Cost of innovation in the pharmaceutical industry.

The research and development costs of 93 randomly selected new chemical entities (NCEs) were obtained from a survey of 12 U.S.-owned pharmaceutical firms. These data were used to estimate the pre-tax average cost of new drug development. The costs of abandoned NCEs were linked to the costs of NCEs that obtained marketing approval. For base case parameter values, the estimated out-of-pocket cost per approved NCE is $114 million (1987 dollars). Capitalizing out-of-pocket costs to the point of marketing approval at a 9% discount rate yielded an average cost estimate of $231 million (1987 dollars).

The cost of biopharmaceutical R&D: Is biotech different?

The costs of developing the types of new drugs that have been pursued by traditional pharmaceutical firms have been estimated in a number of studies. However, similar analyses have not been published on the costs of developing the types of molecules on which biotech firms have focused. This study represents a first attempt to get a sense for the magnitude of the R&D costs associated with the discovery and development of new therapeutic biopharmaceuticals (specifically, recombinant proteins and monoclonal antibodies [mAbs]). We utilize drug-specific data on cash outlays, development times, and success in obtaining regulatory marketing approval to estimate the average pre-tax R&D resource cost for biopharmaceuticals up to the point of initial US marketing approval (in year 2005 dollars). We found average out-of-pocket (cash outlay) cost estimates per approved biopharmaceutical of $198 million, $361 million, and $559 million for the preclinical period, the clinical period, and in total, respectively. Including the time costs associated with biopharmaceutical R&D, we found average capitalized cost estimates per approved biopharmaceutical of $615 million, $626 million, and $1241 million for the preclinical period, the clinical period, and in total, respectively. Adjusting previously published estimates of R&D costs for traditional pharmaceutical firms by using past growth rates for pharmaceutical company costs to correspond to the more recent period to which our biopharmaceutical data apply, we found that total out-of-pocket cost per approved biopharmaceutical was somewhat lower than for the pharmaceutical company data ($559 million vs $672 million). However, estimated total capitalized cost per approved new molecule was nearly the same for biopharmaceuticals as for the adjusted pharmaceutical company data ($1241 million versus $1318 million). The results should be viewed with some caution for now given a limited number of biopharmaceutical molecules with data on cash outlays, different therapeutic class distributions for biopharmaceuticals and for pharmaceutical company drugs, and uncertainty about whether recent growth rates in pharmaceutical company costs are different from immediate past growth rates. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Economics of new oncology drug development.

PURPOSE: Review existing studies and provide new results on the development, regulatory, and market aspects of new oncology drug development. METHODS: We utilized data from the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA), company surveys, and publicly available commercial business intelligence databases on new oncology drugs approved in the United States and on investigational oncology drugs to estimate average development and regulatory approval times, clinical approval success rates, first-in-class status, and global market diffusion. RESULTS: We found that approved new oncology drugs to have a disproportionately high share of FDA priority review ratings, of orphan drug designations at approval, and of drugs that were granted inclusion in at least one of the FDA's expedited access programs. US regulatory approval times were shorter, on average, for oncology drugs (0.5 years), but US clinical development times were longer on average (1.5 years). Clinical approval success rates were similar for oncology and other drugs, but proportionately more of the oncology failures reached expensive late-stage clinical testing before being abandoned. In relation to other drugs, new oncology drug approvals were more often first-in-class and diffused more widely across important international markets. CONCLUSION: The market success of oncology drugs has induced a substantial amount of investment in oncology drug development in the last decade or so. However, given the great need for further progress, the extent to which efforts to develop new oncology drugs will grow depends on future public-sector investment in basic research, developments in translational medicine, and regulatory reforms that advance drug-development science.

Entry and competition in generic biologics

Patents for several blockbuster biological products are expected to expire soon. The Food and Drug Administration is examining whether biologies can and should be treated like pharmaceuticals with regard to generics. In contrast with pharmaceuticals, which are manufactured through chemical synthesis, biologies are manufactured through fermentation, a process that is more variable and costly. Regulators might require extensive clinical testing of generic biologies to demonstrate equivalence to the branded product. The focus of the debate on generic biologies has been on legal and health concerns, but there are important economic implications. We combine a theoretical model of generic biologies with regression estimates from generic pharmaceuticals to estimate market entry and prices in the generic biologic market. We find that generic biologies will have high fixed costs from clinical testing and from manufacturing, so there will be less entry than would be expected for generic pharmaceuticals. With fewer generic competitors, generic biologies will be relatively close in price to branded biologies. Policy makers should be prudent in estimating financial benefits of generic biologies for consumers and payers. We also examine possible government strategies to promote generic competition. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Returns to R&D on new drug introductions in the 1980s.

This study finds that the mean IRR for 1980-84 U.S. new drug introductions is 11.1%, and the mean NPV is 22 million (1990 dollars). The distribution of returns is highly skewed. The results are robust to plausible changes in the baseline assumptions. Our work is also compared with a 1993 study by the OTA. Despite some important differences in assumptions, both studies imply that returns for the average NCE are within one percentage point of the industry's cost of capital. This is much less than what is typically observed in analyses based on accounting data.

The price of innovation: new estimates of drug development costs.

The research and development costs of 68 randomly selected new drugs were obtained from a survey of 10 pharmaceutical firms. These data were used to estimate the average pre-tax cost of new drug development. The costs of compounds abandoned during testing were linked to the costs of compounds that obtained marketing approval. The estimated average out-of-pocket cost per new drug is 403 million US dollars (2000 dollars). Capitalizing out-of-pocket costs to the point of marketing approval at a real discount rate of 11% yields a total pre-approval cost estimate of 802 million US dollars (2000 dollars). When compared to the results of an earlier study with a similar methodology, total capitalized costs were shown to have increased at an annual rate of 7.4% above general price inflation.

The distribution of sales revenues from pharmaceutical innovation.

OBJECTIVE: This report updates our earlier work on the returns to pharmaceutical research and development (R&D) in the US (1980 to 1984), which showed that the returns distributions are highly skewed. It evaluates a more recent cohort of new drug introductions in the US (1988 to 1992) and examines how the returns distribution is emerging for drugs with life cycles concentrated in the 1990s versus the 1980s. DESIGN AND SETTING: Methods were described in detail in our earlier reports. The current sample included 110 new drug entities (including 28 orphan drugs), and sales data were obtained for the period 1988 to 1998, which represented between 7 and 11 years of sales for the drugs included. 20 years was chosen as the expected market life for this cohort, and a 2-step procedure was used to project future sales for the drugs--during the period until patent expiry and then beyond patent expiry until the 20-year time-horizon was completed. Thus, the values in the first half of the life cycle are essentially based on realised sales, while those in the second half are projected using information on patent expiry and other inputs. MAIN OUTCOME MEASURES AND RESULTS: Peak annual sales for the top decile of drugs introduced between 1988 and 1992 in the US amounted to almost $US1.1 billion compared with peak sales of less than $US175 million (1992 values) for the mean compound. In particular, the top decile accounted for 56% of overall sales revenue. Although the sales distributions were skewed in both our earlier and current analysis, the top decile in the later time-period exhibited more rapid rates of growth after launch, a peak that was more than 50% greater in real terms than for the 1980 to 1984 cohort, and a faster rate of expected decline in sales after patent expiry. One factor contributing to the distribution of sales revenues becoming more skewed over time is the orphan drug phenomenon (i.e. most of the orphan drugs are concentrated at the bottom of the distribution). CONCLUSION: The distribution of sales revenues for new drug compounds is highly skewed in nature. In this regard, the top decile of new drugs accounts for more than half of the total sales generated by the 1988 to 1992 cohort analysed. Furthermore, the distribution of sales revenues for this cohort is more skewed than that of the 1980 to 1984 cohort we analysed in previous research.

Economic return of clinical trials performed under the pediatric exclusivity program.

CONTEXT: In 1997, Congress authorized the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to grant 6-month extensions of marketing rights through the Pediatric Exclusivity Program if industry sponsors complete FDA-requested pediatric trials. The program has been praised for creating incentives for studies in children and has been criticized as a "windfall" to the innovator drug industry. This critique has been a substantial part of congressional debate on the program, which is due to expire in 2007. OBJECTIVE: To quantify the economic return to industry for completing pediatric exclusivity trials. DESIGN AND SETTING: A cohort study of programs conducted for pediatric exclusivity. Nine drugs that were granted pediatric exclusivity were selected. From the final study reports submitted to the FDA (2002-2004), key elements of the clinical trial design and study operations were obtained, and the cost of performing each study was estimated and converted into estimates of after-tax cash outflows. Three-year market sales were obtained and converted into estimates of after-tax cash inflows based on 6 months of additional market protection. Net economic return (cash inflows minus outflows) and net return-to-costs ratio (net economic return divided by cash outflows) for each product were then calculated. MAIN OUTCOME MEASURES: Net economic return and net return-to-cost ratio. RESULTS: The indications studied reflect a broad representation of the program: asthma, tumors, attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder, hypertension, depression/generalized anxiety disorder, diabetes mellitus, gastroesophageal reflux, bacterial infection, and bone mineralization. The distribution of net economic return for 6 months of exclusivity varied substantially among products (net economic return ranged from -$8.9 million to $507.9 million and net return-to-cost ratio ranged from -0.68 to 73.63). CONCLUSIONS: The economic return for pediatric exclusivity is variable. As an incentive to complete much-needed clinical trials in children, pediatric exclusivity can generate lucrative returns or produce more modest returns on investment.

The quantity and quality of worldwide new drug introductions, 1982-2003.

We examined trends in the introduction of new chemical entities (NCEs) worldwide from 1982 through 2003. Although annual introductions of NCEs decreased over time, introductions of high-quality NCEs (that is, global and first-in-class NCEs) increased moderately. Both biotech and orphan products enjoyed tremendous growth, especially for cancer treatment. Country-level analyses for 1993-2003 indicate that U.S. firms overtook their European counterparts in innovative performance or the introduction of first-in-class, biotech, and orphan products. The United States also became the leading market for first launch.

Evolving brand-name and generic drug competition may warrant a revision of the Hatch-Waxman Act.

The evolution of pharmaceutical competition since Congress passed the Hatch-Waxman Act in 1984 raises questions about whether the act's intended balance of incentives for cost savings and continued innovation has been achieved. Generic drug usage and challenges to brand-name drugs' patents have increased markedly, resulting in greatly increased cost savings but also potentially reduced incentives for innovators. Congress should review whether Hatch-Waxman is achieving its intended purpose of balancing incentives for generics and innovation. It also should consider whether the law should be amended so that some of its provisions are brought more in line with recently enacted legislation governing approval of so-called biosimilars, or the corollary for biologics of generic competition for small-molecule drugs.

Survey of the potential environmental and health impacts in the immediate aftermath of the coal ash spill in Kingston, Tennessee.

An investigation of the potential environmental and health impacts in the immediate aftermath of one of the largest coal ash spills in U.S. history at the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) Kingston coal-burning power plant has revealed three major findings. First the surface release of coal ash with high levels of toxic elements (As = 75 mg/kg; Hg = 150 microg/kg) and radioactivity (226Ra + 228Ra = 8 pCi/g) to the environment has the potential to generate resuspended ambient fine particles (< 10 microm) containing these toxics into the atmosphere that may pose a health risk to local communities. Second, leaching of contaminants from the coal ash caused contamination of surface waters in areas of restricted water exchange, but only trace levels were found in the downstream Emory and Clinch Rivers due to river dilution. Third, the accumulation of Hg- and As-rich coal ash in river sediments has the potential to have an impact on the ecological system in the downstream rivers by fish poisoning and methylmercury formation in anaerobic river sediments.

Developing drugs for developing countries.

Infectious and parasitic diseases create enormous health burdens, but because most of the people suffering from these diseases are poor, little is invested in developing treatments. We propose that developers of treatments for neglected diseases receive a "priority review voucher." The voucher could save an average of one year of U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) review and be sold by the developer to the manufacturer of a blockbuster drug. In a well-functioning market, the voucher would speed access to highly valued treatments. Thus, the voucher could benefit consumers in both developing and developed countries at relatively low cost to the taxpayer.

R&D Costs and Returns to New Drug Development: A Review of the Evidence

© 2012 by Oxford University Press. All rights reserved.This article reviews the extensive literature on R&D costs and returns. The first section focuses on R&D costs and the various factors that have affected the trends in real R&D costs over time. The second section considers economic studies on the distribution of returns in pharmaceuticals for different cohorts of new drug introductions. It also reviews the use of these studies to analyze the impact of policy actions on R&D costs and returns. The final section concludes and discusses open questions for further research.

Mergers, Acquisitions, and Alliances

© 2012 by Oxford University Press. All rights reserved.This article considers the determinants and effects of M&As in the pharmaceutical industry, with a particular focus on innovation and R&D productivity. As is the case in other industries, mergers in the pharmaceutical field are driven by a variety of company motives and conditions. These include defensive responses to industry shocks as well as more proactive rationales, such as economies of scale and scope, access to new technologies, and expansion to new markets. It is important to take account of firms' characteristics and motivations in evaluating merger performance, rather than using a broad aggregate brushstroke. Research to date on pharmaceuticals suggests considerable variation in both motivation and outcomes. From an antitrust policy standpoint, the larger horizontal mergers in pharmaceuticals have run into few challenges from regulatory authorities in the United States and the European Union, given the option to spin off competing therapeutic products to other drug firms.