Competition for FDI and profit shifting: On the effects of subsidies and tax breaks

We investigate competition for FDI within a region when a foreign multinational rm can profitably exploit differences in statutory corporate tax rates by shifting taxable pro ts to lower-tax jurisdictions. In such framework we show that targeted tax competition may lead to higher welfare for the region as a whole than lump-sum subsidies when the difference in statutory corporate tax rates and/or their average is high enough. Tax competition is also preferable from an efficiency point of view (overall surplus) by changing the firm's investment decision when pro t shifting motivations induce the rm to locate in the (before tax) least pro table country.

Efficient Competition through Cheap Talk: Competing Auctions and Competitive Search without Ex Ante Price

We consider a frictional two-sided matching market in which one side uses public cheap talk announcements so as to attract the other side. We show that if the first-price auction is adopted as the trading protocol, then cheap talk can be perfectly informative, and the resulting market outcome is efficient, constrained only by search frictions. We also show that the performance of an alternative trading protocol in the cheap-talk environment depends on the level of price dispersion generated by the protocol: If a trading protocol compresses (spreads) the distribution of prices relative to the first-price auction, then an efficient fully revealing equilibrium always (never) exists. Our results identify the settings in which cheap talk can serve as an efficient competitive instrument, in the sense that the central insights from the literature on competing auctions and competitive search continue to hold unaltered even without ex ante price commitment.

Legal Uncertainty, Competition Law Enforcement Procedures and Optimal Penalties

In this paper we make three contributions to the literature on optimal Competition Law enforcement procedures. The first (which is of general interest beyond competition policy) is to clarify the concept of “legal uncertainty”, relating it to ideas in the literature on Law and Economics, but formalising the concept through various information structures which specify the probability that each firm attaches – at the time it takes an action – to the possibility of its being deemed anti-competitive were it to be investigated by a Competition Authority. We show that the existence of Type I and Type II decision errors by competition authorities is neither necessary nor sufficient for the existence of legal uncertainty, and that information structures with legal uncertainty can generate higher welfare than information structures with legal certainty – a result echoing a similar finding obtained in a completely different context and under different assumptions in earlier Law and Economics literature (Kaplow and Shavell, 1992). Our second contribution is to revisit and significantly generalise the analysis in our previous paper, Katsoulacos and Ulph (2009), involving a welfare comparison of Per Se and Effects- Based legal standards. In that analysis we considered just a single information structure under an Effects-Based standard and also penalties were exogenously fixed. Here we allow for (a) different information structures under an Effects-Based standard and (b) endogenous penalties. We obtain two main results: (i) considering all information structures a Per Se standard is never better than an Effects-Based standard; (ii) optimal penalties may be higher when there is legal uncertainty than when there is no legal uncertainty.

Bilateral oligopoly and quantity competition

Bilateral oligopoly is a strategic market game with two commodities, allowing strategic behavior on both sides of the market. When the number of buyers is large, such a game approximates a game of quantity competition played by sellers. We present examples which show that this is not typically a Cournot game. Rather, we introduce an alternative game of quantity competition (the market share game) and, appealing to results in the literature on contests, show that this yields the same equilibria as the many-buyer limit of bilateral oligopoly, under standard assumptions on costs and preferences. We also show that the market share and Cournot games have the same equilibria if and only if the price elasticity of the latter is one. These results lead to necessary and sufficient conditions for the Cournot game to be a good approximation to bilateral oligopoly with many buyers and to an ordering of total output when they are not satisfied.

Male dominance linked to size and age, but not to 'good genes' in brown trout (Salmo trutta).

BACKGROUND: Males that are successful in intra-sexual competition are often assumed to be of superior quality. In the mating system of most salmonid species, intensive dominance fights are common and the winners monopolise most mates and sire most offspring. We drew a random sample of mature male brown trout (Salmo trutta) from two wild populations and determined their dominance hierarchy or traits linked to dominance. The fish were then stripped and their sperm was used for in vitro fertilisations in two full-factorial breeding designs. We recorded embryo viability until hatching in both experiments, and juvenile survival during 20 months after release into a natural streamlet in the second experiment. Since offspring of brown trout get only genes from their fathers, we used offspring survival as a quality measure to test (i) whether males differ in their genetic quality, and if so, (ii) whether dominance or traits linked to dominance reveal 'good genes'. RESULTS: We found significant additive genetic variance on embryo survival, i.e. males differed in their genetic quality. Older, heavier and larger males were more successful in intra-sexual selection. However, neither dominance nor dominance indicators like body length, weight or age were significantly linked to genetic quality measured as embryo or juvenile survival. CONCLUSION: We found no evidence that females can improve their offspring's genetic viability by mating with large and dominant males. If there still were advantages of mating with dominant males, they may be linked to non-genetic benefits or to genetic advantages that are context dependent and therefore possibly not revealed under our experimental conditions - even if we found significant additive genetic variation for embryo viability under such conditions.

A stepwise protocol to coat aAPC beads prevents out-competition of anti-CD3 mAb and consequent experimental artefacts.

Artificial antigen-presenting cells (aAPC) are widely used for both clinical and basic research applications, as cell-based or bead-based scaffolds, combining immune synapse components of interest. Adequate and controlled preparation of aAPCs is crucial for subsequent immunoassays. We reveal that certain proteins such as activatory anti-CD3 antibody can be out-competed by other proteins (e.g. inhibitory receptor ligands such as PDL1:Fc) during the coating of aAPC beads, under the usually performed coating procedures. This may be misleading, as we found that decreased CD8 T cell activity was not due to inhibitory receptor triggering but rather because of unexpectedly low anti-CD3 antibody density on the beads upon co-incubation with inhibitory receptor ligands. We propose an optimized protocol, and emphasize the need to quality-control the coating of proteins on aAPC beads prior to their use in immunoassays.

Trade liberalization, competition and growth

Increasing evidence support the claim that international trade enhances innovation and productivity growth through an increase in competition. This paper develops a two-country endogenous growth model, with firm specific R&D and a continuum of oligopolistic sectors under Cournot competition to provide a theoretical support to this claim. Since countries are assumed to produce the same set of varieties, trade openness makes markets more competitive, reducing prices and increasing quantities. Under Cournot competition, trade is pro-competitive. Since firms undertake cost reducing innovations, the increase in production induced by a more competitive market push firms to innovate more. Consequently, a reduction on trade barriers enhances growth by reducing domestic firm's market power.

Interespecific competition between Peckia chrysostoma and Adiscochaeta ingens (Diptera: Sarcophagidae) larvae reared in laboratory

Groups of 10 and 20 first instar larvae of Peckia chrysostoma (Wiedemann, 1830) were combined in a proteic source media with groups of the same number of first instar larvae of Adiscochaeta ingens (Walker, 1849) under the environmental conditions of Rio de Janeiro, RJ, Brasil. P. chrysostoma and A. ingens obtained average competitive potentials of 94.0 ± 2.0% and 31.0 ± 5.0% respectively. In the second experiment, larvae of P. chrysostoma were introduced approximately 15 hr after the introduction of A. ingens larvae (whose majority had already passed to the second instar) in the media. The corresponding average competitive potential of P. chrysostoma (82.0 ± 2.0%) was decreased when compared to the first experiment, but still greater than that of A. ingens (64.5 ± 9.5%). The competitive potential of A. ingens, however, increased significatively, demonstrating the influence of its previous colonization in the media for achieving a higher viability. In both experiments the competitive potential of P. chrysostoma was greater and similar to observations cited in the literature. Control-groups of each species were observed, individually, for the comparison. The mean value obtained for P. chrysostoma was 94.0 ± 3.7% (0.0% [experiment 1] and only 12.8% [experiment 2] greater than the average competitive factor). For A. ingens the average was 86.0 ± 7.3% (64.0% [experiment 1] and 25.0% [experiment 2] greater than average competitive factor).

Manipulating keratinocyte stem cell proliferation and differentiation using RNA interference

ABSTRACT : The epidermis, the outermost compartment of the skin, is a stratified and squamous epithelium that constantly self-renews. Keratinocytes, which represent the main epidermal population, are responsible for its cohesion and barrier function. Epidermal renewal necessitates a fine equilibrium between keratinocyte proliferation and differentiation. The keratinocyte stem cell, located in the basal cell layer, is responsible for epidermal homeostasis and regeneration during the wound healing process. The transcription factor p63 structurally belongs to the p53 superfamily. It is expressed in the basal and supra-basal cell layers of stratified epithelia and is thought to be important for the renewal or the differentiation of keratinocyte stem cells (Yang et al., 1999; Mills et al., 1999). In order to better understand its function, we established an in vitro model of p63 deficient human keratinocyte stem cells using a shp63 mediated RNA interference. Knockdown of endogenous p63 induces downregulation of cell-adhesion genes as previously described (Carroll et al., 2006). Interestingly, the replating of attached p63-knockdown keratinocytes on a feeder layer results in a loss of attachment and proliferation. They are no longer clonogenic. However, if the same population are replated in a fibrin matrix, extended fibrinolysis is reported, a common process in wound healing, suggesting that p63 regulates the fibrinolytic pathway. This result was confirmed by Q-PCR and shows that the urokinase pathway, which mediates fibrinolysis, is upregulated. Altogether, these findings suggest a mechanism in which the fine tuning of p63 expression promotes attachment or release of the keratinocyte stem cell from the basement membrane by inducing genes of adhesion and/or of fibrinolysis. This mechanism may be important for epidermal self-renewal, differentiation as well as wound healing. Its misregulation may be partly responsible for the p63 knockout phenotype. The downregulation of p63 also induces a decrease in LEKTI expression. LEKTI (lymphoepithelial Kazal-type serine protease inhibitor) is a serine protease inhibitor encoded by the Spink5 gene. It is expressed and secreted in the uppermost differentiated layers of stratified epithelia and plays a role in the desquamation process. When this gene is disrupted, humans develop the Netherton syndrome (Chavanas et al., 2000b). It is a dermatosis characterized by hair dysplasias, ichtyosiform erythroderma and impairment in epidermal barrier function promoting inflammation similarly as in psoriasis with inflammatory infiltrate in excess. TNFα (tumor necrosis factor alpha) and EDA1 (ectodysplasin A1) are two transmembraneprecursors that belong to the TNF superfamily, which is involved in immune and inflammation regulation (Smahi et al., 2002). We suggest that the secreted serine protease inhibitor LEKTI plays a role in the regulation of TNFα and EDA1 precursor cleavage and absence of LEKTI induces excess of inflammation. To investigate this hypothesis, we induced downregulation of Spink5 expression in rat keratinocyte stem cells by using a shSpink5 mediated RNA interference approach. Interestingly, expression of TNFα and EDA1 is modified after knockdown of Spink5 by Q-PCR. Moreover, downregulation of Spink5 induces loss of cohesiveness between keratinocytes and colonies adopt a scattered phenotype. Altogether, these preliminary data suggest that downregulation of LEKTI may play a role in the inflammatory response in Netherton syndrome patients, by regulating TNFα expression.

Monopolistic competition and different wage setting systems

In this paper we match the static disequilibrium unemployment model without frictions in the labor market and monopolistic competition with an infinite horizon model of growth. We compare the wages set at the firm, sector and national (centralized) levels, their unemployment rates and growth of the economic variables, for the Cobb-Douglas production function, in order to see under wich conditions the inverse U hypothesis between unemployment and centralization of wage bargain is confirmed. We also analyze, in the three wage setting systems, the effect of an increase in the monopoly power on employment and growth.

Trade, firm selection, and innovation: the competition channel

The availability of rich firm-level data sets has recently led researchers to uncover new evidence on the effects of trade liberalization. First, trade openness forces the least productive firms to exit the market. Secondly, it induces surviving firms to increase their innovation efforts and thirdly, it increases the degree of product market competition. In this paper we propose a model aimed at providing a coherent interpretation of these findings. We introducing firm heterogeneity into an innovation-driven growth model, where incumbent firms operating in oligopolistic industries perform cost-reducing innovations. In this framework, trade liberalization leads to higher product market competition, lower markups and higher quantity produced. These changes in markups and quantities, in turn, promote innovation and productivity growth through a direct competition effect, based on the increase in the size of the market, and a selection effect, produced by the reallocation of resources towards more productive firms. Calibrated to match US aggregate and firm-level statistics, the model predicts that a 10 percent reduction in variable trade costs reduces markups by 1:15 percent, firm surviving probabilities by 1 percent, and induces an increase in productivity growth of about 13 percent. More than 90 percent of the trade-induced growth increase can be attributed to the selection effect.