Comprehensive annual financial report of the Iowa Public Employees’ Retirement System for the Fiscal Year ended June 30, 2001

Report on the Iowa Public Employees’ Retirement System (IPERS) for the year ended June 30, 2001

Comprehensive annual financial report of the Iowa Public Employees’ Retirement System for the Fiscal Year ended June 30, 2002

Report on the Iowa Public Employees’ Retirement System (IPERS) for the year ended June 30, 2002

Comprehensive annual financial report of the Iowa Public Employees’ Retirement System for the Fiscal Year ended June 30, 2003

Report on the Iowa Public Employees’ Retirement System (IPERS) for the year ended June 30, 2003

Comprehensive annual financial report of the Iowa Public Employees’ Retirement System for the Fiscal Year ended June 30, 2004

Report on the Iowa Public Employees’ Retirement System (IPERS) for the year ended June 30, 2004

Comprehensive annual financial report of the Iowa Public Employees’ Retirement System for the Fiscal Year ended June 30, 2005

Report on the Iowa Public Employees’ Retirement System (IPERS) for the year ended June 30, 2005

Comprehensive annual financial report of the Iowa Public Employees’ Retirement System for the Fiscal Year ended June 30, 2006

Report on the Iowa Public Employees’ Retirement System (IPERS) for the year ended June 30, 2006

Comprehensive annual financial report of the Iowa Public Employees’ Retirement System for the Fiscal Year ended June 30, 2008

Report on the Iowa Public Employees’ Retirement System (IPERS) for the year ended June 30, 2008

Comprehensive annual financial report of the Iowa Public Employees’ Retirement System for the Fiscal Year ended June 30, 2011

Report on the Iowa Public Employees’ Retirement System (IPERS) for the year ended June 30, 2011

Comprehensive annual financial report of the Iowa Public Employees’ Retirement System for the Fiscal Year ended June 30, 2012

Report on the Iowa Public Employees’ Retirement System (IPERS) for the year ended June 30, 2012

Waste Authority of Jackson County (formerly known as the Jackson County Sanitary Disposal Agency) independent auditor's reports, basic financial statements, required supplementary information, schedule of findings, June 30, 2012

Audit report on the Waste Authority of Jackson County (formerly known as the Jackson County Sanitary Disposal Agency) for the year ended June 30, 2012

Ringgold County Early Childhood Iowa Area independent auditor's reports, basic financial statements, schedule of findings, June 30, 2012

Audit report on the Ringgold County Early Childhood Iowa Area for the year ended June 30, 2012

City of Villisca independent auditor's reports, basic financial statements, supplementary and other information, schedule of findings, June 30

Audit report on the City of Villisca, Iowa for the year ended June 30, 2012

Use of Incentive/Disincentive Contracting to Mitigate Work Zone Traffic Impacts, 2012

Incentive/disincentive clauses (I/D) are designed to award payments to contractors if they complete work ahead of schedule and to deduct payments if they exceed the completion time. A previously unanswered question is, “Did the costs of the actual work zone impacts that were avoided justify the incentives paid?” This report answers that question affirmatively based on an evaluation of 20 I/D projects in Missouri from 2008 to 2011. Road user costs (RUC) were used to quantify work zone impacts and included travel delays, vehicle operating costs, and crash costs. These were computed using work zone traffic conditions for partial-closure projects and detour volumes and routes for full-closure projects. Conditions during construction were compared to after construction. Crash costs were computed using Highway Safety Manual methodology. Safety Performance Functions produced annual crash frequencies that were translated into crash cost savings. In considering an average project, the percentage of RUC savings was around 13% of the total contract amount, or $444,389 of $3,464,620. The net RUC savings produced was around $7.2 million after subtracting the approximately $1.7 million paid in incentives. In other words, for every dollar paid in incentives, approximately 5.3 dollars of RUC savings resulted. I/D provisions were very successful in saving RUC for projects with full-closure, projects in urban areas, and emergency projects. Rural, non-emergency projects successfully saved RUC but not at the same level as other projects. The I/D contracts were also compared to all Missouri Department of Transportation contracts for the same time period. The results show that I/D projects had a higher on-time completion percentage and a higher number of bids per call than average projects. But I/D projects resulted in 4.52% higher deviation from programmed costs and possibly more changes made after the award. A survey of state transportation departments and contractors showed that both agreed to the same issues that affect the success of I/D contracts. Legal analysis suggests that liquidated damages is preferred to disincentives, since enforceability of disincentives may be an issue. Overall, in terms of work zone impact mitigation, I/D contracts are very effective at a relatively low cost.

Comprehensive annual financial report of the Iowa Public Employees’ Retirement System for the Fiscal Year ended June 30, 2010

Comprehensive annual financial report of the Iowa Public Employees’ Retirement System for the Fiscal Year ended June 30, 2010

Five essays on bankruptcy

Chapter 2 Bankruptcy Initiation In The New Era of Chapter 11 2.1 Abstract The bankruptcy act of 1978 placed corporate managers (as debtor in possession) in control of the bankruptcy process. Between 2000 and 2001 managers apparently lost this control to secured creditors. This study examines financial ratios of firms filing for bankruptcy between 1993 and 2004 and tests the hypothesis that the change from manager to creditor control created or exacerbated the managerial (and dominant creditor) incentive to delay bankruptcy filing. We find a clear deterioration in the financial conditions of firms filing after 2001. This is consistent with managers (or creditors who control them) delaying filing for bankruptcy. We also observe patterns of operating losses and liquidations that suggest adverse economic consequences from such delay. Chapter 3 Bankruptcy Resolution: Priority of Claims with the Secured Creditor in Control 3.1 Abstract We present new evidence on the violation of priority of claims in bankruptcy using a sample of 222 firms that tiled for Chapter 11 bankruptcy over the 1993-2004 period. Our study reveals a dramatic reduction in the violations of priority of claims compared to research on prior periods. These results are consistent with changes in both court practices and laws transferring power to the secured creditors over our sample period. We also find an increase in the time from the date of a bankruptcy filing to reaching plan confirmation where priority is not violated. Chapter 4 Bankruptcy Resolution: Speed, APR Violations and Delaware 4.1 Abstract We analyze speed of bankruptcy resolution on a sample of 294 US firms filing for bankruptcy in the 1993-2004 period. We find strong association between type of Chapter II filing and speed of bankruptcy resolution. We also find that violations to the absolute priority rule reduce the time from bankruptcy filing to plan confirmation. This is consistent with the hypothesis that creditors are willing to grant concessions in exchange for faster bankruptcy resolution. Furthermore, after controlling for the type of filing and violations to the absolute priority rule, we do not find any difference in the duration of the bankruptcy process for firms filing in Delaware, New York, or other bankruptcy districts. Chapter 5 Financial Distress and Corporate Control 5.1 Abstract We examine the replacement rates of directors and executives in 63 firms filing for bank ruptcy during the 1995-2002 period. We find that over 76% of directors and executives are replaced in the four year period from the year prior to the bankruptcy filing through three years after. These rates are higher than those found in prior research and is consistent with changes in bankruptcy procedures and practice (i.e. the increased secured creditors control over the process due to both DIP financing and changes in the Uniform Commercial Code) having a significant impact on the corporate governance of firms in financial distress. Chapter 6 Financial Statement Restatements: Decision to File for Bankruptcy 6.1 Abstract On a sample of 201 firms that restated their financial statements we analyze the process of regaining investor trust in a two year period after the restatement. We find that 20% of firms that restate their financial statements tile for bankruptcy or restructure out of court. Our results also indicate that the decisions to change auditor or management is correlated with a higher probability of failure. Increased media attention appears to partly explain the decision of firms to restructure their debt or tile for bankruptcy.