyers and requires, for example, ˜B (X˜ (B)) = B. When all traders have Cobb-Douglas preferences ˜ X(B) does not depend on B and ˜B (X) does not depend on X: whilst there is competition within each side of the market there is no strategic interdependence between the sides of the market. The Cobb-Douglas assumption provides a tractable framework in which to explore the features of fully strategic trade but it misses perhaps the most interesting feature of bilateral oligopoly, the implications of which are investigated.

Consumption Inequality and Discount Rate Heterogeneity

Although standard incomplete market models can account for the magnitude of the rise in consumption inequality over the life cycle, they generate unrealistically concave age pro.les of consumption inequality and unrealistically less wealth inequality. In this paper, I investigate the role of discount rate heterogeneity on consumption inequality in the context of incomplete market life cycle models. The distribution of discount rates is estimated using moments from the wealth distribution. I .nd that the model with heterogeneous income pro.les (HIP) and discount rate heterogeneity can successfully account for the empirical age pro.le of consumption inequality, both in its magnitude and in its non-concave shape. Generating realistic wealth inequality, this simulated model also highlights the importance of ex ante heterogeneities as main sources of life time inequality.

Picking the Right Budget Constraint for Scotland

This position paper considers the devolution of further fiscal powers to the Scottish Parliament in the context of the objectives and remit of the Smith Commission. The argument builds on our discussion of fiscal decentralization made in our previous published work on this topic. We ask what sort of budget constraint the Scottish Parliament should operate with. A soft budget constraint (SBC) allows the Scottish Parliament to spend without having to consider all of the tax and, therefore, political consequences, of that spending, which is effectively the position at the moment. The incentives to promote economic growth through fiscal policy – on both the tax and spending sides are weak to non-existent. This is what the Scotland Act, 1998, and the continuing use of the Barnett block grant, gave Scotland. Now other budget constraints are being discussed – those of the Calman Commission (2009) and the Scotland Act (2012), as well as the ones offered in 2014 by the various political parties – Scottish Conservatives, Scottish Greens, Scottish Labour, the Scottish Liberal Democrats and the Scottish Government. There is also the budget constraint designed by the Holtham Commission (2010) for Wales that could just as well be used in Scotland. We examine to what extent these offer the hard budget constraint (HBC) that would bring tax policy firmly into the realm of Scottish politics, asking the Scottish electorate and Parliament to consider the costs to them of increasing spending in terms of higher taxes; or the benefits to them of using public spending to grow the tax base and own-sourced taxes? The hardest budget constraint of all is offered by independence but, as is now known, a clear majority of those who voted in the referendum did not vote for this form of budget constraint. Rather they voted for a significant further devolution of fiscal powers while remaining within a political and monetary union with the rest of the UK, with the risk pooling and revenue sharing that this implies. It is not surprising therefore that none of the budget constraints on offer, apart from the SNP’s, come close to the HBC of independence. However, the almost 25% fall in the price of oil since the referendum, a resource stream so central to the SNP’s economic policy making, underscores why there is a need for a trade off between a HBC and risk pooling and revenue sharing. Ranked according to the desirable characteristic of offering something approaching a HBC the least desirable are those of the Calman Commission, the Scotland Act, 2012, and Scottish Labour. In all of these the ‘elasticity’ of the block grant in the face of failure to grow the Scottish tax base is either not defined or is very elastic – meaning that the risk of failure is shuffled off to taxpayers outside of Scotland. The degree of HBC in the Scottish Conservative, Scottish Greens and Scottish Liberal Democrats proposals are much more desirable from an economic growth point of view, the latter even embracing the HBC proposed by the Holtham Commission that combines serious tax policy with welfare support in the long-run. We judge that the budget constraint in the SNP’s proposals is too hard as it does not allow for continuation of the ‘welfare union’ in the UK. We also consider that in the case of a generalized UK economic slow requiring a fiscal stimulus that the Scottish Parliament be allowed increased borrowing to be repaid in the next economic upturn.

Dynamic Relational Contracts under Complete Information

This paper considers a long-term relationship between two agents who both undertake a costly action or investment that together produces a joint benefit. Agents have an opportunity to expropriate some of the joint benefit for their own use. Two cases are considered: (i) where agents are risk neutral and are subject to limited liability constraints and (ii) where agents are risk averse, have quasi-linear preferences in consumption and actions but where limited liability constraints do not bind. The question asked is how to structure the investments and division of the surplus over time so as to avoid expropriation. In the risk-neutral case, there may be an initial phase in which one agent overinvests and the other underinvests. However, both actions and surplus converge monotonically to a stationary state in which there is no overinvestment and surplus is at its maximum subject to the constraints. In the risk-averse case, there is no overinvestment. For this case, we establish that dynamics may or may not be monotonic depending on whether or not it is possible to sustain a first-best allocation. If the first-best allocation is not sustainable, then there is a trade-off between risk sharing and surplus maximization. In general, surplus will not be at its constrained maximum even in the long run.

Reading Ng Kim Chew: Malaysian-Chineseness and memory in contemporary Malaysian Chinese literature in taiwan

The idea of Chineseness as a geographic, cultural-specific and ethnically-charged concept, and the pivotal role assumed by memory linger throughout the writings of most authors hailing from Chinese community in Southeast Asia. Among these communities, being the Malaysian Chinese the more prolific in terms of number of writers and pieces of literature produced, this paper deals specifically with it. Its focus is put on the literature produced by Malaysian Chinese authors residing in Taiwan, which topic constitutes an important part of the first chapter, and on one of its main representatives, Ng Kim Chew, to whom chapter two and three are fully dedicated. A literary analysis of one of his short stories, Huo yu tu, will allow the reader to have a first-hand experience, through excerpts from the original text, of the importance of Chineseness and memory in the literary production of Ng and of many authors sharing with him similar life and literary experiences. I started this research from the assumption that these authors make large use of their own memories and memories from their own community in their writing as a way to re-tie themselves to the Chineseness they left in their places of origin. However in the case of Ng Kim Chew, the analysis of his works led be to theorizing that the identity he is imbued with, if there is one, is not Chinese, nor Malaysian, but purely and distinctively Malaysian-Chinese. This paper can also serve as an introduction for the general public to the field of Sinophone literature from Southeast Asia and to promote wider and innovative paths of research within the realm of Chinese studies that go beyond China proper.

Mass effects mediate coexistence in competing shrews.

Recent developments in metacommunity theory have raised awareness that processes occurring at regional scales might interfere with local dynamics and affect conditions for the local coexistence of competing species. Four main paradigms are recognized in this context (namely, neutral, patch-dynamics, species-sorting, and mass-effect), which differ according to the role assigned to ecological or life-history differences among competing species, as well as to the relative time scale of regional vs. local dynamics. We investigated the patterns of regional and local coexistence of two species of shrews (Crocidura russula and Sorex coronatus) sharing a similar diet (generalist insectivores) over four generations, in a spatially structured habitat at the altitudinal limit of their distributions. Local populations were small, and regional dynamics were strong, with high rates of extinction and recolonization. Niche analysis revealed significant habitat differentiation on a few important variables, including temperature and availability of winter resting sites. In sites suitable for both species, we found instances of local coexistence with no evidence of competitive exclusion. Patterns of temporal succession did not differ from random, with no suggestion of a colonization-competition trade-off. Altogether, our data provide support for the mass-effect paradigm, where regional coexistence is mediated by specialization on different habitat types, and local coexistence by rescue effects from source sites. The strong regional dynamics and demographic stochasticity, together with high dispersal rates, presumably contributed to mass effects by overriding local differences in specific competitive abilities.

Instrumentació i control d'actuadors fluídics per a sistemes analítics: sistema de regulació d'una microbomba de precisió a mode de xeringa

En aquest projecte s’ha implementat un sistema de control per a les bombes microfluídiques LPVX de The Lee Company funcionant a mode de xeringa. El sistema consisteix en un circuit controlador basat en el microxip UDN 296 B de Allegro MicroSystems, que conté dos Ponts en H per a controlar motors pas a pas i dos mòduls de Modulació d’Amplada de Polsos (PWM), governat a partir d’un programa de control com a instrument virtual dissenyat sota l’entorn LabVIEW. El programa de control permet indicar la quantitat de volum a aspirar o dispensar per la bomba i escollir entre una execució simple o una de continuada, podent-ne controlar en aquest segona opció el temps entre execució i execució. El programa també permet visualitzar el procés mitjançant la obtenció de la imatge d’una webcam amb DirectShow. Finalment també permet el control remot de l’Instrument Virtual a través de la xarxa d’Internet.