A search theory of money and commerce with Neoclassical production

This paper advances a highly tractable model with search theoretic foundations for money and neoclassical growth. In the model, manufacturingand commerce are distinct and separate activities. In manufacturing,goods are efficiently produced combining capital and labor. In commerce,goods are exchanged in bilateral meetings. The model is applied to studythe effects of inßation on capital accumulation and welfare. With realisticparameters, inflation has large negative effects on welfare even though itraises capital and output. In contrast, with cash-in-advance, a deviceinformally motivated with bilateral trading, inflation depresses capitaland output and has a negligible effect on welfare.

Employment protection, international specialization and innovation

We develop a model to analyse the implications of firing costs on incentivesfor R&D and international specialization. The Key idea is paying the firingcost, the country with a rigid labor market will tend to produce relativelysecure goods, at a late stage of their product life cycle.Under international trade, an international product cycle emerges where,roughly, new goods are first produced in the low firing cost country willspecialize in 'secondary innovations', that is, improvements in existinggoods, while the low firing cost country will more specialize in 'primaryinnovation', that is, invention of new goods.

Effects of hatching asynchrony on sibling negotiation, begging, jostling for position and within-brood food allocation in the barn owl Tyto alba

When siblings differ markedly in their need for food, they may benefit from signalling to each other their willingness to contest the next indivisible food item delivered by the parents. This sib-sib communication system, referred to as 'sibling negotiation', may allow them to adjust optimally to investment in begging. Using barn owl (Two alba) broods. I assessed the role of within-brood age hierarchy on sibling negotiation, and in turn on jostling for position where parents predictably deliver food (i.e. nest-box entrance), begging and within-brood food allocation. More specifically, I examined three predictions derived from a game-theoretical model of sibling negotiation where a senior and a junior sibling compete for food resources (Roulin, 2002a, Johnstone and Roulin, 2003): (1) begging effort invested by the senior sibling should be less sensitive to the junior sibling's negotiation than vice versa; (2) the junior should invest less effort in sibling negotiation than its senior sibling but a similar amount of effort in begging; and (3) within-brood food allocation should be directly related to begging but only indirectly to sibling negotiation. Two-chick broods were created and vocalization in the absence (negotiation signals directed to siblings) and presence (begging signals directed to parents) of parents was recorded. In support of the first prediction, juniors begged at a low cadence after their senior sibling negotiated intensely, probably because negotiation reflects prospective investment in begging and hence willingness to compete. In contrast, the begging of senior siblings was not sensitive to their junior sibling's negotiation. In contrast to the second prediction, juniors negotiated and begged more intensely than their senior sibling apparently because they were hungrier rather than younger. In line with the third prediction, juniors monopolized food delivered by their parents when their senior sibling begged at a low level. The begging cadence of both the junior and senior sibling, the junior's negotiation cadence, the difference in age between the two nest-mates and jostling for position were not associated with the likelihood of monopolizing food. In conclusion, sibling negotiation appears to influence begging behaviour, which, in turn, affects within-brood food allocation. Juniors may negotiate to challenge their senior siblings, and thereby determine whether seniors are less hungry before deciding to beg for food. In contrast, seniors may negotiate to deter juniors from begging.

ORANGE You Interested In Pumpkins...., 2009

The most popular use of pumpkins may be for jack-o-lanterns and fall decorations but they have many more uses. When selecting a pumpkin for cooking, the best selection is a “pie pumpkin” or “sweet pumpkin.” These are smaller than the large jack-o-lantern pumpkins and the flesh is sweeter and less watery. You can substitute the jack-o-lantern variety with fairly good results. Pumpkin seeds can be used in tossed salads, casseroles, soups, and other baked goods, either ground or whole. Although roasted pumpkin seeds tend to be better-tasting, you'll receive higher nutritional value from the raw seeds. So decorate your place with a pumpkin and make something. This brochure produced by The Department of Agriculture and Land Stewardship.

Vocal sib-sib interactions: how siblings adjust signaling level to each other

Game theory states that iterative interactions between individuals are necessary to adjust behaviour optimally to one another. Although our understanding of the role of begging signals in the resolution of parent-offspring conflict over parental investment rests on game theory implying repeated interactions between family members, empiricists usually consider interactions at the exact moment when parents allocate food among the brood. Therefore, the mechanisms by which siblings adjust signalling level to one another remain unclear. We tackled this issue in the barn owl, Tyto alba. In the absence of parents, hungry nestlings signal vocally to siblings their intention to contest vigorously the next, indivisible, food item. Such behaviour deters siblings from competing and begging when parents return to the nest. In experimental two-chick broods, nestlings producing the longest calls in the absence of parents, a signal of hunger level, were more successful at monopolizing the food item at the first parental feeding visit of the night. Moreover, nestlings increased (versus decreased) call duration when their sibling produced longer (versus shorter) calls, and an individual was more likely to call again if its sibling began to vocalize before or just after it had ended its previous call. These results are in agreement with the hypothesis that siblings challenge each other vocally to reinforce the honesty of sib-sib communication and to resolve conflicts over which individual will have priority of access to the next delivered food item. Siblings challenge each other vocally to confirm that the level of signalling accurately reflects motivation.

Essays in general equilibrium asset pricing

ABSTRACT : Research in empirical asset pricing has pointed out several anomalies both in the cross section and time series of asset prices, as well as in investors' portfolio choice. This dissertation aims to discover the forces driving some of these "puzzling" asset pricing dynamics and portfolio decisions observed in the financial market. Through the dissertation I construct and study dynamic general equilibrium models of heterogeneous investors in the presence of frictions and evaluate quantitatively their implications for financial-market asset prices and portfolio choice. I also explore the potential roots of puzzles in international finance. Chapter 1 shows that, by introducing jointly endogenous no-default type of borrowing constraints and heterogeneous beliefs in a dynamic general-equilibrium economy, many empirical features of stock return volatility can be reproduced. While most of the research on stock return volatility is empirical, this paper provides a theoretical framework that is able to reproduce simultaneously the cross section and time series stylized facts concerning stock returns and their volatility. In contrast to the existing theoretical literature related to stock return volatility, I don't impose persistence or regimes in any of the exogenous state variables or in preferences. Volatility clustering, asymmetry in the stock return-volatility relationship, and pricing of multi-factor volatility components in the cross section all arise endogenously as a consequence of the feedback between the binding of no-default constraints and heterogeneous beliefs. Chapters 2 and 3 explore the implications of differences of opinion across investors in different countries for international asset pricing anomalies. Chapter 2 demonstrates that several international finance "puzzles" can be reproduced by a single risk factor which captures heterogeneous beliefs across international investors. These puzzles include: (i) home equity preference; (ii) the dependence of firm returns on local and foreign factors; (iii) the co-movement of returns and international capital flows; and (iv) abnormal returns around foreign firm cross-listing events in the local market. These are reproduced in a setup with symmetric information and in a perfectly integrated world with multiple countries and independent processes producing the same good. Chapter 3 shows that by extending this framework to multiple goods and correlated production processes; the "forward premium puzzle" arises naturally as a compensation for the heterogeneous expectations about the depreciation of the exchange rate held by international investors. Chapters 2 and 3 propose differences of opinion across international investors as the potential resolution of several international finance `puzzles'. In a globalized world where both capital and information flow freely across countries, this explanation seems more appealing than existing asymmetric information or segmented markets theories aiming to explain international finance puzzles.

Evaluating the effects of decentralization on educational outcomes in Spain

[cat] Diversos arguments derivats de la teoria del federalisme fiscal suggereixen que la descentralització pot portar a majors nivells d’eficiència en la provisió de béns i serveis publics. L’objectiu d’aquest estudi és contrastar aquesta hipòtesi mitjançant l’avaluació dels efectes de la descentralització sobre els resultats educatius a Espanya. Els resultats educatius es mesuren d’acord amb la taxa de supervivència, que es defineix com el nombre d’estudiants que es matricula en educació secundària no obligatòria en relació als alumnes matriculats a l’últim curs d’educació obligatòria durant l’any acadèmic anterior.

Cost-Based Models of Economic Growth

In this paper we highlight the importance of the operational costs in explaining economic growth and analyze how the industrial structure affects the growth rate of the economy. If there is monopolistic competition only in an intermediate goods sector, then production growth coincides with consumption growth. Moreover, the pattern of growth depends on the particular form of the operational cost. If the monopolistically competitive sector is the final goods sector, then per capita production is constant but per capita effective consumption or welfare grows. Finally, we modify again the industrial structure of the economy and show an economy with two different growth speeds, one for production and another for effective consumption. Thus, both the operational cost and the particular structure of the sector that produces the final goods determines ultimately the pattern of growth.

Vertical Syndication-Proof Competitive Prices in Multilateral Markets

[eng] A multi-sided Böhm-Bawerk assignment game (Tejada, to appear) is a model for a multilateral market with a finite number of perfectly complementary indivisible commodities owned by different sellers, and inflexible demand and support functions. We show that for each such market game there is a unique vector of competitive prices for the commodities that is vertical syndication-proof, in the sense that, at those prices, syndication of sellers each owning a different commodity is neither beneficial nor detrimental for the buyers. Since, moreover, the benefits obtained by the agents at those prices correspond to the nucleolus of the market game, we provide a syndication-based foundation for the nucleolus as an appropriate solution concept for market games. For different solution concepts a syndicate can be disadvantageous and there is no escape to Aumman’s paradox (Aumann, 1973). We further show that vertical syndicationproofness and horizontal syndication-proofness – in which sellers of the same commodity collude – are incompatible requirements under some mild assumptions. Our results build on a self-interesting link between multi-sided Böhm-Bawerk assignment games and bankruptcy games (O’Neill, 1982). We identify a particular subset of Böhm-Bawerk assignment games and we show that it is isomorphic to the whole class of bankruptcy games. This isomorphism enables us to show the uniqueness of the vector of vertical syndication-proof prices for the whole class of Böhm-Bawerk assignment market using well-known results of bankruptcy problems.

Evaluating the effects of decentralization on educational outcomes in Spain

[cat] Diversos arguments derivats de la teoria del federalisme fiscal suggereixen que la descentralització pot portar a majors nivells d’eficiència en la provisió de béns i serveis publics. L’objectiu d’aquest estudi és contrastar aquesta hipòtesi mitjançant l’avaluació dels efectes de la descentralització sobre els resultats educatius a Espanya. Els resultats educatius es mesuren d’acord amb la taxa de supervivència, que es defineix com el nombre d’estudiants que es matricula en educació secundària no obligatòria en relació als alumnes matriculats a l’últim curs d’educació obligatòria durant l’any acadèmic anterior.

Complements and substitutes in multilateral assignment markets

[cat] En aquest treball provo que, en mercats d’assignació amb més de dos costats, agents de diferents sectors poden no ser complementaris mentre que agents del mateix sector poden no ser substituts. Shapley (1962) va provar que això mai pot succeïr quan el mercat d’assignació només té dos costats. No obstant, demostro que existeixen condicions suficients que garanteixen la substitutabilitat i la complementarietat entre agents en aquests tipus de mercats. A més, provo que, quan els béns al mercat son homogenis, el resultat de Shapley (1962) es manté.

Discounting Arduousness

[cat] Hi ha una literatura creixent que considera desviacions del descompte exponencial estàndar. En aquest article combinem preferències temporalment inconsistents (descompte no constant) amb preferències recursives. Aquest formalisme l’apliquem a les propietats relatives a la demanda del que anomenem bens ardus. La justificació del descompte no estàndar proposat ve donada pel fet que la producció i el consum no són separables per a aquest tipus de bens. L’esforç implica que els individus descompten el consum d’aquests bens d’una manera especial, amb la presència de preferències esbiaixades i d’un ajustament recursiu dinàmic. D’aquesta manera, la voluntat de realitzar un esforç, caracteritzada per un factor de descompte, resulta endògena.

Union power, minimum wage legislation endogenous labor supplies and production

The objective of this work is to study the impact of the unions' bargaining power on production and wages. We present a model where a competitive final good is produced through two substitutable intermediate goods, one produced by unskilled labor and the other by skilled labor. Potential workers decide at their cost to become skilled or unskilled and, thus, labor supplies are determined endogenously. We find that the reallocation of the labor supplies due to changes in the unskilled (or skilled) unions¿ bargaining power may have a positive impact on the final goods production. At the same time, total labor earnings increase with the unskilled unions¿ bargaining power if the final goods production increases too. We also show that the minimum wage legislation has efects similar to an increase in the bargaining power of the unskilled unions.

Objetivo: cuantificar la reproducción

Se estudian en este trabajo algunas magnitudes relacionadas con el enfoque de la reproducción social. Ante todo se hace hincapié en tres ideas fundamentales, las nociones de: a) Salidas menos entradas; b) Salidas dividido por entradas; c) Subsistemas. A continuación se subrayan los obstáculos para la cuantificación directa de estos conceptos, y se repasan las vías sugeridas para sortear las dificultades (por medio de constructos teóricos propuestos por Leontief, von Neumann y Sraffa). Luego se examinan dos nuevos indicadores: la ¿tasaespecífica de excedente¿, que se refiere a los bienes autorreproducibles, y el ¿coeficiente neto de reproducción¿, que se predica de todos los bienes básicos. De pasada se apuntan algunas pistas para establecer indicadores del mismogénero en campos como la economía ecológica y la economía feminista. Por último, se anotan algunas conjeturas relacionadas con la dirección adecuada del cambio técnico