The automatic selection of ventilation parameters during the initial phase of mechanical ventilation.

OBJECTIVE: To test a method that allows automatic set-up of the ventilator controls at the onset of ventilation. DESIGN: Prospective randomized crossover study. SETTING: ICUs in one adult and one children's hospital in Switzerland. PATIENTS: Thirty intubated stable, critically ill patients (20 adults and 10 children). INTERVENTIONS: The patients were ventilated during two 20-min periods using a modified Hamilton AMADEUS ventilator. During the control period the ventilator settings were chosen immediately prior to the study. During the other period individual settings were automatically determined by the ventilatior (AutoInit). MEASUREMENTS AND RESULTS: Pressure, flow, and instantaneous CO2 concentration were measured at the airway opening. From these measurements, series dead space (V(DS)), expiratory time constant (RC), tidal volume (VT, total respiratory frequency (f(tot), minute ventilation (MV), and maximal and mean airway pressure (Paw, max and Paw, mean) were calculated. Arterial blood gases were analyzed at the end of each period. Paw, max was significantly less with the AutoInit ventilator settings while f(tot) was significantly greater (P < 0.05). The other values were not statistically significant. CONCLUSIONS: The AutoInit ventilator settings, which were automatically derived, were acceptable for all patients for a period of 20 min and were not found to be inferior to the control ventilator settings. This makes the AutoInit method potentially useful as an automatic start-up procedure for mechanical ventilation.

Endogenous Credit Cycles and Financial Dampening in an Adverse Selection Economy

We propose an adverse selection framework in which the financial sector has a dual role. It amplifies or dampens exogenous shocks and also generates endogenous fluctuations. We fully characterize constrained optimal contracts in a setting in which entrepreneurs need to borrow and are privately informed about the quality of their projects. Our characterization is novel in analyzing pooling and separating allocations in a context of multi-dimensional screening: specifically, the amounts of investment undertaken and of entrepreneurial net worth are used to screen projects. We then embed these results in a dynamic competitive economy. First, we show how endogenous regime switches in financial contracts may generate fluctuations in an economy that exhibits no dynamics under full information. Unlike previous models of endogenous cycles, our result does not rely on entrepreneurial net worth being counter-cyclical or inconsequential for determining investment. Secondly, the model shows the different implications of adverse selection as opposed to pure moral hazard. In particular, and contrary to standard results in the macroeconomic literature, the financial system may dampen exogenous shocks in the presence of adverse selection.

Alpha1-adrenoceptors are required for normal male sexual function.

BACKGROUND AND PURPOSE: Alpha(1)-adrenoceptor antagonists are extensively used in the treatment of hypertension and lower urinary tract symptoms associated with benign prostatic hyperplasia. Among the side effects, ejaculatory dysfunction occurs more frequently with drugs that are relatively selective for alpha(1A)-adrenoceptors compared with other drugs of this class. This suggests that alpha(1A)-adrenoceptors may contribute to ejaculation. However, this has not been studied at the molecular level. EXPERIMENTAL APPROACH: The physiological contribution of each alpha(1)-adrenoceptor subtype was characterized using alpha(1)-adrenoceptor subtype-selective knockout (KO) mice (alpha(1A)-, alpha(1B)- and alpha(1D)-AR KO mice) since the subtype-specific drugs available are only moderately selective. We analysed the role of alpha(1)-adrenoceptors in the blood pressure and vascular response as well as ejaculation by determining these variables in alpha(1)-adrenoceptor subtype-selective KO mice and in mice with all their alpha(1)-adrenoceptor subtypes deleted (alpha(1)-AR triple-KO mice). KEY RESULTS: The pregnancy rate was reduced by 50% in alpha(1A)-adrenoceptor KO mice, and this reduction was dramatically enhanced in alpha(1)-adrenoceptor triple-KO mice. Contractile tension of the vas deferens in response to noradrenaline was markedly decreased in alpha(1A)-adrenoceptor KO mice, and this contraction was completely abolished in alpha(1)-adrenoceptor triple-KO mice. This attenuation of contractility was also observed in the electrically stimulated vas deferens. CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS: These results demonstrate that alpha(1)-adrenoceptors, particularly alpha(1A)-adrenoceptors, are required for normal contractility of the vas deferens and consequent sperm ejaculation as well as having a function in fertility.

Adverse Selection, Credit, and Efficiency: the Case of the Missing Market

We analyze a standard environment of adverse selection in credit markets. In our envi- ronment, entrepreneurs who are privately informed about the quality of their projects need to borrow from banks. As is generally the case in economies with adverse selection, the competitive equilibrium of our economy is shown to be ine¢ cient. Under adverse selection, the choices made by one type of agents limit what can be o¤ered to other types in an incentive-compatible manner. This gives rise to an externality, which cannot be internalized in a competitive equilibrium. We show that, in this type of environment, the ine¢ ciency associated to adverse selection is the consequence of one implicit assumption: entrepreneurs can only borrow from banks. If an additional market is added (say, a .security market.), in which entrepreneurs can obtain funds beyond those o¤ered by banks, we show that the e¢ cient allocation is an equilibrium of the economy. In such an equilibrium, all entrepreneurs borrow at a pooling rate in the security market. When they apply to bank loans, though, only entrepreneurs with good projects pledge these additional funds as collateral. This equilibrium thus simultaneously entails cross- subsidization and separation between di¤erent types of entrepreneurs.

Adverse selection, credit, and efficiency: the case of the missing market

We analyze a standard environment of adverse selection in credit markets. In our environment, entrepreneurs who are privately informed about the quality of their projects need to borrow in order to invest. Conventional wisdom says that, in this class of economies, the competitive equilibrium is typically inefficient. We show that this conventional wisdom rests on one implicit assumption: entrepreneurs can only access monitored lending. If a new set of markets is added to provide entrepreneurs with additional funds, efficiency can be attained in equilibrium. An important characteristic of these additional markets is that lending in them must be unmonitored, in the sense that it does not condition total borrowing or investment by entrepreneurs. This makes it possible to attain efficiency by pooling all entrepreneurs in the new markets while separating them in the markets for monitored loans.

Optimal Contracts, Adverse Selection, and Social Preferences: An Experiment

It has long been standard in agency theory to search for incentive-compatible mechanisms on the assumption that people care only about their own material wealth. However, this assumption is clearly refuted by numerous experiments, and we feel that it may be useful to consider nonpecuniary utility in mechanism design and contract theory. Accordingly, we devise an experiment to explore optimal contracts in an adverse-selection context. A principal proposes one of three contract menus, each of which offers a choice of two incentive-compatible contracts, to two agents whose types are unknown to the principal. The agents know the set of possible menus, and choose to either accept one of the two contracts offered in the proposed menu or to reject the menu altogether; a rejection by either agent leads to lower (and equal) reservation payoffs for all parties. While all three possible menus favor the principal, they do so to varying degrees. We observe numerous rejections of the more lopsided menus, and approach an equilibrium where one of the more equitable contract menus (which one depends on the reservation payoffs) is proposed and agents accept a contract, selecting actions according to their types. Behavior is largely consistent with all recent models of social preferences, strongly suggesting there is value in considering nonpecuniary utility in agency theory.

Monoclonal antibodies to carcinoembryonic antigen: ionic strength as a factor in the selection of antibodies for immunoscintigraphy.

As part of an ongoing effort to improve the technique of immunoscintigraphy for the detection of human carcinomas with radiolabeled monoclonal antibodies (MABs) to carcinoembryonic antigen (CEA), we have developed a series of MABs to CEA and have studied the effects of low- and physiological molarity buffers on their CEA binding and affinity, as well as their cross-reactivity with granulocyte glycoprotein(s). These in vitro results in different buffer systems were then correlated with the use of these MABs to CEA in the detection of human colon carcinoma grafts in nude mice. Our results show that the binding of CEA by some MABs is influenced by ionic strength and that this may be an important factor in their successful use for the immunolocalization of carcinomas in vivo.

Adaptation and the genetics of social behaviour.

In recent years much progress has been made towards understanding the selective forces involved in the evolution of social behaviour including conflicts over reproduction among group members. Here, I argue that an important additional step necessary for advancing our understanding of the resolution of potential conflicts within insect societies is to consider the genetics of the behaviours involved. First, I discuss how epigenetic modifications of behaviour may affect conflict resolution within groups. Second, I review known natural polymorphisms of social organization to demonstrate that a lack of consideration of the genetic mechanisms involved may lead to erroneous explanations of the adaptive significance of behaviour. Third, I suggest that, on the basis of recent genetic studies of sexual conflict in Drosophila, it is necessary to reconsider the possibility of within-group manipulation by means of chemical substances (i.e. pheromones). Fourth, I address the issue of direct versus indirect genetic effects, which is of particular importance for the study of behaviour in social groups. Fifth, I discuss the issue of how a genetic influence on dominance hierarchies and reproductive division of labour can have secondary effects, for example in the evolution of promiscuity. Finally, because the same sets of genes (e.g. those implicated in chemical signalling and the responses that are triggered) may be used even in species as divergent as ants, cooperative breeding birds and primates, an integration of genetic mechanisms into the field of social evolution may also provide unifying ideas.

A Model of Collateral, Investment, and Adverse Selection

This paper characterizes the relationship between entrepreneurial wealth and aggregate investment under adverse selection. Its main finding is that such a relationship need not be monotonic. In particular, three results emerge from the analysis: (i) pooling equilibria, in which investment is independent of entrepreneurial wealth, are more likely to arise when entrepreneurial wealth is relatively low; (ii) separating equilibria, in which investment is increasing in entrepreneurial wealth, are most likely to arise when entrepreneurial wealth is relatively high and; (iii) for a given interest rate, an increase in entrepreneurial wealth may generate a discontinuous fall in investment.

Sexual Harassment in Education: It's Against the Law

An informational sheet about workplace sexual harassment produced by Iowa Commission on the Status of Women.

Sexual Harassment in Housing: It's Against the Law, 2001

An informational sheet about housing and sexual harassment produced by Iowa Commission on the Status of Women.

Sexual Harassment in the Workplace: Sample Policy

An informational sheet about developing and implementing a policy which prohibits sexual harassment in the workplace.

Time Series Input Selection using Multiple Kernel Learning

In this paper we study the relevance of multiple kernel learning (MKL) for the automatic selection of time series inputs. Recently, MKL has gained great attention in the machine learning community due to its flexibility in modelling complex patterns and performing feature selection. In general, MKL constructs the kernel as a weighted linear combination of basis kernels, exploiting different sources of information. An efficient algorithm wrapping a Support Vector Regression model for optimizing the MKL weights, named SimpleMKL, is used for the analysis. In this sense, MKL performs feature selection by discarding inputs/kernels with low or null weights. The approach proposed is tested with simulated linear and nonlinear time series (AutoRegressive, Henon and Lorenz series).