The EU as an Effective Trade Power? Strategic Choice of Judicial Candidates in the Context of the World Trade Organization

Drawing on the European Union (EU) foreign policy literature on effectiveness, this article studies how the European Union chooses judges to serve on the World Trade Organization’s key judicial institution: the Appellate Body. Conceptually, the article differentiates between effectiveness in representation and effectiveness in impact. The article shows how delegation to the European Commission has increased the strategic agenda-setting power for championing its preferred candidates. The article further compares European and US practice in nominating candidates. Overall, the article finds that effectiveness in representation has increased over time. In terms of effectiveness in impact, the article shows how the international environment conditions the EU’s influence. The article also exposes the difficulties of studying the effectiveness of EU external relations due to the peculiar decision-making processes dominant in judicial bodies.

Statistical Methods and the Meaning of Probabilities. A Philosopher Looks at Statistics

The talk starts out with a short introduction to the philosophy of probability. I highlight the need to interpret probabilities in the sciences and motivate objectivist accounts of probabilities. Very roughly, according to such accounts, ascriptions of probabilities have truth-conditions that are independent of personal interests and needs. But objectivist accounts are pointless if they do not provide an objectivist epistemology, i.e., if they do not determine well-defined methods to support or falsify claims about probabilities. In the rest of the talk I examine recent philosophical proposals for an objectivist methodology. Most of them take up ideas well-known from statistics. I nevertheless find some proposals incompatible with objectivist aspirations.

Agents, Trustees, and International Courts: Nomination and Appointment of Judicial Candidates in the WTO Appellate Body

Scholars have increasingly theorized, and debated, the decision by states to create and delegate authority to international courts, as well as the subsequent autonomy and behavior of those courts, with principal–agent and trusteeship models disagreeing on the nature and extent of states’ influence on international judges. This article formulates and tests a set of principal–agent hypotheses about the ways in which, and the conditions under which, member states are able use their powers of judicial nomination and appointment to influence the endogenous preferences of international judges. The empirical analysis surveys the record of all judicial appointments to the Appellate Body (AB) of the World Trade Organization over a 15-year period. We present a view of an AB appointment process that, far from representing a pure search for expertise, is deeply politicized and offers member-state principals opportunities to influence AB members ex ante and possibly ex post. We further demonstrate that the AB nomination process has become progressively more politicized over time as member states, responding to earlier and controversial AB decisions, became far more concerned about judicial activism and more interested in the substantive opinions of AB candidates, systematically championing candidates whose views on key issues most closely approached their own, and opposing candidates perceived to be activist or biased against their substantive preferences. Although specific to the WTO, our theory and findings have implications for the judicial politics of a large variety of global and regional international courts and tribunals.

Limit theorems for nondegenerate U-statistics of continuous semimartingales

This paper presents the asymptotic theory for nondegenerate U-statistics of high frequency observations of continuous Itô semimartingales. We prove uniform convergence in probability and show a functional stable central limit theorem for the standardized version of the U-statistic. The limiting process in the central limit theorem turns out to be conditionally Gaussian with mean zero. Finally, we indicate potential statistical applications of our probabilistic results.

Tools & Techniques - Statistics: Propensity score techniques.

Propensity score (PS) techniques are useful if the number of potential confounding pretreatment variables is large and the number of analysed outcome events is rather small so that conventional multivariable adjustment is hardly feasible. Only pretreatment characteristics should be chosen to derive PS, and only when they are probably associated with outcome. A careful visual inspection of PS will help to identify areas of no or minimal overlap, which suggests residual confounding, and trimming of the data according to the distribution of PS will help to minimise residual confounding. Standardised differences in pretreatment characteristics provide a useful check of the success of the PS technique employed. As with conventional multivariable adjustment, PS techniques cannot account for confounding variables that are not or are only imperfectly measured, and no PS technique is a substitute for an adequately designed randomised trial.