L'ordenació dels espais de sòl no urbanitzable periurbà al Vallès Occidental: marc normatiu, planificació i experiències pràctiques

Els espais periurbans juguen un paper important en la configuració del territori i del medi ambient, ja que contenen valors i acullen funcions diverses (ecològiques i ambientals, socials i lúdiques, productives etc.). Si bé és cert que a la comarca del Vallès Occidental aquests espais són –també- producte de la relació amb un context geogràfic molt humanitzat, també ho és que actualment i en aquest context, es donen circumstàncies d’amenaça a l’equilibri que fou origen dels valors i funcions esmentats (tendències urbanitzadores i metropolització). Aquest escenari de complexitat demana una òptima ordenació del territori que garanteixi la preservació dels valors i funcions anomenats. El marc i les eines dels quals la societat s’ha dotat per a fer-ho les aporta el planejament del territori, la legislació sectorial etc. Tot i que aquest marc presenta oportunitats per a l'ordenació d’espais de sòl no urbanitzable periurbà, a la realitat pràctica s’observen pocs resultats d’aquesta favorable avinentesa. Aquesta és la paradoxa principal que planteja l’estudi de la temàtica escollida.

Els agrocombustibles a Catalunya : mecanismes i efectes de l'europeïtzació en la política pública

En els darrers temps els agrocombustibles s’han promocionat com una alternativa als combustibles fòssils,adquirint un pes important en les agendes polítiques internacionals. Les dues grans potències econòmiques mundials, els Estats Units i la Unió Europea, han impulsat els agrocombustibles a través de diferents estratègies; plans, legislació, però també amb excempcions fiscals i obligacions de barreja amb combustibles fòssils. En aquest marc, Catalunya va ser de les comunitats autònomes de l’Estat espanyol pioneres en la potenciació d’experiències de producció i consum d’agrocombustibles. A partir de l’anàlisi de la política i el debat a Catalunya es pot destacar la gran influència de l’esfera europea a través de diversos mecanismes en el procés, el que s’ha anomenat en la literatura com europeïtzació. Darrerament Europa s’ha convertit en un important centre de producció de polítiques públiques, especialment en polítiques ambientals i agrícoles a partir dels anys 80. És per aquest motiu que resulta rellevant conèixer les dinàmiques europees en una política complexa com la dels agrocombustibles a Catalunya, que presenta components energètics, però també amb altres aspectes relacionats amb el món agràri i el medi ambient.

Las Elecciones municipales de 2007 en Cataluña

A partir d’una breu explicació de l’evolució electoral produïda a Catalunya des dels comicis municipals de 1999, es realitza una aproximació als resultats de les darreres eleccions municipals de maig de 2007 des d’una òptica doble. D’una banda s’analitzen els resultats electorals en les seves diverses vessants, es a dir, es tracta el comportament electorals dels ciutadans de Catalunya reflectit en la participació i en el vot als principals partits, sempre tenint present la particularitat de l’existència d’un sistema propi de partits polítics, diferent de que s’ha configurat al conjunt d’Espanya. En segon lloc s’analitza l’evolució de la representació política que aquests resultats electorals ha produït i, per tant, la configuració dels Ajuntaments catalans com a resultat del seu procés constitutiu.

Intra-Group Competition and Inter-Group Conflict: An Application to Northern Ireland

This paper reviews four economic theories of leadership selection in conflictual settings. The first of these by Cukierman and Tomassi (1998) labeled the ‘information rationale’, argues that hawks may actually be necessary to initiate peace agreements. The second labeled the ‘bargaining rationale’ borrowing from Hamlin and Jennings (2007) agrees with the conventional wisdom that doves are more likely to secure peace, but post-conflict there are good reasons for hawks to be rationally selected. The third found in Jennings and Roelfsema (2008) is labeled the social psychological rationale. This captures the idea of a competition over which group can form the strongest identity, so can apply to group choices which do not impinge upon bargaining power. As in the bargaining rationale, dove selection can be predicted during conflict, but hawk selection post-conflict. Finally, the expressive rationale is discussed which predicts that regardless of the underlying structure of the game (informational, bargaining, psychological) the large group nature of decision-making by making individual decision makers non-decisive in determining the outcome of elections may cause them to make choices based primarily on emotions which may be invariant with the mode of group interaction, be it conflictual or peaceful. Finally, the paper analyses the extent to which the theories can throw light on Northern Ireland electoral history over the last 25 years.

The Good, the Bad and the Populist: A Model of Political Agency with Emotional Voters

This paper attempts to extend existing models of political agency to an environment in which voting may be divided between informed and instrumental, informed and ‘expressive’ (Brennan and Lomasky (1993)) and uninformed due to ‘rational irrationality’ (Caplan (2007)). It constructs a model where politicians may be good, bad or populist. Populists are more willing than good politicians to pander to voters who may choose inferior policies in a large-group electoral setting because their vote is insignificant compared with those that voters would choose were their vote decisive in determining the electoral outcome. Bad politicians would ideally like to extract tax revenue for their own ends. Initially we assume the existence of only good and populist politicians. The paper investigates the incentives for good politicians to pool with or separate from populists and focuses on three key issues – (1) how far the majority of voter’s preferences are from those held by the better informed incumbent politician (2) the extent to which the population exhibits rational irrationality and expressiveness (jointly labelled as emotional) and (3) the cost involved in persuading uninformed voters to change their views in terms of composing messages and spreading them. This paper goes on to consider how the inclusion of bad politicians may affect the behaviour of good politicians and suggests that a small amount of potential corruption may be socially useful. It is also argued that where bad politicians have an incentive to mimic the behaviour of good and populist politicians, the latter types of politician may have an incentive to separate from bad politicians by investing in costly public education signals. The paper also discusses the implications of the model for whether fiscal restraints should be soft or hard.

The disadvantage of winning an election

This paper analyzes the problem that an incumbent faces during the legislature when deciding how to react to popular initiatives or policy proposals coming from different sources. We argue that this potential source of electoral disadvantage that the incumbent obtains after being elected can jeopardize the reelection possibilities of the incumbent. We analyze the decision of the incumbent when facing reelection and we characterize the conditions under which the advantages that the incumbent obtains can overcome the disadvantages. Finally, we use the results of this analysis to discuss some implications of the use of mechanisms of direct democracy like referenda and popular assemblies on electoral competition.

(Don’t) Make My Vote Count

Proponents of proportional electoral rules often argue that majority rule depresses turnout and may lower welfare due to the 'tyranny of the majority' problem. The present paper studies the impact of electoral rules on turnout and social welfare. We analyze a model of instrumental voting where citizens have private information over their individual cost of voting and over the alternative they prefer. The electoral rule used to select the winning alternative is a combination of majority rule and proportional rule. Results show that the above arguments against majority rule do not hold in this set up. Social welfare and turnout increase with the weight that the electoral rule gives to majority rule when the electorate is expected to be split, and they are independent of the electoral rule employed when the expected size of the minority group tends to zero. However, more proportional rules can increase turnout within the minority group. This effect is stronger the smaller the minority group. We then conclude that majority rule fosters overall turnout and increases social welfare, whereas proportional rule fosters the participation of minorities.

Mafia in the ballot box

We study the impact of organized crime on electoral competition. Assuming that the mafia is able to bring votes to the supported party in exchange of money, we show that (i) the strongest party is willing to pay the highest price to secure mafia services; (ii) the volume of electoral trade with the mafia increases with political competition and with the efficiency of the mafia. Studying in detail parliamentary elections in Sicily for the period 1946- 1992, we document the significant support given by the Sicilian Mafia to the Christian Democratic party, starting at least from the 1970s. This is consistent with our theoretical predictions, as political competition became much tighter during the 1970s and the Sicilian mafia experienced an extensive centralization process towards the end of the 1960s, which increased substantially its control of the territory. We also provide evidence that in exchange for its electoral support the mafia got economic advantages for its activities in the construction industry.

The Political Economy of Resource Rent Distribution

I model the link between political regime and level of diversification following a windfall of natural resource revenues. The explanatory variables I make use of are the political support functions embedded within each type of regime and the disparate levels of discretion, openness, transparency, and accountability of government. I show that a democratic government seeks to maximize the long-term consumption path of the representative consumer, in order to maximize its chances of re-election, while an authoritarian government, in the absence of any electoral mechanism of accountability, seeks to buy off and entrench a group of special interests loyal to the government and potent enough to ensure its short-term survival. Essentially the contrast in the approaches towards resource rent distribution comes down to a variation in political weights on aggregate welfare and rentierist special interests endogenized by distinct political support functions.

Inter-regional redistribution through infrastructure investment: tactical or programmatic?

In this paper we analyze the effects of both tactical and programmatic politics on the inter-regional allocation of infrastructure investment. We use a panel of data for the Spanish electoral districts during the period 1964-2004 to estimate an equation where investment depends both on economic and political variables. The results show that tactical politics do matter since, after controlling for economic traits, the districts with more ‘Political power’ still receive more investment. These districts are those where the incumbents’ Vote margin of victory/ defeat in the past election is low, where the Marginal seat price is low, where there is Partisan alignment between the executives at the central and regional layers of government, and where there are Pivotal regional parties which are influential in the formation of the central executive. However, the results also show that programmatic politics matter, since inter-regional redistribution (measured as the elasticity of investment to per capita income) is shown to increase with the arrival of the Democracy and EU Funds, with Left governments, and to decrease the higher is the correlation between a measure of ‘Political power’ and per capita income.

Implantació d'un ERP a un hospital públic

Aquest projecte tracta de la implantació del mòdul de Gestió dels Recursos Humans de la tecnologia SAP. En concret s’estudia la versió relativa al Sector Públic que aquest Software ofereix. Per tal de realitzar el Projecte ens fixem en un ens públic determinat com és un Hospital tenint en compte totes les peculiaritats que aquests organismes presenten. Part essencial del Projecte es dedica a la gestió del correcte pagament de la Nòmina i la representació de l’Estructura Organitzativa. Es cobreixen també tots els aspectes que les legislacions vigents imposen en aquests àmbits.

Descentralización y estrategias organizativas: las relaciones especiales entre partidos de ámbito estatal (PAE) y partidos de ámbito no estatal (PANE) en España

El objetivo de este artículo es desarrollar un marco analítico que permita examinar y, eventualmente, clasificar qué son y cómo han evolucionado las relaciones especiales entre Partidos de Ámbito Estatal (PAEs) y Partidos de Ámbito No Estatal (PANEs) que acuerdan un marco estable de cooperación no sólo en el ámbito electoral sino también organizativo. Este marco analítico, basado en los conceptos de integración vertical y de autonomía, se aplicará al caso español para analizar las relaciones del Partido Socialista Obrero Español (PSOE) con el Partit dels Socialistes de Catalunya (PSC); el Partido Popular (PP) con Unión del Pueblo Navarro (UPN); e Izquierda Unida (IU) con Iniciativa per Catalunya Verds (ICV).

La Ley de Igualdad 3/2007 y las elecciones al Congreso de los Diputados de 2004 y 2008

La desigual representación de sexos en el Congreso de los Diputados continúa siendo una realidad, a pesar de la aplicación de la Ley de Igualdad, que modifica la normativa electoral para impulsar la presencia de mujeres en la elite política. A través del presente artículo se explica metódicamente con datos empíricos porque la implementación de las cuotas femeninas por ley no ha modificado la composición del Parlamento español según sexo. Por un lado, se analiza la primera fase de reclutamiento de los diputados, es decir, las listas electorales. Por otro, se estudia el escenario parlamentario, en concreto la consolidación de esta elite política femenina.

Las Respuestas estratégicas de los partidos de ámbito estatal a los desafíos de la competición multinivel: la política de alianzas del PP y el PSOE en las Comunidades Autónomas de España (1980-2008)

Este trabajo se propone analizar las estrategias electorales y de coalición del PP y del PSOE en las distintas Comunidades Autónomas con el objetivo de demostrar que un mismo partido puede adoptar simultáneamente respuestas. Este comportamiento según el planteamiento que aquí se sostiene se debe que cada comunidad presenta una dinámica de la competencia diferenciada, sobre todo aquellas que cuentan con partidos de ámbito no estatal relevantes.

Impact of voting advice applications on voters's decision-making

So-called online Voting Advice Applications (VAAs) have become very popular all over Europe. Millions of voters are using them as an assistance to make up their minds for which party they should vote. Despite this popularity there are only very few studies about the impact of these tools on individual electoral choice. On the basis of the Swiss VAA smartvote we present some first findings about the question whether VAAs do have a direct impact on the actual vote of their users. In deed, we find strong evidence that Swiss voters were affected by smartvote. However, our findings are somewhat contrary to the results of previous studies from other countries. Furthermore, the quality of available data for such studies needs to be improved. Future studies should pay attention to both: the improvement of the available data, as well as the explanation of the large variance of findings between the specific European countries.